Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

After Sloan’s Cove, LLC executed a power of sale foreclosure on Armand Vachon’s property, Vachon and Oceanic Inn, Inc. (collectively, Oceanic) filed suit claiming that Sloan’s Cove improperly conducted the sale. The trial court (1) dismissed Oceanic’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (2) granted summary judgment against Oceanic on its claims for breach of contract and accounting and in favor of Sloan’s Cove on its counterclaim seeking a declaration that its foreclosure by sale of the Oceanic Inn property was legal and effective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as amended, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, but that the judgment must be amended to correct a clerical error. View "Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

The predecessors of Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a right-of-way agreement that created an express easement for the benefit of property owned by Plaintiff over a driveway located on the property owned by Defendants. Plaintiff commenced this action asserting a quiet title claim and a claim seeking an injunction restoring Plaintiff’s rights under the agreement. Defendants raised special defenses, asserting that Plaintiff’s property had been used for purposes other than “professional offices or residential uses” in violation of the terms of the agreement. The trial court entered judgment for Defendants, concluding that the easement was in effect until Plaintiff’s property was used by a mortgage brokerage, a home health-care agency, and an appliance delivery coordination service, which tenancies terminated the agreement. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the term “professional offices,” as used in the agreement, was plain an unambiguous; and (2) using the broader definition of the term “professional” indicates that the agreement did not preclude offices of the type that had been previously operated out of Plaintiff’s property. Remanded. View "NPC Offices, LLC v. Kowaleski" on Justia Law

This three-way dispute between Link Development, LLC (Link), BD Lending Trust (BD), and RFF Family Partnership LP (RFF) stemmed from an unauthorized conveyance of a mortgage to BD on commercial property in Massachusetts, then owned by Link and now owned by RFF. Previous litigation resulted in settlement agreements between Link and BD and between RFF and BD. In this appeal, RFF challenged (1) the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Link and against RFF on RFF’s claims regarding the validity of the BD mortgage on the grounds that RFF was judicially estopped from challenging the validity of the mortgage, and (2) the court’s decision to exclude attorneys’ fees from damages that BD owed RFF for breach of the settlement agreement between RFF and BD, and the court’s refusal to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of RFF on contract damages. The First Circuit (1) vacated the entry of summary judgment on RFF’s claims pertaining to the validity of the BD mortgage, holding that the district court abused its discretion in applying judicial estoppel; and (2) affirmed the district court’s decisions related to contract damages and the court’s award of attorneys’ fees under Chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws. View "RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Link Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan (as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased) sued the Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. ("TJF") for: (1) misrepresentation; (2) "slander, libel, and trade infringement"; (3) fraud; (4) wantonness; (5) suppression; (6) negligence; (7) breach of contract; and (8) tortious interference with business relations. TJF was a nonprofit organization that owned and curated a museum in Monticello, the historic home of Thomas Jefferson. In 1957, Juliet Cantrell lent TJF a "filing press" for display at Monticello. Cantrell passed away in 1976 and bequeathed the filing press, which was then on loan to TJF, and the dressing table to Emma. In 1977, Emma lent TJF the dressing table for use in the museum. Certain "loan agreements" were executed with TJF when the furniture was lent to TJF, and there were subsequent loan agreements executed by Emma, James, and Sara. The loan agreements were silent as to whether TJF had the authority to perform any "conservation" work on the furniture without first obtaining permission from plaintiffs. In November 2007, plaintiffs removed the furniture from Monticello and shipped it to Sotheby's in New York with the intent to sell it. Sotheby's "research consultants" questioned the authenticity of the dressing table, and determined that the filing press was not in sufficiently original condition to be offered for bid. Sotheby's declined to place either piece of furniture for sale at auction; according to plaintiffs, Sotheby's found that the value of the dressing table had been "destroyed" and that the filing press then had a market value of $20,000 to $30,000, whereas "its fair market value would be around $4 million" had TFJ not performed conversation work on it. Only the claims (6), (7), and (8) above were presented to the jury; the remaining claims were disposed of before the case went to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of TJF on all three counts, and the trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, in pertinent part, that TJF did not disclose that it had insurance and that, therefore, "the venire was not properly qualified as to insurance." The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion. TJF appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, and affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted TJF's motion for a JML on the plaintiffs' suppression claim. View "Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Lloyd Anastasi loaned $2.4 million to a third party in exchange for a mortgage on a property supposedly owned by that third party. Fidelity Insurance Company insured that the third party had good title, but the warranty deed purporting to give title to the third party was forged. Anastasi was sued by the owners of the property, and Fidelity accepted tender of the claim under a reservation of rights. Anastasi later filed a bad faith and breach of contract claim against Fidelity, alleging that the lawsuit was used by Fidelity to delay paying him under the title insurance policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Fidelity. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded in part and vacated in part. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ICA’s judgment insofar as it remanded to the circuit court an order allowing Fidelity to withhold certain documents that Anastasi requested during discovery under the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine; and (2) vacated the ICA’s judgment insofar it it concluded that Anastasi failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that Fidelity acted in bad faith. View "Anastasi v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This was the third of three lawsuits arising from the development of condominiums at Lakeside Village on Hauser Lake in Lewis and Clark County. Cherrad, LLC (Cherrad) was the project’s developer and Mountain West Bank (Bank) was its lender. Craig Kinnaman was the general contractor on the project but died in 2007. In this third suit, the estate of Kinnaman (the Estate) brought eight claims against the Bank. The Bank moved for summary judgment on all the Estate’s claims on the grounds that the claims were barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule or the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion (1) in granting the Bank’s motion to change venue; (2) in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all claims; (3) by taking judicial notice of the record in previous actions; and (4) by denying the Estate’s motion for relief from judgment under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). View "Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Sophie Danforth entered into a purchase and sales agreement (PSA) with Timothy and Rebecca More, pursuant to which Danforth agreed to sell, and the Mores agreed to purchase, certain real estate. The PSA provided that $30,000 would be paid as a deposit at the time the PSA was executed. The Mores failed to appear at the scheduled closing. Thereafter, Danforth filed an amended complaint alleging breach of contract, requesting that she be allowed to retain the Mores’ deposit, and seeking declaratory relief, asking the court to construe the terms of the PSA and to order the escrow agent to disburse the deposit to Danforth. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Danforth, concluding that Danforth was entitled to retain the deposit. The court further denied Danforth’s motion for attorney’s fees but awarded prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of Danforth, the award of prejudgment interest to Danforth, and the denial of attorneys’ fees. View "Danforth v. More" on Justia Law

Mind & Motion entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The REPC required Celtic Bank to record plats by a certain date for the first phase of development of condominiums on the land and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank sufficient time to record. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but declined to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mind & Motion, ruling that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the recording provision is a covenant, not a condition; and (2) there is no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp." on Justia Law

On March 28, 2014, real party in interest PCH Enterprises, Inc. sued defendants Sallie Cribley-Cole and Anna Gonzalez for breach of contract, specific performance, and declaratory relief. It alleged defendants failed to perform on a written agreement to sell a certain parcel of real property to PCH. PCH recorded a lis pendens on the same day it filed the complaint. No proof of service accompanied the lis pendens. Petitioner Rey Sanchez Investments sought to intervene, claiming it was the true owner of the property pursuant to a grant deed recorded April 2, 2014. Petitioner moved to expunge the lis pendens on grounds that there were technical defects in the service. PCH offered a proof of service that the lis pendens was personally served on Cribley-Cole in November 2014. The trial court denied the motion to expunge. On appeal, petitioner argued the lis pendens was completely void and subject to expungement because service was improper. The Court of Appeal agreed service was improper and reversed the trial court's judgment by way of a writ of mandate. View "Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Cherri Porter’s beachfront vacation home was completely destroyed during Hurricane Katrina. Porter claimed the destruction was the result of a barge, owned by Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.–Biloxi, breaking free from its moorings and alliding with her home. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy excluded from coverage damage caused by water or windstorm, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company denied Porter’s claim. Porter filed suit against the insurance agent who maintained the policy, Max Mullins, against State Farm, and against Grand Casino. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Porter filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming genuine issues of fact existed as to each defendant, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted her petition. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy unambiguously excluded from coverage loss that would not have occurred absent water damage, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Porter’s bad-faith denial of coverage claim against State Farm. Additionally, Porter failed to produce sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of fact as to whether Grand Casino breached its duty to take reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable injury. The Court therefore affirmed the decisions of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals as to all issues. View "Porter v. Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.- Biloxi" on Justia Law