Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The landlord is a four-member LLC with a single asset--a building in downtown Napa. The tenant, Stone Brewing, a large beer brewing and retail corporation, operates a brewpub in the building. Stone Brewing did not pay rent for several months during the pandemic. The landlord sued for unlawful detainer. Stone argued it was excused from paying rent because COVID-19 regulations and business interruptions triggered a force majeure provision in its lease.The trial court granted the landlord summary judgment, finding that the force majeure provision only excused performance if the claiming party was unable to meet its obligations due to factors outside its control; the tenant admitted during discovery it had the financial resources to pay rent during the period of the COVID-19 regulations but simply refused to do so. The court of appeal affirmed. The force majeure provision does not apply where the tenant had the ability to meet its contractual obligations but chooses not to perform due to financial constraints. The plain meaning of the force majeure provision does not support an interpretation that ties a party’s obligation to pay rent to its profitability or revenue stream instead of a delay or interruption caused by the force majeure event itself. View "West Pueblo Partners, LLC v. Stone Brewing Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the interpretation of a restrictive covenant was a question of fact for a jury, holding that because the evidence did not conclusively establish one covenanting party's intent in drafting the document at issue, the interpretation of the covenant was a question of fact for a jury.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the interpretation of an ambiguous restrictive land use covenant is a question for a jury unless extrinsic evidence proffered by the parties is conclusive as to the covenanting parties' intent; (2) a jury should strictly construe an ambiguity in a restrictive covenant against the land use restriction only if the jury is unable to resolve by a preponderance of the evidence the ambiguity from the extrinsic evidence; and (3) the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the extrinsic evidence in this case did not conclusively resolve the ambiguity in the restrictive covenant. View "Windcliff Ass'n v. Breyfogle" on Justia Law

In this case, a purchase agreement provided provided that the parties were obligated to close a real-estate sale unless the buyer -- Lafayette Land Acquisitions II, LLC ("Lafayette Land") -- rejected the deal in writing before the end of the due-diligence period. Although the parties disputed when that period began, and how long it lasted, it was undisputed that Lafayette Land never rejected the deal. Therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the parties were obligated to close. Because the Circuit Court held otherwise, judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Lafayette Land Acquisitions II, LLC v. Walls" on Justia Law

In this mineral lease dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a lease deadline and untimely scheduled drilling date were irrelevant for invoking a force majeure clause and thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case, holding that the court of appeals erred.In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals determined that fact issues existed both as to whether the force majeure clause applied and as to each element of the lessee's tortious-interference claims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) construed in context, the phrase "Lessee's operations are delayed by an event of force majeure" does not refer to the delay of a necessary drilling operation already scheduled to occur after the deadline for perpetuating the lease; (2) the force majeure clause in this case did not save the lease; and (3) to the extent the lessee's tortious-interference claims were predicated on the force majeure clause's saving the lease, a take-nothing judgment is rendered in part. View "Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC v. MRC Permian Co." on Justia Law

In this action concerning a lease renewal for property on which a cell tower was built the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and the court of appeals in favor of a cell phone service company and dismissing this action brought by property owners, holding that there was no error.In 1988, the cell phone company entered into a thirty-year lease of the subject property that included a thirty-year renewal option. In 2018, when the lease came up for renewal, the rent was substantially below market, and the company gave written notice of renewal to the property owners. Because the company did not immediately pay the renewal rent the property owners brought suit arguing that the option had not been validly exercised. The district court granted judgment for the cell phone company, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the property owners were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. View "Pitz v. U.S. Cellular Operating Co. of Dubuque" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant following the court's summary judgment and grant of motions to strike in favor of Defendant, holding that the hearing justice erred when he granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count five of Plaintiff's complaint.Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging five counts against Defendant stemming from the purchase and lease of a commercial property. A hearing justice granted Defendants' motions to strike an expert disclosure and an affidavit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that the hearing justice (1) properly granted Defendant's motion to strike the affidavit; but (2) erroneously granted summary judgment as to count five of the complaint. View "Donnelly Real Estate, LLC v. John Crane Inc." on Justia Law

Wilburn Lord, Jr. agreed to sell SEL Business Services, LLP and Skip Lloyd (collectively, SEL) a building in Rolling Fork, Mississippi, for $60,000. SEL moved into the building and alleged to have begun making improvements and paying the taxes. But Lord never followed through with the sale. Instead, Lord sold the building to Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital, a community hospital operated by Sharkey and Issaquena Counties (collectively, Hospital Defendants). SEL initially sought to enjoin the sale. In an amended complaint, in addition to seeking the injunction, SEL alleged Lord breached his contract with SEL to sell the building. SEL requested specific performance. Alternatively, SEL alleged detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel. SEL finally requested, “should the Court find that specific performance, promissory estoppel and/or equitable estoppel are somehow inapplicable and/or the Contract should not otherwise be enforced based on the principles of equity and/or other grounds/for other reasons, . . . [that] the Court disgorge all funds paid to Defendants and/or otherwise award all monetary damages available under Mississippi law.” Both Lord and the Hospital Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming the statute of frauds barred not only SEL’s contract-based claim for specific performance but also any “derivative” equitable claims. Both the chancery and Court of Appeals relied on Barriffe v. Estate of Nelson, 153 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2014) to conclude that the statute of frauds barred not just claims for equitable liens but all potential equitable remedies. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted SEL’s petition for writ of certiorari to overrule the erroneous Barriffe decision and to reinstate the Supreme Court’s long-standing equitable principles. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court reversed the chancellor’s dismissal of SEL and Lloyd’s equitable claims against Lord. The Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment of dismissal as to the remaining defendants. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings. View "SEL Business Services, LLC v. Lord, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint brought by Lustre Oil Company LLC and Erehwon Oil & Gas, LLC (collectively, Lustre Oil) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the district court did not properly weigh the relevant jurisdictional factors.Lustre Oil filed an action against A&S Mineral Development Company, LLC seeking to quiet title and to invalidate A&S's interests in forty-one of the fifty-seven oil and gases leases operated by A&S within the Fort Beck Indian Reservation, home to the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that A&S was an arm of the Tribes entitling it to immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that A&S's incorporation under Delaware law did not favor immunity and in thus refusing to deny A&S tribal sovereign immunity based on state incorporation alone; and (2) consideration of the White factors weighed against the extension of sovereign immunity to A&S as an arm of the Tribes for the purpose of Lustre Oil's claims in this case. View "Lustre Oil Co. v. Anadarko Minerals, Inc." on Justia Law

The Morningstars contracted to purchase a residential property from the Robisons, who intended to buy a nearby vacant lot and build a new house. When the lot they wished to buy was purchased by someone else, the Robisons failed to comply with the terms of the contract with the Morningstars. The Morningstars sought specific performance and monetary damages. The district court found the Robisons breached the contract, but denied the request for specific performance and awarded monetary damages.The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed. The district court erred in placing the burden on the Morningstars to prove monetary damages were an inadequate or impractical remedy and abused its discretion when it found specific performance was not an appropriate remedy. After finding only one of the special equities factors weighed in favor of the Robisons, the court essentially rewrote the contract to allow the Robisons to cancel because their preferred lot was unavailable. The Robisons admit they “had no legal recourse to cancel.” On remand, when determining if any monetary damages should be awarded in addition to specific performance, the court’s “guiding principle” should be to relate the contract back to August 2021, and place the Morningstars in as nearly the same position as they would have been in if the Robisons had not breached the contract. View "Morningstar v. Robison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the appellate court determining that the four exclusive commercial real estate listing agreements at issue in this case were unenforceable, holding that the appellate court decided that issue correctly.When this case was first brought to the Supreme Court, the Court held that the listing agreements did not violate state antitrust law. On remand for consideration of the remaining grounds on which Defendants had prevailed at trial, the appellate court concluded that the listening agreements incorrectly failed to specify the duration of the brokerage authorization, as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 20-325a(b) and/or (c), thus rendering them unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the listing agreements complied with the statutory durational requirement; (2) the agreements were personal service contracts requiring the personal performance of the named broker, who died in January 2013; and (3) therefore, Defendants were not liable to Plaintiffs. View "Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC" on Justia Law