Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Janice Willis executed a general warranty deed reserving a life estate in her home for herself and conveying the remainder to her Eddie in fee simple. While Janice was still alive, Eddie died, and his interest passed to his children. Janice subsequently sought reformation of the deed based on unilateral mistake of the grantor in the absence of fraud. The trial judge granted a directed verdict for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that, under Crawford v. Willoughby and its progeny, reformation of a deed was unavailable as a remedy in this case.

Oscar Armendariz, the owner of a tract of land subject to eminent domain proceedings, appealed the district court's order determining the final distribution of an appraisers' award. Armedariz contended the district court erred in distributing a portion of the award based on quantum meruit to Vernon Jarboe, the attorney for Richard and Angela Britt, who were formerly interested parties to the eminent domain proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's award, holding that the district court lacked statutory authority to award fees to Jarboe. Remanded with directions to enter an order distributing the entire amount of the award in favor of Armendariz.

The dispute in this case revolved around a limited partnership (Kellom Heights) formed to provide financing for the redevelopment of property. Appellees were Kellom Heights, a corporation, and limited partners in Kellom Heights. Appellants were the redevelopment corporation, the general partner, and a corporation that was a limited parter of the redevelopment corporation. Appellees became dissatisfied with the operation of Kellom Heights and filed this complaint asserting various causes of action. The district court found for Appellees on certain causes of action and entered a judgment in their favor in the amount of $918,228 plus costs and interest. The court also awarded attorney fees and denied Appellees' request for prejudgment interest. The Supreme in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred when it rejected Appellants' statute of limitations defenses as to certain claims; and (2) the court erred in ruling that additional supervisory fees were not permitted. The Court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment.

Lamar Hooker appealed a chancery court's grant of Stephen Greer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in which the court awarded attorney's fees to Greer based on Hooker's improper filing of a lis pendens, and Greer's Motion for Summary Judgment on Hooker's counterclaim. Greer and Hooker knew each other for more than thirty years, having worked together in multiple business ventures. In early 2002, Greer and Hooker entered into an agreement for the purchase, development, and sale of two tracts of land to which each made monetary contributions and participated in certain decisions regarding the development and marketing of the properties. In September 2003, Greer sent a letter to Hooker in which he cancelled their business arrangement. In this letter, he characterized the relationship as a "proposed joint venture" and declared such proposed venture "null and void." Greer claimed the venture was predicated on Hooker's ability to put up one half of the initial capital investment to purchase the properties, and that Hooker had failed to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the lis pendens was improperly filed. However, because the trial court based the attorney's fees award on an improper interpretation of the Litigation Accountability Act, the Court reversed the judgment, vacated the award, and remanded for further consideration. Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Greer on Hooker's counterclaim, holding that his claim was subject to a three-year statute of limitations and was thus time-barred.

H&H Development, LLC hired Jim Ramlow for legal services. In 2007, H&H filed a pro se complaint in Lake County against Ramlow and his law firm for professional negligence. Eleven days later, H&H, through counsel, filed a complaint in Flathead County against Eagle Bend, seeking damages based on allegations similar to those in the Lake County complaint. H&H settled with Eagle Bend. In 2010, H&H filed an amended Flathead County complaint that named Ramlow and his firm as defendants and included a lawyer's signature. The district court subsequently declared the Lake County complaint null and void after determining that a non-lawyer could not file a complaint on behalf of a limited liability company. Thereafter, the court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the amended complaint based upon the running of the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a district court has discretion to determine whether a corporation should be able to relate back to an amended complaint signed by a lawyer, to its original, pro se complaint. Remanded to assess whether Mont. R. Civ. P. 15(c) permitted H&H's amended complaint in Flathead County to relate back to H&H's pro se Lake County complaint.

In April and June of 2008, Best of the Best Auto Sales, Inc. purchased seven vehicles from Dealers Auto Auction of Idaho and Brasher's Idaho Auto Auction with checks that were returned for insufficient funds. As a result, Dealers and Brasher refused to provide Best of the Best with the titles to the vehicles. Best of the Best then sold the vehicles to Idaho consumers without providing them with titles. Dealers and Brasher filed claims with CNA Surety d/b/a Western Surety Company which acted as a surety for a "$20,000 Vehicle/Vessel Dealer Bond." Best of the Best was the principal. Upon Best of the Best's failure to provide evidence or defenses for Dealers' and Brasher's claims, Western Surety alleged that it lawfully settled those claims in good faith upon the condition that the consumers received their titles, even though they were not based on final judgments. Plaintiff Nick Hestead submitted his claim, which was based on a final judgment. Plaintiff's claim involved fraud and fraudulent representation concerning a separate vehicle that he purchased from Best of the Best that was previously branded a lemon in California. Western Surety responded by asserting that the Dealer Bond was exhausted. Plaintiff contended that the plain meaning of I.C. 49-1610(4) provides that his claim should be given priority because it was submitted thirty days after a final judgment was entered, unlike Dealers' and Brasher's claims. Western Surety asserted that the plain meaning of I.C. 41-1839(3) permits sureties to settle Dealer Bond claims in good faith. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the payments on the surety bond were lawfully made in good faith pursuant to I.C. 49-1610(1) and I.C. 41-1839(3) because Dealers' and Brasher's claims were undisputed and supported by competent evidence.

First American Title Insurance Company (FATIC) provided title insurance for a mortgage refinancing to SunTrust Mortgage through FATIC's title agent, First Alliance. First Alliance subsequently obtained a $100,000 surety bond pursuant to the Virginia Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) from Western Surety (Western). After the property owner defaulted under the original mortgages, SunTrust lost $734,296. FATIC paid the full amount of this loss then made a formal demand upon Western for $100,000. Western refused to pay FATIC the amount of the surety bond. FATIC sued Western and First Alliance for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in FATIC's favor for $100,000. The Supreme Court held (1) CRESPA does not recognize a private cause of action that may be asserted against a surety and the surety bond issued pursuant to former Va. Code Ann. 6.1-2.21(D)(3); (2) Virginia law nonetheless permits a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond executed pursuant to CRESPA by the assertion of a common law claim; and (3) a title insurance company may have standing, not in its own right, but as a subrogee of its insured, to maintain a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond.

This case concerned a commercial lease between Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellants Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf and the Plaitniff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant Watkins Company, LLC’s predecessor in interest, Watkins and Watkins for a restaurant and microbrewery in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Watkins filed a lawsuit seeking to enforce the lease after Storms and Burggraf failed to timely pay the rent. The issues were tried to the district court, which found that Storms and Burggraf had materially breached the lease and that Watkins could regain possession of the property. The district court also found that Storms and Burggraf had been unjustly enriched by failing to pay rent for additional storage space. Further, the district court found that the lease's provision for accelerated rent was a liquidated damages clause and found it be unconscionable. Storms and Burggraf appealed the district court’s decision, arguing that an accord and satisfaction had been reached between the parties and that the court erred in its finding of the rent for the upstairs storage area above the restaurant. Watkins argued on cross-appeal that the district court based its finding regarding the accelerated rent on insufficient evidence. Because of an error in the district court's finding regarding the upstairs storage area, the Supreme Court vacated that part of the court's order but upheld the remaining issues.

The Davises failed to pay the real estate tax for their property, resulting in a statutory tax. The Davises then filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted. Subsequently, the sheriff sold the tax lien. After the statutory time period that the Davises could redeem the property had passed and the property remained unredeemed, the tax lien purchaser received a tax deed conveying the Davises' property. The trial court set aside the tax deed, concluding that the tax lien sale should not have been held because the Davises had been in bankruptcy and because the sheriff did not give sufficient notice to the Davises of the tax delinquency, lien, and sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in considering issues relating to the sufficiency of the sheriff's service of the notices; (2) in considering the sheriff's pre-sale notices to the Davises, as only the post-sale notice to redeem is relevant in a lawsuit to set aside a tax deed; and (3) by granting judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the effect the Davises' bankruptcy had on the tax lien. Remanded.

This was an appeal and cross-appeal from a district court judgment awarding appellant homebuyer treble damages against respondent seller, a limited liability company, but refusing to find that the individual respondent, a former manager of the limited liability company, was liable for the judgment as the company's alter ego. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's award of treble damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 113.150(4), which awards treble damages for a seller's delayed disclosure or nondisclosure of property defects, despite the court's failure to make a finding that the seller acted willfully, as the legislature did not intend to imply a heightened level of mental culpability to the statute; and (2) vacated the portion of the court's judgment concerning the alter ego issue, as the court failed to explain its reasoning for denying alter ego status. Remanded.