Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action for damages against Alerus Financial Corporation, Alerus Financial, National Association ("Alerus Entities") and Jayson Menke, and an order denying leave to amend their complaint. Robert Olson, Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg ("Olsons") are siblings who owned farm real estate in Grand Forks County, North Dakota. Jayson Menke was a real estate agent with Botsford & Qualey Land Company of Grand Forks. On June 9, 2011, the Olsons signed a real estate listing agreement with Botsford Qualey and Menke that provided Botsford Qualey with the exclusive right to sell 200 acres of the Olsons' farmland. The listing agreement stated, "Seller is solely responsible for determining the appropriate listing price and has elected to offer the property by Conventional Sale." Menke provided the Olsons an analysis of their farmland, estimating the fair market value at $1,500 per acre. The Olsons increased the listing price to $1,700 per acre. The listing agreement shows an initially proposed sale price of $225,000, which the Olsons increased when they crossed out that amount and inserted $340,000 as the selling price. The Olsons' long-time tenant made a written offer to buy the land at the full asking price of $1,700 per acre. he Olsons and Menke subsequently learned the tenant was attempting to resell the farmland at a higher price than he agreed to pay the Olsons. On August 30, 2011, the tenant closed on his purchase from the Olsons. That same day, the tenant closed on the sale of the same farmland to a nearby farmer for $500 more per acre than he paid the Olsons. On December 15, 2011, Alerus Financial, N.A. acquired the stock of Botsford Qualey and Botsford Qualey filed notice of intent to dissolve. the Olsons sued "Alerus Financial Corporation (former parent company of Botsford & Qualey Land Company)." Alerus Financial Corporation answered. At about the same time, Botsford Qualey and Menke served a joint answer to the complaint even though they were not listed as defendants or served with the summons. The Olsons moved to amend the complaint to add Alerus Financial, N.A., Menke and Botsford Qualey as defendants. On April 4, 2014, the district court granted the Olsons leave to add Alerus Financial, N.A. and Menke as defendants but did not allow the Olsons to add Botsford Qualey. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying leave to amend the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims against Menke for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court affirmed the district court's order for summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims seeking to impose respondeat superior liability on the Alerus entities and to pierce the Alerus entities' corporate veil. View "Olson v. Alerus Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Rocio Trujillo's home loan was secured by a deed of trust encumbering the home. She defaulted, and Northwest Trustee Services Inc. (NWTS), the successor trustee, sent a notice of default and scheduled a trustee's sale of her property. NWTS had a beneficiary declaration from Wells Fargo Bank. RCW 61.24.030(7)(a) (part of the Deeds of Trust Act) required that a trustee not initiate such a nonjudicial foreclosure without "proof that the beneficiary [of the deed of trust] is the owner of any promissory note ... secured by the deed of trust," and must include "[a] declaration by the beneficiary made under the penalty of perjury stating that the beneficiary is the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation secured by the deed of trust shall be sufficient proof as required under this subsection." NTWS' declaration did not contain that specific statutory language. Instead, it stated under penalty of perjury, "Wells Fargo Bank, NA is the actual holder of the promissory note . . . or has requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce said [note]" (This declaration language differed from the language of RCW 61.24.030(7)(a), by adding the "or" alternative). Following the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "Lyons v. U.S. Bank National Ass 'n," (336 P.3d 1142 (2014)), the Court held in this case that a trustee could not rely on a beneficiary declaration containing such ambiguous alternative language. The Court found that Trujillo alleged facts sufficient to show that NWTS breached the DTA and also to show that that breach could support the elements of a Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim. However, her allegations did not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or criminal profiteering. The Court therefore reversed in part and remanded for trial. View "Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Shortly after plaintiff John Ross signed a contract to sell his home, he learned of contamination on his property as a result of a leak that previously existed in an underground oil storage tank located on a neighboring property. The prospective purchaser then cancelled the contract, and plaintiffs commenced suit against the current and former owners of the neighboring property, and their respective insurers. After the insurers remediated the contamination on the property, the lawsuit proceeded on the claims for damages against all defendants on theories of negligence, strict liability, private nuisance and trespass, as well as violations of the Spill Compensation and Control Act. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed, and whether plaintiffs could maintain claims as third-party beneficiaries against the insurers which provided coverage to the former owner of the neighboring property where the underground storage tank was located. The Court found no basis for the claims of private nuisance or trespass against the homeowner defendants because there was no proof of negligence, recklessness, intentional conduct, or the conduct of an abnormally dangerous activity, by these parties. Additionally, the Court declined to expand these causes of action to impose strict liability upon defendants. Plaintiffs could not proceed with a direct claim against the defendant insurers for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in the insurance contracts because they did not hold an assignment of rights from the named insured, and there was no evidence that the named insured or her insurers agreed to recognize plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries of the insurance contracts. View "Ross v. Lowitz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants counterclaimed for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and abuse of process. After a second jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for damages on Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants appealed from the denial of a variety of motions and an award of costs and attorney fees to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the filing of a post-judgment motion that tolls the time to appeal also tolls Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)’s twenty-day deadline to move for attorney fees; (2) the district court erred in finding that the $100,000 offset in Defendants’ favor from the first trial was extinguished by this Court’s previous order of reversal and remand; (3) the district court erred in finding that all Defendants, rather than just a real estate agency, were liable for attorney fees; and (4) the district court’s judgment is otherwise affirmed. View "Barbara Ann Hollier Trust v. Shack" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was a home inspection Don Hall performed of a home purchased by Gregory Hall. Gregory brought this action against Don, the seller of the home, and two real estate brokers, alleging that Defendants failed to disclose material defects in the property. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants with the exception of Don on the grounds that Gregory received a disclosure statement and had imputed knowledge of the defects. The district court entered default judgment against Don after determining that Don had not filed a sufficient answer to the complaint. After a writ of execution was issued, Don requested that the default judgment be set aside and later sought to claim exemptions. The district court denied the requests. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court striking Don’s motion to set aside default judgment, holding that, under the circumstances of this case and in the interests of justice, Don was entitled to relief from judgment. Remanded. View "Hall v. Hall" on Justia Law

Libby O’Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC (LOKC) filed a complaint for breach of contract against Sharon Blanchard and simultaneously filed a motion for approval of attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s property. Blanchard objected to LOKC’s motion but did include a supporting affidavit or other supporting documentation. The district court determined that Blanchard had waived her objection to the motion and considered the merits of the attachment motion without a hearing. The court then ordered attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s real and personal property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s findings in support of attachment and trustee process were supported by competent evidence in the motion record. View "Kingsley v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Voorhees Cattle Co. brought a foreclosure action against Dakota Feeding Co. (DFC). In answering the complaint, DFC brought a third party complaint against B and B Equipment, Inc. (B&B) for breach of contract. B&B counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and impossibility of performance. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for Voorhees on the foreclosure claim and for B&B on its counterclaims against DFC. DFC satisfied the judgment granted to Voorhees, leaving DFC and B&B as the remaining parties to this appeal. DFC appealed, arguing that evidence admitted at trial violated the attorney-client privilege and that the error prejudicially tainted the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the privileged evidence should not have been allowed, but the evidence did not prove, nor go to the heart of B&B’s claims; and (2) as a result, the erroneous admission of the privileged communications was not unfairly prejudicial to DFC as against B&B. View "Voorhees Cattle Co. v. Dakota Feeding Co." on Justia Law

Voorhees Cattle Co. brought a foreclosure action against Dakota Feeding Co. (DFC). In answering the complaint, DFC brought a third party complaint against B and B Equipment, Inc. (B&B) for breach of contract. B&B counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and impossibility of performance. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for Voorhees on the foreclosure claim and for B&B on its counterclaims against DFC. DFC satisfied the judgment granted to Voorhees, leaving DFC and B&B as the remaining parties to this appeal. DFC appealed, arguing that evidence admitted at trial violated the attorney-client privilege and that the error prejudicially tainted the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the privileged evidence should not have been allowed, but the evidence did not prove, nor go to the heart of B&B’s claims; and (2) as a result, the erroneous admission of the privileged communications was not unfairly prejudicial to DFC as against B&B. View "Voorhees Cattle Co. v. Dakota Feeding Co." on Justia Law

In 2006 and 2007, Respondent lent Petitioners, a group of real estate investors, over $170,000. When the real estate bubble burst the next year, Petitioners defaulted on the loans. Following more than a year of pretrial litigation, the district court entered default judgment against Petitioners because of their repeated failure to meet discovery deadlines. Petitioners appealed, arguing that their discovery failures did not merit the sanction of default and that the default judgment could not be entered on some claims because Respondent’s complaint had not alleged sufficient facts to support relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment. The court refused to consider the second set of arguments because they had not been preserved. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering default; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that it should not consider the issue of the complaint’s legal sufficiency because that issue had not been preserved. View "Fu v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

In 2012, a fire destroyed three buildings and related equipment that were owned by Jackson Hop, LLC, and were used to dry hops, to process and bale hops, and to store hop bales. The buildings were insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho for the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment, not to exceed the policy limit. Farm Bureau’s appraisers determined that the actual cash value of the buildings was $295,000 and the value of the equipment was $85,909. Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $380,909. Jackson Hop disagreed with that figure, and it hired its own appraiser, who concluded that the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment totaled $1,410,000. Farm Bureau retained another appraiser to review the report of Jackson Hop’s appraiser, and that appraiser concluded that the value of $1,410,000 was unrealistically high. Jackson Hop filed this action to recover the balance of what it contended was owing under the insurance policy, plus prejudgment interest. The parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration as provided in the policy. During that process, Jackson Hop presented additional opinions regarding the actual cash values, ranging from $800,000 to $1,167,000 for the buildings and $379,108 to $399,000 for the equipment. Farm Bureau’s experts revised their opinions upward, although only from $295,000 to $333,239 for the buildings and from $85,909 to $133,000 for the equipment. Before completion of the arbitration, Farm Bureau paid an additional sum of $85,330. Arbitrators determined that the actual cash value of the buildings and the equipment was $740,000 and $315,000, respectively, for a total of $1,055,000. Within seven days of the arbitrators’ decision, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $588,761, which was the amount of the arbitrators’ award less the prior payments. Jackson Hop filed a motion asking the district court to confirm the arbitrators’ award and to award Jackson Hop prejudgment interest, court costs, and attorney fees. Farm Bureau filed an objection to the request for court costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court awarded Jackson Hop attorney fees, but denied the request for court costs because the parties’ arbitration agreement stated that both parties would pay their own costs, and the court denied the request for prejudgment interest because the amount of damages was unliquidated and unascertainable by a mathematical process until the arbitrators’ award. Jackson Hop then appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson Hop v. Farm Bureau Insurance" on Justia Law