Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

After Lender failed to respond to Plaintiff's correspondence regarding ownership of his loan, Lender foreclosed on Borrower's property. Plaintiff filed suit against all the actors involved (Defendants), alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) , seeking injunctive relief against foreclosure, and claiming breach of contract, failure to act in good faith, and wrongful foreclosure under Nevada law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's Nevada law claims with prejudice. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint claiming a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court dismissed the amended complaint without leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's TILA and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, as Lender was not legally required to respond to Plaintiff's correspondence in its capacity as loan servicer; and (2) vacated the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims regarding the foreclosure of Plaintiff's property and remanded those remaining claims to the district court.

This was an appeal from the circuit court's entry of summary judgment quieting title to certain property in favor of Edward and Nancy Bosch. Harpagon MO, LLC asserted that the circuit court should have entered summary judgment in its favor because it complied with the requirements of Mo. Rev. Stat. 140.405 by providing the Bosches with timely and sufficient notice of their right to redemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a purchaser is authorized to acquire a deed to property purchased at a tax sale one year after the sale; (2) therefore, a purchaser must notify the owner of that property of the owner's right to redeem at least ninety days prior to one year after the tax sale; (3) if the purchaser does not provide timely or sufficient notice, but still acquires the deed by presenting the certificate of purchase to the collector, then the owner can file a petition to set aside the tax sale asserting the purchaser's failure to comply with section 140.405; and (4) the circuit court did not err in finding that the notices provided to the Bosches were not timely and thus awarding the Bosches quiet title to the property.

Defendant-Appellant Robert Shipley appealed a district court order which granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee BNSF Railway Company. BNSF leased commercial property in Miles City, Montana, to Shipley. The lease provided that either party could terminate the lease upon 30 days written notice. Shipley failed to pay rent to BNSF for a number of years. This failure by Shipley resulted in overdue rent payments of $17,700. BNSF notified Shipley on January 7, 2011, that the Lease Agreement would be cancelled and terminated in 30 days, effective on February 10, 2011. The Lease Agreement also required that Shipley remove all improvements and personal property from the leased premises within the 30 days of the lease termination. Shipley failed to remove the items. BNSF provided Shipley with a 60 day extension to remove the items. Shipley again refused to remove the items. Shipley’s refusal prompted BNSF to file a complaint to quiet title to the improvements and personal property, a declaratory judgment that BNSF had terminated the lease validly, trespass, unlawful detainer, and claim for reasonable rent. Shipley acknowledged that he owed $17,700 in rent. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment.

Appellants James J. and Linda L. Clark appealed a district court order that approved the filing of an amended certificate of survey, approved a settled agreement, and required each party to pay one-half of the fees and costs relative to a surveyor agreed upon by the parties. Appellees Bill and Katy Martin purchased the Fishtail General Store from Clarks in May 2000. The sewer system for the Fishtail General Store failed in July 2005. Keith Brown, a licensed Professional Engineer, designed a replacement septic wastewater disposal sewer system. The Stillwater County Health Department issued a replacement sewer system permit, and the Martins installed the new sewer system north of the Fishtail General Store on "Tract 2-A." A number of unresolved issues remained between Clarks and Martins. Clarks and Martins ultimately jointly petitioned to relocate the boundary lines between Tract 2-A and property owned by Clarks. The District Court approved the boundary line relocation. This relocation reduced the size of Tract 2-A. The new sewer system failed again in 2009. Martins requested that Clarks allow Martins to use land located outside the adjusted boundary line to install the two additional laterals. Clarks refused. Martins filed a motion pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) for relief from the district court’s order of June 7, 2006 that had approved the boundary line relocation. The parties advised the District Court at the conclusion of a pre-trial conference that they had reached a settlement. The court ordered the parties to hire Tom Kelly, a licensed surveyor, to prepare a certificate of survey that would implement the Septic System Easement Agreement. Martins then filed a motion asking the court to approve a Corrected Tract 2-A Amended Certificate of Survey prepared by Kelly. Clarks argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the District Court incorrectly determined that the Corrected Tract 2-A'a Amended COS did not change the boundaries between the Clarks’ and Martins’ tracts. Clarks further contended that the District Court improperly concluded that Martins’ proposed septic system agreement accurately reflected the agreement of the parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was substantial evidence in the district court record to support the court's ultimate decision in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.

In August of 2009, Samson Resources Company owned oil and gas leases covering 87.78 mineral acres in Roger Mills County, Oklahoma, including the Schaefer Lease. The Schaefer Lease covered 70 net acres in the Southwest Quarter of Section 28 and had a three-year primary term that ended on November 22, 2007. If drilling operations were commenced by the end of the primary term, the lease would continue so long as such operations continued. On August 2, 2007, Newfield sent a letter to Samson, proposing to drill a well in Section 28. The estimated cost of the well was over $8.5 million dollars. On August 9, 2007, Newfield filed an application with the Commission, seeking to force pool the interests of Samson and other owners in Section 28. Newfield sent an e-mail dated April 14, 2008, to Samson that informed Samson that Newfield had commenced operations prior to the expiration of the Schaefer Lease. Newfield's e-mail stated that Samson had underpaid well costs and that an election to participate with 87.78 acres would require prepayment of $1,411,982.45. Samson responded by e-mail on the same date, informing Newfield its intent was only to elect its 17.78 acres. On April 28, 2008, Samson filed an Application seeking to have its election to participate in the well limited to 17.78 acres rather than 87.78 acres. After an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge determined that Samson's timely election to participate only covered 17.78 acres of its interest and that Samson accepted the cash bonus as to its remaining 70 acres. The Oil and Gas Appellate Referee reversed the ALJ's determination, finding that the ALJ improperly relied on actions which occurred prior to the issuance of the pooling order. The Commission issued Order No. 567706, which adopted the Referee's report, reversed the ALJ, and declared that Samson had elected to participate to the full extent of its 87.78 acre interest in the unit. The Commission found Samson made a "unilateral mistake" when it elected to participate to the full extent of its interest. Samson appealed the Commission's order to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed. Before COCA issued its opinion affirming the Commission, Samson filed an action in the district court alleging actual fraud, deceit, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and breach of duty as operator. Samson also alleged Newfield's actions amounted to extrinsic fraud on the Commission, rendering Pooling Order No. 550310 invalid as to Samson's working interest attributable to the 70-acre Schaefer Lease. The trial court granted Newfield's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the petition to be an impermissible collateral attack on a valid Commission order. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that Samson's actions for damages sounding in tort were beyond the Commission's jurisdiction, and the district court in this case was the proper tribunal for Samson to bring its claims. The trial court's order granting Newfield's Motion to Dismiss was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner Kilnwood on Kanasatka Condominium Unit Association, Inc. (Association) appealed a superior court's decision that dismissed its petition to change the ownership form of twenty-nine units in a residential subdivision from condominiums to single-family simple lots. In 2010, the Association members considered reforming the Declaration to convert it from a condominium association to single-family homes, but they could not reach the unanimous vote required by the Declaration to do so. Unable to reach an accommodation with the minority members, Perry Smith, Andy and Jill Belliveau, and Rob and Candy Baker, the Association petitioned the superior court to reform the Declaration. The minority members, who are the respondents in this case, cross-petitioned the court to declare that Kilnwood remain a condominium association, and moved to dismiss. The Association argued that the Declaration should have been reformed because it was not intended to create a condominium, but rather a subdivision of single-family residential lots. Finding that the fact that large majority of the Association’s members no longer found it desirable to own their property as condominiums did not alter the underlying contractual requirement contained in the Declaration, that any amendment to “matters . . . adjudicating the ownership interest in common areas” must be approved by unanimous vote. The failure of one local realtor to list the homes for sale in Kilnwood as condominiums was irrelevant to the inquiry into the intent of the Developer when it created Kilnwood as a condominium association or when Association members purchased condominium units within Kilnwood. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in dismissing the Association's petition.

This dispute centered around two roads owned by the Maceys, their company Family Link, and the remaining defendants (Defendants). Petitioner Nadine Gillmor previously brought suit against the Maceys seeking to interpret and enforce the terms of a settlement agreement purporting to give the Gillmors a limited private easement over one road and limited access over the other road. The court of appeals held that Gillmor had a limited private easement over the roads but that the easement would not pass on to her children from a prior marriage. Gillmor later brought two claims for access over the roads, asserting that the roads were subject to condemnation for a public access easement and that the roads had been continuously used as public thoroughfares for a period of ten years and were thus dedicated to public use as a "highway by use" under Utah Code 72-5-104. The district court dismissed the complaint based on res judicata and imposed sanctions on Gillmor's attorney for filing a claim without a basis in law. The Supreme Court (1) held that Gillmor's claims were not barred by res judiciata; and (2) vacated the imposition of sanctions. Remanded for adjudication of Gillmor's suit on the merits.

In this action, a real estate company that prepared due diligence reports for a developer in connection with the potential purchase of commercial properties alleged that a rival brokerage firm was unjustly enriched when it acquired the material from the developer and later obtained a commission on the ultimate sale of the properties. Supreme Court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim against the rival brokerage firm, and the appellate division affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether a sufficient relationship existed between the two real estate firms to provide a basis for an unjust enrichment cause of action. Based on the allegations presented in the complaint, the Court of Appeals held that the relationship between the two parties was too attenuated and affirmed.

Appellant's mother (Miller) opened a checking account with Bank. Appellant alleged that Miller added him as joint owner of the account with right of survivorship. After Miller died, Appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account. Miller's Estate brought an action against Appellant, alleging that the funds Appellant had withdrawn from the account belonged to the Estate. The probate court determined that Miller was the sole owner of the checking account and that the funds Appellant had withdrawn were the property of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later sued the Bank, seeking damages for breach of contract and negligence for failing to retain the records that would show his ownership of the account. Appellant also sought punitive damages. The superior court dismissed the action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that the precise issue of ownership was common to both proceedings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the breach of contract and punitive damages claims; but (2) vacated as to the negligence claim, holding that Appellant's negligence claim against the Bank was not barred by collateral estoppel, as the probate court did not adjudicate the factual issues related to this claim.

In the recent decision in Bates v. Cohn, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a borrower challenging a foreclosure action must ordinarily assert known and ripe defenses to the conduct of the foreclosure sale in advance of the sale. After the sale, the borrower is ordinarily limited to raising procedural irregulatories in the conduct of the sale, although the Court left open the possibility that a borrower could assert a post-sale exception that the deed of trust was itself the product of fraud. This case arose out of the foreclosure of a deed of trust for the residence of Darnella and Charles Thomas by Jeffrey Nadel and others. In apparent hope of fitting their post-sale exceptions within the question left open in Bates, the Thomases alleged certain defects in the chain of title of the note evidencing their debt and characterized them as a "fraud on the judicial system." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the alleged defects did not establish that the Thomases' deed of trust was the product of fraud.