Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (CBRE), pursuant to a 2004 listing agreement, sought a commission after the 2005 sale of 38 acres of land in Murrieta. Arbitration proceedings between CBRE and the seller, Jefferson 38, LLC resulted in a confirmed arbitral award in CBRE’s favor, but no monetary satisfaction for CBRE because Jefferson had no assets by the time of the arbitral award and judgment. The issue this case presented to the Court of Appeal centered on CBRE’s attempt to recover damages from Jefferson’s individual members. A jury trial resulted in a $354,000 judgment in favor of CBRE. Both defendants and CBRE appealed the judgment, citing alleged errors pertaining to jury instructions, the admissibility of evidence, juror misconduct, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. Upon review, the Court of Appeal rejected the parties’ contentions, except with regard to CBRE’s entitlement to attorney fees.View "CB Richard Ellis v. Terra Nostra Consultants" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605(e); conversion; breach of contract; wrongful attempted foreclosure; and trespass. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claims where, although the court recognized that HUD regulations are enforceable terms of the contract, plaintiff failed to put forward any evidence of damages caused by the purported breach of these contract terms or seek any cognizable relief; plaintiff's trespass claim failed because plaintiff was admittedly in default and any visits by Chase's agents to the property at issue were permitted; plaintiff's wrongful attempted foreclosure claim failed where Chase believed it was entitled to foreclose on the property at the time and plaintiff attributed the problems with Chase only to its inability to fully keep track of her payments and communicate her payment status to her; and plaintiff's RESPA claim failed where Chase's response to plaintiff's requests was adequate and there were no damages as a matter of law from an inadequate response. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all claims.View "Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s property was subject to a mortgage. Plaintiff discussed refinancing with a predecessor in interest to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as well as a mortgage broker and his firm, whom Plaintiff referred to as “agents” of Wells Fargo. Based on these discussions, Plaintiff began making improvements to increase the property’s appraised value. Ultimately, Plaintiff was unable to refinance her mortgage. Plaintiff brought suit against Wells Fargo, alleging, among other claims, a violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 397-A:2(VI) (count one) and promissory estoppel (count five). The district court dismissed counts one and five of Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding both claims were inadequately pleaded. Plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that although she could not claim a private right of action under section 397-A:2(VI), she did state a claim for common law fraud. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed any state law fraud claim that Plaintiff belatedly attempted to advance and correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim.View "Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant, a law firm, contracted with Plaintiff for Plaintiff to provide title insurance on two mortgages that Defendant took as security from a client indebted to Defendant. Upon foreclosure of liens that were superior to those of Defendant, Defendant sought coverage from Plaintiff under the insurance policies, which seemingly provided coverage for priority liens. Defendant requested indemnification, and Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, arguing that coverage for priority liens was not intended by either party. A federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that because Defendant was aware of the prior mortgages, it could not expect to receive coverage it did not bargain for. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff had conclusively shown that Defendant was aware that its bargain with the client for security of its debt would result in junior mortgages, and the insurance policies clearly excluded such encumbrances from coverage.View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lane Powell PC" on Justia Law

The Developer converted a vacant building into a residential condominium by gutting and refitting it. The Developer purchased Commercial Lines Policies covering bodily injury and property damage from Nautilus, covering periods from June 1998 through June 2000. The policies define occurrence as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” but do not define accident. The policies exclude damage to “that particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations;” eliminate coverage for damage to “that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it;” and contain an endorsement entitled “Exclusion—Products-Completed Operations Hazard.’ Construction was completed in 2000; the Developer transferred control to a board of owners. By May 2000, one homeowner was aware of water damage. In 2005, the Board hired a consulting firm, which found that the exterior brick walls were not fully waterproofed and concluded that the deterioration had likely developed over many years, even prior to the condominium conversion, but that the present water penetration was the result of inadequate restoration of the walls. The Board sued the Developer. Nautilus denied coverage and obtained a declaratory judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reviewing the policy and finding that the shoddy workmanship, of which the board complained, was not covered by the policies; that Nautilus did not unduly delay pursuing its declaratory suit; and that the alleged damage to residents’ personal property occurred after the portions of the building were excluded from coverage.View "Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Dirs. of Regal Lofts Condo Ass'n" on Justia Law

John and Lori Finstad owned 80 acres of a section of land in Ransom County and leased 240 adjacent acres in the same section from Willis and Doris Olson. The Ranson-Sargent Water Users District was considering this tract of land as a potential site to drill water wells. In 1997, the Finstads and the Olsons granted to the District options to purchase the land. The options also allowed the Finstads and the Olsons to lease back the property for five years, after which they had a nonassignable right of first refusal to lease back the property for an additional five years. The Finstads appealed from a judgment awarding them $53,000.99 in damages and interest in their action against the District for breach of the lease-back provisions of an option agreement between the parties. The District cross-appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the economic duress doctrine relieved the Finstads of their obligations under a subsequent agreement and release they had entered into with the District. Because the agreement and release is valid and enforceable, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc." on Justia Law

Buyers agreed to buy a condominium from Seller pursuant to a purchase agreement. Buyers demanded that Seller fix a minor electrical problem as a condition of purchase, which led to this protracted litigation. In the first appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Buyers breached the contract with their unreasonable demand and remanded for the trial court to determine damages. The trial court awarded Seller $93,972 in damages. Seller appealed, arguing that she reasonably mitigated her damages and that the trial court erred in calculating damages. Buyers cross-appealed. The court of appeals reversed and awarded only $117 in damages, concluding that Seller could have avoided all damages except a $117 repair bill if she had responded to Buyers’ demand to fix the electrical problem, thus preserving the agreement. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion (1) by finding that Seller could have mitigated her damages by selling her condo in 2007 rather than waiting until 2011; and (2) in refusing to find that Seller’s duty to mitigate required yielding to the Buyers’ breach. View "Fischer v. Heymann" on Justia Law

Meadow Brook owned land that it developed into lots with covenants, conditions, and restrictions. Meadow Brook then decided to develop an undeveloped tract as an independent subdivision. The existing homeowners, however, argued that the covenants granted them exclusive use of three roads that future homeowners would need to use to access the subdivision. A court concluded that the covenants did not reserve an easement over the three roads for use by future lot owners. First American Title Insurance Company and First American Title Company of Montana (collectively, First American), which had issued Meadow Brook a title insurance policy, subsequently denied Meadow Brook’s claim for coverage and refused to further defend against the homeowners’ counterclaims. Meadow Brook settled with the homeowners in the easement litigation and then sued First American for, inter alia, breach of contract and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to Meadow Brook as to the breach of contract claim, concluding First American had insured under the policy that the three roads would be open to public access. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Meadow Brook’s motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. View "Meadow Brook, LLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved efforts to create an Armenian Genocide Museum. Gerard Cafesjian, one of the project's principal founders and benefactors, and CFF first filed suit against the Assembly, alleging that the Assembly failed to reissue a $500,000 promissory note as required by a Grant Agreement, asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its disposition of appellants' claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Cafesjian and John Waters; the district court correctly determined that CFF was entitled to take the Grant Property in full because the Grants were fully funded at the time CFF exercised its reversionary rights; the court found no basis to disturb Cafesjian and Water's indemnification award; the court affirmed the district court's denial of appellants' post-trial motions for relief; and rejected the notion that the Assembly's lease in the Families USA building is invalid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Armenian Assembly of America, et al. v. Cafesjian, et al." on Justia Law

Greg LeMond had an oral contract to purchase a five-acre lot (Lot 11) at the Yellowstone Mountain Club from the lot's owner, Yellowstone Development. Yellowstone Development allegedly breached its contract with LeMond by combining twenty-three acres of additional property with Lot 11 to create what became the Overlook Lots, comprising a total of twenty-eight acres. LeMond sued, claiming that Yellowstone Development breached its contract to convey Lot 11 and was under an equitable duty to convey the entirety of Overlook Lots to LeMond. In its final determination, the district court quieted title to the Overlook Lots in favor of LeMond. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court did not provide adequate insight into the equitable considerations involved in granting LeMond title to the Overlook Lots, as Yellowstone Development was obligated to transfer Lot 11 to LeMond and was unjustly enriched by failing to do so, but LeMond was entitled to enforce a constructive trust worth only the equitable value of the parties’ bargain. View "LeMond v. Yellowstone Dev., LLC" on Justia Law