Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Abraham and Betty Jean Morrow filed a request for a modification of their home loan, serviced by Bank of America, through the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. Bank of America denied the modification and scheduled a trustee’s sale of the property. The Morrows subsequently filed a complaint against Bank of America based on the bank’s alleged breach of an oral contract for modification of their loan. The district court granted summary judgment to Bank of America, concluding (1) the Morrows’ claims for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) were barred by the Statute of Frauds; and (2) the Morrows could not succeed on their claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Bank of America owed no duty to the Morrows. The Supreme Court reversed as to the negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of MCPA claims, holding that Bank of America owed a duty to the Morrows, genuine issues of material fact existed as to some claims, and the Statute of Frauds did not preclude the remainder of the Morrows’ claims. View "Morrow v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Farm Credit had a security interest in corn delivered to Cargill and filed suit against Cargill in replevin for the corn. The district court concluded that Farm Credit's security interest under the Food Security Act (FSA) of 1985, 7 U.S.C. 1631(e), entitled it to proceeds from the corn delivered to Cargill. The court concluded that Cargill did not dispute that Farm Credit complied with the FSA. To the extent that the U.C.C. governs priority disputes as a foundation for the FSA, Cargill's argument failed because U.C.C. 9-404 does not apply in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Farm Credit. View "Farm Credit Serv. v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased property with a mortgage from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. In October 2006, Plaintiff took out a loan from Countrywide to cure his breach of a divorce agreement. In December 2006, Plaintiff took out a home equity loan from Countrywide. Because Plaintiff was not able to make payments on his October 2006 loan, Countrywide foreclosed on his property. In May 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging claims of unjust enrichment, rescission/equitable relief, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and negligence. Countrywide removed the case to federal court. The district court resolved certain claims as a matter of law and, after a bench trial on the remaining claims, entered judgment in favor of Countrywide. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that no grounds exited for reversing any of the district court’s decisions. View "Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between property owners in a subdivision developed by Christopher and Jeffrey Houden. In 2007, twenty-three lot owners (“Defendants”) voted to record an amendment (“second amendment”) to the original covenants for the subdivision that prohibited division of the Houdens’ lot. The Houdens filed a complaint against Defendants seeking injunctive relief to declare the second amendment invalid. During the ensuing litigation, the lot owners passed another amendment (“third amendment”) purporting to revoke the second amendment. In 2010, the Houdens and all Defendants except Wayne Todd entered into a settlement agreement which set forth restated covenants expressly prohibiting amendment to prevent subdivision of the Houdens’ lot. The district court subsequently entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Houdens and against Todd, declaring the second and third amendments null and void and ordering that the Houdens were entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to a provision in the original covenants. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in the Houdens’ favor, as the restated covenants mooted the underlying merits of the case; and (2) affirmed the district court’s determination that the Houdens’ were entitled to attorney’s fees. View "Houden v. Todd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, including Lyle Sukup and Kristen Sukup, seeking payment for a boundary fence he built between his property and the property in which Defendants had an interest. Specifically, Defendant alleged that he had an agreement with the Sukups to build the fence between his property and the Sukups’ property and that the Sukups agreed to share equally in the cost. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Plaintiff's cause of action arose under Nebraska's "fence law" and that the county courts had exclusive jurisdiction over fence contribution cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint was not simply an action for contribution but was also a common-law contract action that was subject to the district court’s jurisdiction. View "Kotrous v. Zerbe" on Justia Law

To purchase her home, Kim King executed a promissory note to Virginia Housing Development Authority (“VHDA”) that was secured by a deed of trust. When King lost her full-time job, she arranged for a special forbearance agreement with VHDA. The VHDA eventually foreclosed on King’s loan, and King’s home was sold. King filed a complaint against VHDA and Evans & Bryant, PLC (“Evans”), as substitute trustee, alleging, among other things, that (1) certain federal regulations prevented VHDA from foreclosing until she was three months in arrears and VHDA had a face-to-face meeting with her, and (2) VHDA breached the deed of trust by foreclosing before it fulfilled these requirements and Evans breached its fiduciary duty by foreclosing when neither of the requirements had been met. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrers. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the trial court (1) erred in sustaining the demurrers regarding the failure to hold a face-to-face meeting prior to foreclosure; and (2) did not err in sustaining demurrers against King’s allegation of breach of contract regarding the forbearance agreement and against King's requests for declaratory judgment, rescission, and to quiet title. View "Squire v. Va. Housing Dev. Auth." on Justia Law

In 1940, property owners (Yanceys) and the predecessor to Norfolk Southern Railway Company (together, Norfolk) entered into an agreement (Agreement) whereby Norfolk agreed to construct and maintain a private grade grossing over its railroad tracks. In 1996, E.A. Breeden, Inc. acquired part of the Yancey estate and leased a house upon this track to Todd Ditton and his wife. Ditton was injured when his vehicle was struck by a Norfolk train at the crossing. Ditton filed an action against Norfolk, and the parties settled. In 2006, Norfolk filed an action against Breeden seeking to recover the settlement amount based on an indemnity clause in the Agreement. The circuit court ruled that Norfolk was not entitled to indemnification or contribution from Breeden because Ditton was a successor in interest under the terms of the Agreement and his use of the crossing was independent of Breeden. Subsequently, Norfolk removed the private crossing, and Breeden sought a permanent injunction requiring Norfolk to replace and maintain the crossing. The circuit court granted the request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding there was no material breach by Breeden and in granting the injunction. View "Norfolk S. Ry. v. E.A. Breeden, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Plaintiff inherited an interest in a real estate cooperative (“the Association”). Plaintiff became a member of the cooperative and executed a mutual ownership contract with the Association in which Plaintiff acquired a possessory interest in a dwelling (“unit”). A paragraph of the contract (“the Provide and Pay Provision”) required the association to "provide and pay for the property" except that Plaintiff shall make “minor interior repairs.” In 2011, Plaintiff began experiencing plumbing problems in her unit. After the Association refused to replace Plaintiff’s pipes, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the Provide and Pay Provision obligated the Association to replace the pipes. The circuit court concluded that the Provide and Pay Provision did not obligate the Association to replace the pipes and declined to award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) finding that Plaintiff failed to prove that the parties intended the Association to make the repairs Plaintiff sought; and (2) declining to award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees. View "Robinson-Huntley v. G.W. Carver Mut. Homes Ass'n" on Justia Law

Belmont, Inc., a meat and produce business, leased unfinished commercial real estate space from Tri-City Associates, LP, the owner and developer of a shopping center. The parties later filed claims against each other for breach of the lease. After a court trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Belmont on all claims, concluding that Tri-City materially breached the lease by failing to deliver the space in “broom clean” condition and failing to complete its allocated portion of the initiated construction, and that these failures excused Belmont from performance. Tri-City appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was excused by Belmont’s failure to give notice of the breach and an opportunity to cure under a notice-and-cure provision in the lease. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that conflicting authority and the circuit court’s failure to address the notice-and-cure provision prevented effective appellate review. Remanded to the circuit court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Tri-City Assocs., LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed a quiet title action against owners of adjacent lots, seeking a declaration that express easements granted in favor of the adjacent lots were invalid. The defendants filed counterclaims asserting that the express easements were valid. Plaintiffs submitted to Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") a claim for defense pursuant to a policy of title insurance issued by Commonwealth insuring Plaintiffs’ property, but Commonwealth denied the claim. In the quiet title action, the district court extinguished the express easements and denied the counterclaims but concluded that the defendants possessed implied easements. While the quiet title action was pending, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Commonwealth, seeking a determination that Commonwealth breached its duty under the policy by refusing to provide a defense to the counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in sustaining Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment because Commonwealth did not violate its contract with Plaintiffs by denying coverage or indemnification. View "Woodle v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law