Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellant's mother (Miller) opened a checking account with Bank. Appellant alleged that Miller added him as joint owner of the account with right of survivorship. After Miller died, Appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account. Miller's Estate brought an action against Appellant, alleging that the funds Appellant had withdrawn from the account belonged to the Estate. The probate court determined that Miller was the sole owner of the checking account and that the funds Appellant had withdrawn were the property of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later sued the Bank, seeking damages for breach of contract and negligence for failing to retain the records that would show his ownership of the account. Appellant also sought punitive damages. The superior court dismissed the action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that the precise issue of ownership was common to both proceedings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the breach of contract and punitive damages claims; but (2) vacated as to the negligence claim, holding that Appellant's negligence claim against the Bank was not barred by collateral estoppel, as the probate court did not adjudicate the factual issues related to this claim.

In the recent decision in Bates v. Cohn, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a borrower challenging a foreclosure action must ordinarily assert known and ripe defenses to the conduct of the foreclosure sale in advance of the sale. After the sale, the borrower is ordinarily limited to raising procedural irregulatories in the conduct of the sale, although the Court left open the possibility that a borrower could assert a post-sale exception that the deed of trust was itself the product of fraud. This case arose out of the foreclosure of a deed of trust for the residence of Darnella and Charles Thomas by Jeffrey Nadel and others. In apparent hope of fitting their post-sale exceptions within the question left open in Bates, the Thomases alleged certain defects in the chain of title of the note evidencing their debt and characterized them as a "fraud on the judicial system." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the alleged defects did not establish that the Thomases' deed of trust was the product of fraud.

Defendant Michael A. Langlois appealed a Superior Court's declaratory judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association. The judgment decreed that a lease agreement that Defendant had entered into violated the "Declaration of Condominium of Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominiums." Defendant asserted on appeal that the declaration was ambiguous and that, therefore, the trial justice incorrectly interpreted it to exclude the lease agreement. Upon review of the lease agreement in question, the Supreme Court concluded the trial justice did not incorrectly interpret the language, and affirmed that court's decision.

The circuit court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment in a partition action for the sale of jointly owned real estate, having found that the statute of frauds prevented enforcement of an alleged oral "buy/sell" agreement between the parties. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Appellants, as the party attempting to force the sale, were impermissibly using the statute of frauds as a "sword" and not a "shield" and because "no action" was brought by Appellees that might trigger the application of the statute. The court therefore remanded the matter for a determination as to whether the oral buy/sell agreement existed and its effect on the disposition of the property at issue. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that because there was no signed writing in this case, and because there was no evidence that the agreement was not reduced to writing because of fraud at the time of omission or evidence that the application of the statute of fraud would result in Appellants being unjustly enriched, summary judgment was proper.

David Bennett and Bennett & Bennett Construction, Inc. ("Bennett") appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of the claims alleging fraud in the inducement and the tort of outrage brought against them by Barbara and Leotes Skinner. The Skinners entered into a construction-services contract with Bennett, pursuant to which Bennett was to renovate and remodel their residence located in Oxford. After disagreements developed between the parties, the Skinners sued Bennett, alleging claims of breach of contract; breach of warranty; fraud in the inducement; assault and battery; the tort of outrage; and negligence, wantonness and recklessness. Bennett moved to compel arbitration of all claims, arguing that, because each of the claims alleged by the Skinners arose from the construction-services contract or were related to the construction-services contract, the claims were subject to arbitration. Furthermore, Bennett argued that the tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and that the Skinners should not be allowed to avoid arbitration because they cast their claim as a tort. The Skinners responded, arguing that their agreement to the arbitration clause in the contract was obtained fraudulently. The trial court denied Bennett's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Skinners' tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and thus was a proper claim for arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In this real estate dispute, some of the defendants filed a motion for sanctions, alleging Defendant brought the action to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. The district court ordered sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel for $1,000. The court of appeals affirmed the sanctions, ordering them payable to the jury and witness fund. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of the sanction at $1,000; (2) the court abused its discretion by ordering the sanction be paid to the jury and witness fund; and (3) given Rule 1.413(1)'s preference of compensating victims, the district court should enter an order requiring Plaintiff's counsel to pay the sanction in equal sums to the defendants who sought the sanction as partial reimbursement of the legal fees they incurred in defending against the unfounded claims brought against them. Remanded.

In this case the Supreme Court addressed several issues arising from a dispute over a series of property transactions. Plaintiffs sued Defendants under various theories of liability, including breach of contract and fraud. Defendants countersued for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and fraud by concealment. Defendants also brought a claim against Plaintiffs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.257, which provides a statutory cause of action for the victim of a real estate licensee's breach of the various duties imposed by Nev. Rev. Stat 645.252-.254. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court, holding (1) compromise offers are not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a failure to mitigate damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.105; (2) although Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.251 does not, in all instances, shield real estate licensees from common law forms of liability, it precludes such liability when the type of conduct complained of is covered by sections 645.252-.254; and (3) punitive damages may not be recovered under section 645.257, but compensatory damages are recoverable under the statute in accordance with the measure of damages that appropriately compensates the injured party for the losses sustained as a result of the real estate licensee's violations. Remanded.

The parcel of land that was the subject of this appeal was once owned by a school. An adjacent property, now owned by Defendants, Eric and Wendy Federer, was previously owned by Wendy's father. In 1990, the school sold its property to a limited liability corporation subject to a set of restrictive covenants that did not expressly reference any third parties. The present action arose when Plaintiff, the current owner of the property, sought permits to develop the school property in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the restrictive covenants. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish the unenforceability of the restrictive covenants as to Defendants. Defendants counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to Plaintiff's property and to enforce the restrictive covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the covenants at issue in this case were not void as a matter of law; and (2) questions of material fact existed as to whether Defendants were entitled to enforce them. Remanded.

After a landslide damaged their home, homeowners Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase (the Jackowskis) sued the sellers of the home, seeking rescission or, in the alternative, damages for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The homeowners also sued the sellers' broker and agent, alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of common law fiduciary duties. They leveled similar claims against their own broker and agent together with a claim for breach of statutory fiduciary duties. The trial court entered summary judgment dismissing all of the Jackowskis' claims, except the fraudulent concealment claims against the sellers and the sellers’ broker and agent regarding cracks in the concrete basement floor. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in part and reversed it in part. The sellers and the homeowners’ broker and agent then sought review by the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals and to address four issues stemming from a lawsuit by LensCrafters to enforce a noncompete provision against optometrist Dennis Kehoe after a sublease contract between the two parties ended. After review of the "complex, convoluted, and contentious eleven-year dispute," the Supreme Court held that (1) the district court properly dismissed LensCrafters' breach of contract claim on summary judgment because LensCrafters terminated the parties' contract as a matter of law and, with it, the contract's noncompete provision; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kehoe's request to supplement his pleadings shortly before trial; and (3) summary judgment dismissing Kehoe's malicious abuse of process and tortious interference with contract counterclaims was proper because Kehoe did not demonstrate genuine issues of material fact. Because we hold that the noncompete provision was not in effect during any relevant time, the Court did not address Kehoe's fourth issue, whether the provision would have been contrary to public policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part.