Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Sheri Lee hired Morgan Pierce, PLLP to represent her in a bankruptcy proceeding. Morgan Pierce subsequently filed notice of an attorney’s lien against five pieces of Lee’s real property for legal services rendered. Joseph Mulroy and Lee then entered into an agreement for two of the pieces of property against which Morgan Pierce’s lien was recorded. Thereafter, Mulroy filed a petition for interpleader and declaratory relief asking the district court to determine the validity of Morgan Pierce’s attorney’s lien. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mulroy and awarded his costs and fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in holding that the agreement entered into between Morgan Pierce and Lee did not create a lien by consent. View "Mulroy v. Morgan Pierce, PLLP" on Justia Law

623 Partners, LLC obtained a judgment against R. Larry Hunter and Larry Hunter Development Co. (collectively Larry). In its effort to satisfy the judgment, 623 Partners alleged that properly originally owned by Hunter Development was fraudulently transferred to Larry Todd Hunter, Larry’s son. The district court concluded that the properly was fraudulently transferred in order to avoid subjecting the property to 623 Partners’ writ of attachment and that Todd was liable to 623 Partners for the proceeds he received from the sale of a parcel of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed. On remand, Todd argued that he was entitled to an offset from the judgment amount based on the value of the improvements that he made to the property and that the property was exempt from execution or forced sale because he had claimed it as his homestead. The district court rejected Todd’s assertions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Todd was not entitled to an offset and correctly concluded that Todd did not qualify for a homestead exemption. View "623 Partners, LLC v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Developer intended to develop real property into single-family residential lots and secured financing through Bank. Insurer provided a surety bond to the Planning and Zoning Commission. Insurer executed three Bond Agreements as surety for Developer. Developer later defaulted in its loan. In lieu of foreclosure, Developer deed the property to Bank’s property management company. Bank transferred the property to another internal holding company. The Commission subsequently complied with Bank’s request for the Commission to call Developer’s bonds and place the proceeds in escrow for the purpose of reimbursing Bank for completion of the necessary infrastructure projects required by Developer’s approved plat. Developer filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the bonds were not callable and that payment on the bonds would result in Bank receiving an unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Developer was liable under the bond; and (2) Developer’s claims of error during discovery were unavailing. View "Furlong Development Co. v. Georgetown-Scott County Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Appellant Leo Gilbride contended that the district court erred by refusing his request for attorney’s fees. The underlying dispute arose out of a sale of real property between Respondent David Kosmann and Gilbride, which was executed with the alleged understanding that Gilbride would re-convey the property back to Kosmann at a later time. After purchasing the property, with down payment funds provided by Kosmann, Gilbride refused to re-convey the property to Kosmann. Accordingly, Kosmann filed a complaint against Gilbride alleging, inter alia, unjust enrichment and demanding specific performance of Gilbride’s promise to re-convey the property. The district court dismissed the specific enforcement claim, awarded Kosmann $30,990 based on his unjust enrichment claim, and denied both parties’ claims for attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error in the district court's order, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kosmann v. Gilbride" on Justia Law

NeYada, Inc., a Nevada corporation, appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment to Respondent Marian Hoke, and declaring a lease (the “Lease”) and an option to purchase (the “Option”) between the parties invalid and unenforceable. In November 2014, Hoke executed the Lease and Option with NeYada for the transfer of an interest in real property located in Canyon County, Idaho. A mere two months later, Hoke filed suit seeking to invalidate the Lease and the Option alleging, inter alia, that neither document complied with the statute of frauds. Both parties moved for summary judgment on that issue. The district court held that the Lease and Option (together, the “Contract”) were invalid and unenforceable because neither complied with the statute of frauds. Further, the district court held that the doctrine of part performance did not require the enforcement of the otherwise invalid Contract. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's holding, finding that the district court erred by failing to specifically enforce the Contract via the doctrine of part performance. At the time this lawsuit was initiated, NeYada’s performance was essentially complete. At oral argument, Hoke’s counsel admitted that NeYada took actual possession of the Property, and there was “probably nothing” more NeYada could have done. "Such an admission undercut Hoke’s argument against the application of the doctrine of part performance. All that remained to be done was to make monthly payments and to convey title." View "Hoke v. NeYada, Inc." on Justia Law

Stephen Shapiro was a licensed real estate broker and the principal of plaintiff Westside. Shapiro's friends, James and Eleanor Randall, agreed to have Shapiro represent them in a residential real estate purchase. However, the agreement was never put in writing. The Randalls later worked with their attorney, Richard Meaglia, to buy the $65 million dollar estate Shapiro had originally identified and negotiated offers and counteroffers on. Westside then filed suit against the Randalls for breach of an implied contract and filed suit against Meaglia for intentional interference with an implied contract. Westside sought compensatory damages of $925,000, the same amount as the broker’s fee Meaglia eventually collected. Westside subsequently dismissed its case against Meaglia, and the trial court entered a final judgment dismissing the first amended complaint (FAC) against all defendants. The court concluded that the trial court correctly ruled that the statute of frauds applies to Westside's claim; the FAC alleges no written agreement between Westside and the Randalls; and thus Westside’s claim for its commission is subject to—and barred by—the statute of frauds. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend its claim against the Randalls. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Westside Estate Agency v. Randall" on Justia Law

In 1971, the City of Quincy, as trustee of the Adams Temple and School Fund (Adams Fund), sought a decree authorizing it to execute a proposed fifty-year lease of a building and parking lot of the Adams Academy that it had negotiated with the Quincy Historical Society (Society). In 1972, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court decreed that the City was authorized to execute the proposed lease. In 2014, the successor trustee of the Adams Fund (Plaintiff) filed a complaint seeking rescission of the lease and money damages, arguing that the City violated its fiduciary duty to the Woodward School for Girls, Inc., the sole income beneficiary of the Adams Fund, by executing the lease. Defendants, the City and the Society, moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to judgment under res judicata. The single justice allowed Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff appealed, contending that he should not be precluded by res judicata from obtaining relief because neither he nor the Woodward School was a party to the 1972 equity proceeding. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded by res judicata from prevailing on his challenge to the execution of the lease. View "DeGiacomo v. City of Quincy" on Justia Law

Defendant Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC (“VPD”) appealed a Superior Court order granting injunctive relief and requiring an accounting in this suit by RMW Development Fund, II, LLC (“RMW”) stemming from VPD’s management of Veterans Parkway Apartments, LLC (the “Company”). The order at issue granted RMW an interlocutory injunction: (1) enjoining VPD from using funds in its possession or control to construct a second entrance to an apartment complex in Columbus (the “Property”), constructed and managed by the Company; (2) prohibiting VPD from using funds for any purpose other than the normal day-to-day expenses of the Property; and (3) requiring VPD to submit a monthly report of its expenses to the superior court, with copies to counsel for the parties. RMW filed suit against VPD alleging VPD’s breach of contract by its entering into an unauthorized management agreement and thereby paying an unauthorized management fee, and a claim for “promissory estoppel,” stemming from VPD’s alleged failure to use some of the Company’s funds for partial repayment of a development loan; RMW asked for VPD’s removal as manager of the Company and for the costs of litigation. Prior to the filing on the complaint, the Company had purchased a 60-foot strip of land for the purpose of creating a second entrance to the Property. At a hearing on the injunction, RMW argued that it could not undo any construction of the second entrance to the Property. VPD countered that RMW was, in reality, concerned about money being spent on the construction of the second entrance instead of being used to repay the loans made by RMW, and that any appropriate redress was monetary damages. Ultimately the injunction was granted and VPD appealed. The Supreme Court found after review of this matter that the trial court's injunction was not supported by the record, and that court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC v. RMW Development Fund II, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the interpretation a land description in an option contract between Landowners and an oil and gas company (Company). Landowners argued that the description excluded a 400-acre tract. Company argued that the description included the 400-acre tract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Company. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the option contract was ambiguous and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Landowners’ interpretation of the contract was the only reasonable interpretation, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in holding that the contract was ambiguous. Remanded. View "North Shore Energy, L.L.C. v. Harkins" on Justia Law

Kiva Lodge Condominium Owners' Association, Inc. ("Kiva Lodge") was an Alabama nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of administering and maintaining the Kiva Dunes Clubhouse and Condominium ("Kiva Dunes") located in Gulf Shores. In 2009, Kiva Lodge contracted with Hudak & Dawson Construction Co., Inc. ("Hudak") to be the general contractor for the remediation of deficiencies in Kiva Dunes buildings that were allowing water to enter the buildings. Hudak subcontracted the stucco and/or sealant portion of the work to Don Colvin d/b/a Colvin Plastering ("Colvin"). The Hanover Insurance Company ("Hanover"), as surety for Hudak, issued to Kiva Lodge a performance bond ensuring and/or securing the full performance of Hudak's contractual obligations. In September 2012, Kiva Lodge informed Hudak and Colvin of leaks and bubbling in the stucco exterior of the buildings at Kiva Dunes caused by water intrusion. Kiva Lodge alleged that Hudak and Colvin failed to determine and/or disclose the course of the problems and the proper scope of repairs necessary. It also alleged that Hanover breached the terms of its performance bond by failing to promptly remedy the default, complete the work within the scope of the contract in accordance with the terms and conditions, or arrange for payment of an alternative contractor to complete the work. Hanover filed a motion to dismiss Kiva Lodge's claims against Hanover on the ground that, under its performance bond, its claims were time-barred, falling outside of a two-year statute of limitations. In 2015, the circuit court heard arguments concerning Kiva Lodge's motion to compel arbitration, eventually granting the stay and ordering the parties to arbitration. The court also denied Hanover's motion to dismiss. Hudak, Colvin, and Hanover timely appealed the circuit court's order. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's order and affirmed. View "Hanover Insurance Co. v. Kiva Lodge Condominium Owners' Association, Inc." on Justia Law