Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The primary question in this commercial dispute involving, among other things, the right to a leasehold to certain commercial property, was whether, pursuant to the "necessary affects" requirement under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(a)(1), Defendants' appeal to the appellate division from a judgment declaring Plaintiff the lawful tenant of the subject property brought up for review two non-final supreme court orders: one dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint and the other denying Defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the appellate division, concluding that the appellate division improperly held that Defendants' appeal from the judgment did not bring up for review the order dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint. In other words, the appellate division erred in ruling that this order did not necessarily affect the final judgment. View "Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v. E. 149th Realty Corp." on Justia Law

In this construction defect case, defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff then filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment ruling. The court meanwhile entered judgment, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. When the trial court later denied the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff did not file a new notice of appeal. The question in this case was whether plaintiff needed to do so. Defendant argued that, because a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for new trial, its filing rendered plaintiff's earlier notice of appeal premature and, as a consequence, a nullity. Plaintiff argued that the motion for reconsideration did not constitute a motion for a new trial and thus had no effect on the filing of the notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under "Carter v. U.S. National Bank," (747 P2d 980 (1987)), a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, the court held that the filing of the motion did not have the effect of rendering the appeal a nullity. Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff was not required to file a new notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Carter" and earlier decisions declaring that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment constitutes a motion for a new trial were incorrectly decided. In this case, plaintiff's filing of the motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment did not render the filing of the notice of appeal premature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo v. Warren" on Justia Law

This was a quiet title action challenging a claimed interest to oil and gas rights reserved in 1924 when the landowners sold the surface and mineral estate but kept for themselves and their heirs what was described as a portion of the landowners' one-eighth interest in the oil, gas, or other minerals that might later be developed. The district court and court of appeals held that this reservation was a royalty interest and invalidated it under the rule against perpetuities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the royalty interest was not void under the rule against perpetuities because it was reserved in the grantors. View "Rucker v. DeLay" on Justia Law

Terry Leonhardt and his wife, Cindy, alleged that they entered into an oral lease with Terry's father, Delbert Leonhardt, which was to extend for the lives of Delbert and his wife, Ellen. They claimed the oral lease contained a right of first refusal that Terry could exercise after the death of both Delbert and Ellen. Delbert later entered into a written lease with his grandson, Matthew Oswald. The written lease encompassed some of the farmland Terry and Cindy alleged was part of their oral lease with Delbert. Terry and Cindy initiated a declaratory judgment action against Delbert, seeking a declaration that the oral lease and right of first refusal were valid. Matthew intervened in the lawsuit. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Delbert and Matthew on the ground that the lease was invalid under the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to provide them with notice that it would consider granting summary judgment on a legal theory different from the legal theory advances by Delbert and Matthew in their summary judgment pleadings and brief, and Terry and Cindy were prejudiced by the error. View "Leonhardt v. Leonhardt" on Justia Law

Defendants owned land on the shore of a pond. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants claimed to be the owners of the land under the pond that was adjacent to Defendants' waterfront land. The parties' claims depended on the interpretation of two 1973 deeds from Anthony and Marilyn Furlano to Defendants' predecessors in title. According to Defendants, the deeds conveyed both waterfront land and land under the water. Plaintiffs claimed that only the waterfront land was conveyed. Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin Defendants from interfering with or using the underwater property "and the water thereon." The supreme court granted summary judgment for defendants, but the appellate division modified and ruled in Plaintiffs' favor. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since the deeds did not expressly exclude underwater lands, they must be read as conveying such land, to the center of the pond, to Defendants' predecessors. View "Knapp v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Riverbend Community, LLC and Parkway Gravel, Inc. jointly owned a parcel of land (the Property), which they intended to develop into residential real estate. Before purchasing the Property, Riverbend and Green Stone Engineering, LLC signed a August 2005 Contract, which required Green Stone to perform four tasks: (1) Site Evaluation and Regulatory Review, (2) Wetlands Restoration Conceptual Design, (3) Wetland Enhancement Conceptual Layout, and (4) Regulatory Meetings and Presentation. In March 2006, the parties signed a second contract which required Green Stone to provide design services for the site and roadways, the stormwater collection and conveyance systems, the sanitary sewer system, the water supply piping system, the stormwater management plans, the sediment and erosion control plans, and the landscape plans. Green Stone left the project in late 2007. Riverbend hired a new engineering firm to complete the work, but the new firm needed Green Stone's work product. Green Stone would not release its work product unless Riverbend executed a release. In 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued two Cease and Desist Letters against Riverbend because of the work in the wetlands. Meanwhile, the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control filed a complaint against Riverbend too. As a result of the federal and state issues, Riverbend could not sell houses, and its lender foreclosed on and purchased the Property at a sheriff's sale in April 2012. Riverbend sued Green Stone for breach of contract, professional negligence, and simple negligence. Green Stone moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the economic loss doctrine barred the tort claims and the general release barred all claims. The trial judge granted the motion, and Riverbend appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court interpreted the release as a general release, and did not address the application of the economic loss doctrine. Because the Court found the release was a general release that unambiguously waived all claims, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment below on both the tort and contract claims. View "Riverbend Community, LLC, et al. v. Green Stone Engineering, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute over a mortgage was whether statutes of limitations apply to actions for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant based on the applicable statute of limitations, holding that to the extent Plaintiff's complaint sought declaratory relief, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural device through which parties may vindicate substantive legal rights, an action for declaratory judgment is barred by an applicable statute of limitations to the same extent that the same cause of action would be barred in a nondeclaratory proceeding. Remanded. View "Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents in this case were owners of a condominium unit, and Petitioner was the administrator and manager of the condominium. At issue in this case was whether the trial court erred in granting a judgment and dismissal in favor of Respondents, pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 42, reasoning that Petitioner's lien and foreclosure claim against Respondents' condominium unit was invalid because it was based upon an improperly administered assessment and not a valid debt. The court of appeals vacated and remanded the matter to the trial court, concluding that Petitioner's assessment against Respondents' unit was unlawful, in that it was not uniform and not levied on a pro rata basis, but concluded further that Petitioner did have the authority to make the assessment against Respondents. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that Petitioner's assessment against Respondents' unit was unlawful because it was not applied uniformly nor calculated in accord with Respondents' percentage undivided interest in the common areas and facilities; and (2) held that the remaining issues addressed by the court of appeals were not properly before the Court. Remanded. View "In re Foreclosure of Johnson" on Justia Law

This case involved a residence that the plaintiff homeowners allege contained "major structural defects." After discovering these defects and notifying the builder, the parties entered a "tolling agreement" to toll the applicable limitations period, so they could "engage in a review and analysis of the structural settlement issues to determine an agreed upon repair." After the builder refused to correct the defects, the plaintiffs filed suit averring breach of the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA); breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; implied warranty of construction performed in a workmanlike manner; negligence; and fraud/misrepresentation/and/or omission of fact. In response, the defendant builder asserted the claims were time-barred and that the tolling agreement was void. This appeal arose from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the tolling agreement was void: "Parties should not be discouraged from honest efforts to settle and/or compromise disputes, and thereby avoid incurring the attendant expenses and uncertainty of litigation and further burdening the courts – all laudable and desired goals. . . .parties should be allowed to agree to extend statutes of limitations (or repose) if they believe this to be in their best interest; however, the limitation period should not be shortened, absent an act of the Legislature." View "Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law