Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Defendants owned three lots in the Eagle Crest subdivision adjacent to the Eagle Ridge Estates (Eagle Ridge) subdivision. Defendants' predecessor in title obtained a private access easement from the prior owners of Eagle Ridge, which allowed Defendants to access their property in Eagle Crest by way of roads running through Eagle Ridge. In exchange, the grantee of the easement agreed to pay an annual general road assessment for each lot. The Eagle Ridge Homeowners Association (Association) brought suit against Defendants for their failure to pay general assessments for three assessment years. Defendants argued that the Association only had authority to assess general road assessments against them and not general assessments. Ultimately, the trial court found in favor of the Association and awarded attorney fees, finding that the expenditures made by the Association were associated with roads. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues with the exception of the Association's request for certain attorney fees because of contradictory findings and conclusions by the trial court. Remanded. View "Eagle Ridge Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Massachusetts residents, bought a three-dwelling in Massachusetts, financing the entire purchase price with two mortgage loans from Plaza Home Mortgage (Plaza). After the collapse of the housing market, Plaintiffs sued Plaza, alleging state common law and statutory violations in making the loans. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claim based on Plaza's alleged violation of the Massachusetts covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs' claim based on a violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection was correctly dismissed as time-barred. View "Latson v. Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

While a lawsuit by Appellees David and Elizabeth Speaks was pending against Rosemary and Byron Baker for damages related to poor construction workmanship, the Bakers transferred two parcels of real property to their son, Nathan Baker. The case resulted in a judgment against Byron but a dismissal of the claims against Rosemary. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Five days later, Nathan transferred the properties to a limited liability company (LLC) he and his family controlled. Appellees subsequently filed this case under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. While the case was pending, the LLC transferred the two pieces of property to trusts controlled by Rosemary Baker. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees permitting execution on the properties, finding that all of the conveyances were fraudulent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly found the conveyances to be fraudulent; but (2) Appellees failed to make the required prima facie showing that the properties were subject to execution on a judgment against Byron Baker alone. View "Baker v. Speaks" on Justia Law

Dittmer appealed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) of their two lawsuits against a failed bank, the FDIC as the bank's receiver, and the successor representative to the Estate of John Peters. Barkley is a Missouri general partnership with two equal partners, John Peters and Joe Dittmer. In the first of two eventual lawsuits arising out of a 2006 loan transaction to Barkley, Dittmer, representing Joe Dittmer's half interest in Barkley, sued Premier Bank, seeking declaratory judgment that the loan should be declared void as to Dittmer and sought to enjoin the bank from selling encumbered property. The suit was filed in Missouri state court, and the primary basis for Dittmer's complaint was that Peters did not have authority from his partner, Joe Dittmer, to mortgage Barkley property for this transaction. The second suit included the same claims as the first case but included various Dittmer successors as plaintiffs, and both the FDIC and the personal representative were added as defendants. The court found that under 12 U.S.C. 1821(j), the district court correctly dismissed Dittmer's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; given the language of the Missouri Uniform Partnership Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 358.090(1), the amended partnership agreement, and the power of attorney documents, the district court correctly dismissed the claim in the second suit against the FDIC; and the court agreed with the district court that the doctrine of res judicata required dismissal of the second suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dittmer Properties v. FDIC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Dennis and Evangeline Bakken appealed a judgment declaring the Bakkens no longer had an option to repurchase Pierce County property Paul and Evangeline Bakken sold to John and Bernadine Duchscher in 1991, and which the Duchschers later transferred to John Duchscher, Jr., and Ann Duchscher. Upon review of the trial court record and applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Bakkens' option to repurchase the property had expired. View "Bakken v. Duchscher" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, prospective luxury home buyers, alleged that Toll Brothers, a real estate development company, unlawfully refused to return deposits when plaintiffs could not obtain mortgage financing. The district court denied Toll Brothers' motion to dismiss or stay the suit pending arbitration, finding that the Agreement of Sale's arbitration provision lacked mutuality of consideration under Maryland law because it required only the buyer - but not the seller - to submit disputes to arbitration. The court held that the appeal was properly before it under 9 U.S.C. 16(a), and that the Agreement of Sale's arbitration provision was unenforceable for lack of mutual consideration under Maryland law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal in this case related to attorney fees incurred in litigation arising from a construction contract for a custom cabin in Island Park, Idaho. There were two issues: (1) whether the district court erred in holding that the Maglebys were entitled to recover only $2,500 from defaulting parties by operation of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4); and (2) whether the district court erred in its decision regarding the Maglebys' entitlement to post-judgment attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) did not limit the Maglebys' fees to the $2,500 pled in their complaint even though defendants did not contest them. The Court vacated the judgments of the district court as they related to attorney fees awards in light of I.C. sec. 12-120(5) and "ITP" and "Jenks." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Magleby v. Garn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Adriana Berneike appealed the district court’s dismissal of her Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), Utah Consumer Sales Protection Act (UCSPA), and breach of contract claims asserted against CitiMortgage, Inc. (Citi). In 2010, Plaintiff faxed twenty-eight different letters to Citi, her mortgage loan servicer, asserting that Citi was incorrectly billing her for overcharges and improper fees. She faxed a two more rounds of different letters, insisting Citi was overcharging her. Citi replied that Plaintiff's account was correct and that taxes and an escrow shortage caused billing fluctuation. Several months later, Plaintiff sent a third round of fort-seven different letters to Citi claiming billing errors. Altogether, Plaintiff faxed more than one hundred letters to Citi, and claimed that despite paying in full every bill she received, she continued to be overcharged and was facing foreclosure and bankruptcy. Plaintiff then filed suit in Utah state court. Among other damages, she sought $1,000 per violation of RESPA. Citi removed the case to federal court, and the court subsequently granted Citi's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Finding that the federal court did not err by dismissing Plaintiff's claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant and Appellees were engaged in a commercial real estate transaction. Appellant was unable to secure adequate financing to close the transaction, and Appellees retained his earnest money deposit. Appellant filed suit, and the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) given that there was an ambiguity in the language of the contract regarding whether the earnest money clause constituted a proper liquidated damages provision, summary judgment in this case was inappropriate; (2) there was a question of genuine fact as to whether the amount of the earnest money deposit was reasonable or so unreasonably large that it was unenforceable on the grounds that public policy would deem it to be a penalty; and (3) if the deposit is deemed to be an unenforceable penalty, a constructive trust should have been established in order to protect the funds. View "Patel v. Tuttle Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joe F. Watkins, Patricia M. Smith, and RE/MAX Lake Martin Properties, LLC sued Bear Brothers, Inc., ETC Lake Development, LLC ("ETC Lake"), and E.T. "Bud" Chambers, among others, asserting claims related to the construction and development of a condominium project on Lake Martin. ETC Lake and Chambers crossclaimed against Bear Brothers seeking to recover losses suffered on the project as well as indemnification for the costs of litigating the plaintiffs' action and any damages for which they might be found liable to the plaintiffs. In January 2010, Bear Brothers moved the circuit court to compel arbitration of the cross-claim against it. The circuit court did not rule on that motion. Bear Brothers renewed its motion in July 2011, and the circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim in December. Bear Brothers then moved the circuit court "to stay [the] proceedings [in the plaintiffs' action] pending the outcome of a related arbitration." After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion to stay. Bear Brothers appealed the circuit court's order denying the motion to stay to the Supreme Court; ETC Lake and Chambers moved to dismiss the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the motion at issue in this case was a motion to stay related proceedings pending the arbitration of a crossclaim between codefendants and was filed separately from the initial motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim and subsequent to the circuit court's order granting the motion. Thus, Bear Brothers did not demonstrate a right to appeal the denial of the motion to stay at this time, and accordingly the Court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "Bear Brothers, Inc. v. ETC Lake Development, LLC" on Justia Law