Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This was the third of three lawsuits arising from the development of condominiums at Lakeside Village on Hauser Lake in Lewis and Clark County. Cherrad, LLC (Cherrad) was the project’s developer and Mountain West Bank (Bank) was its lender. Craig Kinnaman was the general contractor on the project but died in 2007. In this third suit, the estate of Kinnaman (the Estate) brought eight claims against the Bank. The Bank moved for summary judgment on all the Estate’s claims on the grounds that the claims were barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule or the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion (1) in granting the Bank’s motion to change venue; (2) in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all claims; (3) by taking judicial notice of the record in previous actions; and (4) by denying the Estate’s motion for relief from judgment under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). View "Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Sophie Danforth entered into a purchase and sales agreement (PSA) with Timothy and Rebecca More, pursuant to which Danforth agreed to sell, and the Mores agreed to purchase, certain real estate. The PSA provided that $30,000 would be paid as a deposit at the time the PSA was executed. The Mores failed to appear at the scheduled closing. Thereafter, Danforth filed an amended complaint alleging breach of contract, requesting that she be allowed to retain the Mores’ deposit, and seeking declaratory relief, asking the court to construe the terms of the PSA and to order the escrow agent to disburse the deposit to Danforth. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Danforth, concluding that Danforth was entitled to retain the deposit. The court further denied Danforth’s motion for attorney’s fees but awarded prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of Danforth, the award of prejudgment interest to Danforth, and the denial of attorneys’ fees. View "Danforth v. More" on Justia Law

Mind & Motion entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The REPC required Celtic Bank to record plats by a certain date for the first phase of development of condominiums on the land and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank sufficient time to record. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but declined to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mind & Motion, ruling that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the recording provision is a covenant, not a condition; and (2) there is no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp." on Justia Law

On March 28, 2014, real party in interest PCH Enterprises, Inc. sued defendants Sallie Cribley-Cole and Anna Gonzalez for breach of contract, specific performance, and declaratory relief. It alleged defendants failed to perform on a written agreement to sell a certain parcel of real property to PCH. PCH recorded a lis pendens on the same day it filed the complaint. No proof of service accompanied the lis pendens. Petitioner Rey Sanchez Investments sought to intervene, claiming it was the true owner of the property pursuant to a grant deed recorded April 2, 2014. Petitioner moved to expunge the lis pendens on grounds that there were technical defects in the service. PCH offered a proof of service that the lis pendens was personally served on Cribley-Cole in November 2014. The trial court denied the motion to expunge. On appeal, petitioner argued the lis pendens was completely void and subject to expungement because service was improper. The Court of Appeal agreed service was improper and reversed the trial court's judgment by way of a writ of mandate. View "Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Cherri Porter’s beachfront vacation home was completely destroyed during Hurricane Katrina. Porter claimed the destruction was the result of a barge, owned by Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.–Biloxi, breaking free from its moorings and alliding with her home. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy excluded from coverage damage caused by water or windstorm, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company denied Porter’s claim. Porter filed suit against the insurance agent who maintained the policy, Max Mullins, against State Farm, and against Grand Casino. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Porter filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming genuine issues of fact existed as to each defendant, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted her petition. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy unambiguously excluded from coverage loss that would not have occurred absent water damage, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Porter’s bad-faith denial of coverage claim against State Farm. Additionally, Porter failed to produce sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of fact as to whether Grand Casino breached its duty to take reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable injury. The Court therefore affirmed the decisions of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals as to all issues. View "Porter v. Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.- Biloxi" on Justia Law

Decedent entered into a contract for the sale of a parcel of real property to Buyer. Before entering into the contract, Decedent specifically devised the property to Plaintiff, a church, in his will. After Decedent died, a botanical garden and museum claimed entitlement to the proceeds from the sale of the property by the by the coexecutors of Decedent’s estate, due to a charitable pledge made by Decedent prior to his death. The trial court concluded that title to the property passed to Buyer at the signing of the contract under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that equitable conversion did not apply because Decedent died prior to the fulfillment or expiration of a mortgage contingency clause in the contract. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the mortgage contingency clause did not preclude the application of equitable conversion, and equitable title passed to Buyer at the execution of the contract. View "Southport Congregational Church-United Church of Christ v. Hadley" on Justia Law

Buyers bought a commercial property from Seller. Buyers subsequently filed a complaint against Seller challenging the adequacy of Seller’s disclosures. The circuit court dismissed the action without prejudice to allow the parties to engage in mediation. Because of a dispute between the parties regarding mediation, the mortgage payments were briefly interrupted. Seller subsequently brought a foreclosure action against Buyers. Seller then held a nonjudicial public foreclosure auction at which she purchased the property by submitting the highest bid. After a trial on Buyers’ claims for nondisclosure and misrepresentation, the circuit court ordered judgment in favor of Seller. The court also ordered judgment in favor of Seller and against Buyers on Seller’s counterclaims for breach of the note and mortgage and ejectment. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) Seller’s failure to disclose certain facts regarding the property’s sewer system was actionable under the nondisclosure and misrepresentation causes of action; and (2) Seller’s nonjudicial foreclosure of the property and ejectment of Buyers was wrongful. View "Santiago v. Tanaka" on Justia Law

Mind & Motion Utah Investments, LLC entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The prior owner and received approval to construct condominium units on the land but had not recorded the plats for the first phase of development. Mind & Motion agreed to purchase the property, but the REPC required the Bank to record the plats by a certain date and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank enough time to record. Under the REPC, if Mind & Motion extended the deadline, the deadline to complete the transaction would be automatically extended. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but refused to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Mind & Motion, concluding that the recording provision was unambiguously a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition, and there was no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion v. Celtic Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant/cross-appellee OXY USA Inc. appealed the grant of summary judgment to appellees/cross-appellants, a class of plaintiffs represented by David and Donna Schell, and Ron Oliver, on the question of whether their oil and gas leases required OXY to make "free gas" useable for domestic purposes. OXY also appealed: the district court’s certification of plaintiffs' class; the denial of a motion to decertify; and an order to quash the deposition of an absent class member. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's: denial of their motion for attorneys' fees; denial of their motion for litigation expenses; and denial of an incentive award. Notably, plaintiffs also moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. OXY opposed dismissal for mootness, but argued that if the Tenth Circuit found mootness, the Court should vacate the district court’s decision. Appellees/cross-appellants were approximately 2,200 surface owners of Kansas land burdened by oil and gas leases held or operated by OXY, executed separately from approximately 1906 to 2007. The leases contained a "free gas" clause. The clauses weren't identical, but all, in substance, purported to grant the lessor access to free gas for domestic use. All of the plaintiffs who have used free gas obtain their gas from a tap connected directly to a wellhead line. In addition, some members of the plaintiff class (including about half of the current users of free gas) received royalty payments from OXY based on the production of gas on their land. In August 2007, OXY sent letters warning free gas users that their gas may become unsafe to use, either because of high hydrogen sulfide content or low pressure at the wellhead. These letters urged the lessors to convert their houses to an alternative energy source. On August 31, 2007, leaseholders David Schell, Donna Schell, Howard Pickens, and Ron Oliver filed this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, seeking a permanent injunction, a declaratory judgment, and actual damages based on alleged breaches of mineral leases entered into with OXY for failure to supply free usable gas. After review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that that OXY’s sale of the oil and gas leases at issue here mooted its appeal; therefore, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the cross-appeal had not been mooted by this sale, and affirmed the district court’s judgment as to the denial of attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and an incentive award. View "Schell v. OXY USA" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation appealed a judgment of approximately $1.1 million plus interest, costs, and attorney fees of approximately $1.8 million in favor of plaintiff-respondent Hot Rods, LLC. This case involved an environmentally compromised property Hot Rods purchased from Northrop and the alleged damages stemming from environmental cleanup and related issues. The matter was tried by a referee pursuant to stipulation, and judgment was entered by the trial court, adopting the referee’s recommendations. Northrop alleged numerous errors. Upon review, the Court of Appeal found that there was language in the referee’s statement of decision indicating Northrop had negligently misrepresented certain facts, but did not find any damages were proximately caused, nor did the referee award any damages on that cause of action. The Court concluded the referee erred in admitting certain evidence, and that a finding of negligent misrepresentation was therefore improper, and not sufficiently supported by substantial evidence. The Court reversed the bulk of the damages award, and remanded for a reconsideration of which party was the prevailing party, and therefore entitled to attorney fees. View "Hot Rods v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp." on Justia Law