Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Buyers sued Bahamas Sales, and others associated with Bahamas Sales, alleging that they engaged in appraisal fraud. Buyers purchased undeveloped lots in a planned resort in the Bahamas where the purchase contracts contained a provision that required all disputes to be litigated in the Bahamas. The district court dismissed for improper venue. The court held that the district court erred when it determined that Buyers' claims fell within the scope of the lot purchase contracts' forum-selection clauses; the district court erred in applying equitable estoppel to allow the Mortgage Entities and the Credit Suisse Entities (nonsignatories to the lot purchase contracts) to invoke the lot purchase contracts' forum-selection clauses; and reversed the district court's judgment granting the motions to dismiss for improper venue and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bailey, et al v. ERG Enterprises, LP, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute in district court over two liens on real property: a deed of trust and a mortgage. Appellants (Insight, LLC and several other companies) are assignees of a mortgage secured by 160 acres of real property owned by Summitt, Inc., which included an 18-acre parcel Summitt purchased from Respondents Patrick and Monica Gunter. The Respondents held a deed of trust on the 18-acre parcel. Summitt defaulted on its obligations to both Insight and the Gunters. Insight filed suit naming Summitt's principals and the Gunters as defendants. The Gunters denied that their deed of trust was junior to the Insight-Summitt mortgage. The district court denied Insight's motion for summary judgment because there was an issue as to who was the initial encumbrancer. After trial, the district court found that the closing of the Gunter-Summitt deed of trust was separate and independent from the Insight-Summitt mortgage. Furthermore, the court found that the Gunters' deed of trust effectively encumbered the Gunter property at the time the transaction between Summitt and the Gunters closed. However, it found that the Insight mortgage on the combined 160-acre parcel did not create an encumbrance on the Gunter property until the Gunter-Summitt transaction closed. On appeal, Insight argued that the mortgage had priority as a matter of law because it was a purchase money mortgage that was first recorded. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's finding that Insight had notice of the Gunters' deed of trust was clearly erroneous. Further, the Insight-Summitt mortgage was a purchase money mortgage , and that the court erred in concluding the deed of trust took priority. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment in this case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Insight LLC v. Gunter" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a commercial lease dispute. Boise Mode, LLC leased space in its building to Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd. (DPP). Timothy Pace executed a personal guarantee for the lease. During the term of the lease, Boise Mode remodeled part of the building for another tenant. After raising concerns to Boise Mode about the adverse effects of the construction to its business, DPP eventually stopped paying rent and vacated the premises prior to the end of the lease. Boise Mode then brought an action against DPP, alleging breach of contract, and against Pace for breaching the guarantee. DPP counterclaimed, alleging that the disruption caused by the construction constituted breach of contract and constructive eviction. After Boise Mode moved for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, DPP requested a continuance to complete discovery. The district court denied DPP's motion and ultimately granted Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment. DPP appealed the grant of summary judgment as well as the district court's denial of its request for a continuance. Upon review, and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants seeking a declaratory judgment that, under the doctrine of adverse possession, Plaintiffs were the owners of a parcel of land bordering Defendants' property. The parties reached a settlement agreement providing for a new boundary line between their properties. The agreement provided that Defendants would apply for and pursue a variance from the town zoning board of appeals because the new boundary line left Defendants with slightly less than the minimum frontage requirement. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, which the trial court granted. The trial court ultimately conveyed the property to Plaintiffs. The appellate court reversed in part and remanded to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of adverse possession in favor of Plaintiffs contingent on the parties' compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal. However, after examining the record, the Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that certification was improvidently granted. View "Vance v. Tassmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased title insurance for a condominium unit she had recently purchased. Plaintiff's neighbor subsequently initiated a lawsuit against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff's property was subject to a view easement. Plaintiff tendered the complaint to her title insurance company (Insurer) requesting a defense pursuant to her title insurance policy. Commonwealth denied Plaintiff's request based on certain exclusions in the policy. Plaintiff sued Insurer alleging a breach of contract and requesting a declaratory judgment that Insurer had a duty to defend Plaintiff against her neighbor's complaint. The superior court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding that the policy specifically excluded the view easement from coverage. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that due to the broad nature of the duty to defend and the law's requirement that insurance-policy interpretation be focused on the insured, Insurer had a duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying litigation. View "Cox v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo for fraudulent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel after Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure when plaintiffs stopped paying on their mortgage loan. The court held that plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the modification of their home loan and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The court also held that plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for promissory estoppel and the district court did not err in dismissing their claim. View "Freitas, et al v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Donna Mae Peck appealed a superior court judgment that granted plaintiff Victor Shattuck a writ of possession for the parties' former residence in Cavendish and that denied her counterclaim for an equitable interest in the Cavendish property and another former residence in Springfield. Between December 1997 and June 1999, plaintiff purchased two adjoining parcels of land in Cavendish. He made most of the payments for the first parcel, but defendant made a significant financial contribution toward payment of the second parcel. In 2001, plaintiff conveyed the Cavendish properties to himself and defendant as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, and defendant conveyed the Springfield property to herself and plaintiff as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The parties lived together in Cavendish until June 2010, when plaintiff decided to end their relationship. Following an angry confrontation, defendant obtained a relief-from-abuse order against plaintiff and was awarded sole possession of the Cavendish property. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in superior court seeking to evict defendant from the Cavendish property. Defendant answered and counterclaimed, alleging that the Cavendish and Springfield properties were the subject of a partnership agreement between the parties. Alleging that she had been induced to convey the Springfield properties by plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentations, she also sought equitable relief through imposition of a resulting or constructive trust. She later claimed that the Cavendish property was also held in a constructive trust for her benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: "pursuant to the principles of equity, not every unmarried cohabitant who confers an economic benefit on his or her partner is entitled to payback if the relationship ends. In this case, defendant may or may not ultimately be entitled to restitution, whether in the form of a constructive trust or a money judgment, for her substantial investments in the Cavendish and Springfield properties, and any such judgment could well be subject to offsets for benefits received." View "Shattuck v. Peck" on Justia Law

This dispute stemmed from WaMu's lease agreement with Interface, the lessor. WaMu subsequently closed as a "failed bank" and entered into receivership under the direction of the FDIC. The FDIC then entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement (P&A Agreement) with JPMorgan, which set forth the terms and conditions of the transfer of WaMu's assets and liabilities to JPMorgan. Interface filed a breach of lease claim against JPMorgan. On appeal, Interface challenged two district court orders that granted JPMorgan's motion for summary judgment, denied Interface's motion for summary judgment, and granted the FDIC's, the intervenor, request for declaratory relief. The court concluded that Interface was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the P&A Agreement executed between FDIC and JPMorgan, and, as a result, Interface lacked standing to enforce its interpretation of that agreement. The court also concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award declaratory relief to the FDIC. Consequently, the court vacated and remanded the judgment. View "Interface Kanner, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

First Franklin Financial Corporation and Jason Gardner attended foreclosure mediation. The parties disputed the outcome of the mediation. Gardner argued that the parties reached a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer a trial loan modification plan to Gardner and subsequently filed a motion for sanctions. The district court granted the motion and ordered First Franklin to pay monetary sanctions and to enter into a loan modification with Gardner on the terms agreed upon by the parties at foreclosure mediation. First Franklin filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and held that the motion court did not err (1) in finding that Gardner and First Franklin entered into a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer the loan modification to Gardner; and (2) in finding that First Franklin did not mediate in good faith and in granting Gardner's motion for sanctions. View "First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

MCR, LLC filed an action for condemnation of a compressor station site on property owned by Appellees. Appellees counterclaimed against MCR for damage to their property and claimed punitive damages. Appellees sought restoration costs as the measure of damages for their contract, trespass, and nuisance claims. The parties stipulated to the substitution of MCR Transmission, LLC (MCR-T) for MCR on the condemnation claim. The district court dismissed MCR-T's condemnation claim and granted Appellees' summary judgment motion allowing Appellees to seek restoration costs. The jury awarded restoration costs and punitive damages to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in dismissing MCR-T's motion to condemn Appellees' property for a compressor station, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellees' property was necessary for the compressor station; (2) properly determined that Appellees were entitled to seek restoration costs as the measure of their damages; and (3) properly admitted evidence at trial that MCR had jumped Appellees' bid on state trust land leases. View "McEwen v. MCR, LLC" on Justia Law