Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellant, defendant, and cross-complainant Earl Greif sold 10 acres of raw vacant land (Property) in Rancho Mirage to plaintiff-respondent Yardley Protective Limited Partnership, a family real estate investment partnership. A few days after Earl signed the purchase agreement (Purchase Agreement), he concluded he had sold the Property for less than its fair market value and attempted to back out of the sale. The Yardley partnership sued Earl, Earl’s wife, Shirley Greif, and Gabriel Nicholas Limited Liability Company (collectively GNLLC) to enforce the Purchase Agreement. Greif filed a cross-complaint against the Yardley partnership and one of its limited partners, Solail Ahmad (Yardley), later adding as cross-defendants Yardley’s real estate brokers, Desert Gate Real Estate, Inc. dba Four Season Realty (Desert Gate) and Desert Gate broker, Eddie Sanin (collectively Sanin). The trial court dismissed Greif’s third amended cross-complaint (Cross-complaint) on the eve of trial for failing to state any cause of action as a matter of law. After a lengthy court trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Yardley and against Greif and GNLLC. Greif filed three separate appeals. Rejecting Grief and GNLLC's contentions raised in the appeals, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Greif v. Sanin" on Justia Law

The dispute underlying this appeal began with the failure of Camille Village, LLC, the owner of an apartment complex, to deposit additional money in escrow for repairs after it was demanded by Lenders Federal National Mortgage Association and Barings Multifamily Capital, LLC. The Lenders held Camille Village to be in default, lengthy settlement negotiations failed, and the amount demanded for repairs increased dramatically after additional inspections. After a trial, the chancery court concluded that Camille Village was in default and had failed to prove the Lenders had acted in bad faith. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Camille Village, LLC v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part the judgment entered in the Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) awarding attorney fees and expenses to Forney & Weygandt, Inc. (F&W) but vacated a portion of the judgment awarding F&W attorney fees and expenses related to subcontractor claims, holding that remand was required.Lewiston DMEP IX, LLC, et al. (collectively, GBT), a group of limited purpose entities and a commercial real estate developer, appealed the attorney fees and expenses award to F&W, a commercial general contractor, pursuant to Maine's prompt payment statute, Me. Rev. Stat. 10, 1111-1120. Specifically, GBT contended that the BCD erred in awarding attorney fees and expenses that were not incurred in direct pursuit of F&W's prompt payment claims, including those related to F&W's contract claims, GBT's counterclaims and affirmative defenses, and subcontractor claims against F&W. The Supreme Judicial Court largely affirmed the judgment but vacated the award of attorney fees and expenses related to the subcontractor claims, holding that the court abused its discretion when it did not articulate a basis for an award of fees that would be proper under the prompt payment statute and this Court's interpretative case law. View "Fortney & Weygandt, Inc. v. Lewiston DMEP IX, LLC" on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review. In the first appeal, Singing River MOB, LLC (MOB), argued that the leases between itself and Singing River Health System (SRHS) and the lease between Jackson County, Mississippi (County), and SRHS were valid and that the chancery court erred by finding the leases invalid under Mississippi’s “minutes rule.” In the second appeal, Jackson County and SRHS contended the chancery court erred by fashioning its own equitable relief as a result of the first ruling. MOB also raised its own objection as to the manner in which the equitable relief was fashioned. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the partial summary-judgment order as to the first appeal (No. 2019-IA-01630-SCT); however, the Court reversed and remanded that order as to the second appeal (No. 2019-IA-01653-SCT). View "Singing River MOB, LLC v. Jackson County" on Justia Law

William Greenwood was in the business of salvaging valuable materials from old buildings. Greenwood was insured by Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company through a policy sold by Dixie Specialty Insurance. Greenwood was later sued by adjoining building owners who complained he had damaged their property, and Mesa denied coverage based, in part, on a policy exclusion for demolition work. Greenwood later brought suit against his insurers alleging breach of contract and bad-faith denial of coverage. Greenwood averred that his business was actually “deconstruction” rather than demolition, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Estate of Greenwood v. Montpelier US Insurance Company, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that no contract to settle a debt was formed in this case, that the implied-revocation doctrine is not constrained to real-property transactions, and that the settlement offer was impliedly revoked when the offeror assigned the underlying judgment.At issue in this contract dispute was whether a purported offer to settle a debt for a reduced sum was accepted before it was revoked. The issue's resolution turned on the parameters of the doctrine of implied revocation adopted by the Supreme Court in Antwine v. Reed, 199 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1947). The trial court granted summary judgment against the offeree. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the implied-revocation doctrine is not limited to offers involving the sale of land; and (2) the settlement offer in this case was impliedly revoked when the offeror assigned the underlying judgment to a third party for collection and the assignee gave the offeree a copy of the assignment agreement before the offeree accepted the settlement offer. View "Angel v. Tauch" on Justia Law

Jeanne and Nevin Tergesen appealed a judgment dismissing their complaint and awarding Nelson Homes, Inc. damages for its breach of contract counterclaim. The Tergesens argued the district court erred in dismissing their rescission and breach of contract claims, and the court erroneously found the Tergesens breached the contract. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing the Tergesens’ claims or finding the Tergesens breached the contract, but the court did err in calculating the amount of prejudgment interest on Nelson Homes’ damages. View "Tergesen, et al. v. Nelson Homes" on Justia Law

Gavora, Inc., a real estate company, acquired an existing long-term lease with a purchase option for a municipality-owned property. Dry-cleaning businesses operating on the property contaminated the groundwater both prior to and during the real estate company’s involvement. The municipality knew about, but did not disclose, groundwater contamination at nearby sites when the real estate company ultimately purchased the property. A state agency later notified Gavora and the municipality of their potential responsibility for environmental remediation. Gavora sued the municipality in federal district court; the federal court determined that the parties were jointly and severally liable for the contamination, and apportioned remediation costs. Gavora also sued the municipality in state court for indemnity and further monetary damages, alleging that the municipality had misrepresented the property’s environmental status during purchase negotiations. The superior court ruled in the municipality’s favor, finding the municipality did not actively deceive Gavora; Gavora had reason to know of the contamination; and all physical harm occurred before the sale. Gavora challenged all three findings. Finding no error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Gavora, Inc. v. City of Fairbanks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty, holding that a trial was required as to certain claims.This case arose from a dispute surrounding the purchase of an oceanfront beach house by Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs later discovered significant structural damages to the house arising from past water intrusion Plaintiffs brought this complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The trial court reversed in part and remanded the case for a trial on the merits on certain claims, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' claims of negligence and fraud against Re/Max Community Brokers and Robert Carroll; and (2) erred by reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Rudd & Associates, Inc., Brooke Rudd-Gaglie, and James Goodman as to Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary claim. View "Cummings v. Carroll" on Justia Law

BGC secured a $3.1 million mortgage loan from Romspen for the Arlington commercial property. Following a Foreclosure Judgment but before the sale of the property, the parties negotiated an agreement. Romspen agreed to forbear from exercising remedies for 60 days and to reinstate the loan and extend the maturity date for two years. BGC agreed to make a $1.6 million payment on the loan. Meanwhile, BGC learned that Romspen had filed a lien against BGC’s 1907 property. BGC had planned to refinance the 1907 Property to make the payment on the Arlington property required by the Forbearance Agreement. Romspen agreed to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to remove the lien. When BGC failed to provide proof of a refinancing plan for the Arlington Property, Romspen refused to remove the lien on the 1907 Property.After the foreclosure sale of the Arlington Property, BGC sought to file a counterclaim alleging that Romspen had breached the Forbearance Agreement. Romspen sought an order confirming the sale of the property. The Seventh Circuit confirmed the denial of BGC’s motion and the sale of the Arlington Property. Romspen did not breach the Forbearance Agreement because it made “commercially reasonable efforts” to remove the lien on the 1907 Property. Romspen was on solid ground in requesting some concrete proof of BGC's refinancing efforts before agreeing to remove the lien. View "Romspen Mortgage L.P. v. BGC Holdings LLC - Arlington Place One" on Justia Law