Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellants Raoel and Janet Clark and Jerry and Betty Peterson appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Buku Properties, LLC. Buku filed suit against the Clarks and the Petersons to recover earnest money deposits after two codependent land sale contracts failed to close. At the time the parties entered into the land sale contracts, the properties were zoned "R-1," which allowed for a minimum density of one acre lots. However, after the contracts were executed, but prior to closing, the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission began discussions to change the R-1 designation of the properties to R-5, which mandated a five acre minimum density. While conducting its due diligence, Buku discovered the County’s plan to change the zoning designation of the properties. Aware of the potential re-zoning, Buku sent Appellants proposed addenda to the land sale contracts seeking to extend the review period and closing date due to concerns about zoning and financing. The bank financing Buku’s purchase of the properties sent Buku a letter stating that Buku’s loan was only “conditionally approved,” and that, if the property were re-zoned R-5, the property value would be decreased. The bank stated that in order to fund the loan it “must receive verification from Jefferson County that this property will remain zoned R-1 Residential.” Buku sent Appellants’ counsel a letter demanding that all of the earnest money, except for a non-refundable amount from the Peterson contract, be returned. When none of the earnest money was returned, Buku brought suit alleging: (1) return of earnest money under contract; (2) conversion; and, (3) unjust enrichment. Additionally, Buku requested prejudgment interest on the earnest money and attorney fees. Appellants filed a counterclaim with their answer, asserting seven claims: (1) specific performance; (2) breach of contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) estoppel; (5) promissory estoppel/unjust enrichment; (6) Consumer Protection Act violations; and, (7) attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's judgment, and affirmed its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Buku. View "Buku Properties v. Clark" on Justia Law

Olin brought suit against its insurers, including American Home, regarding environmental contamination at Olin sites in the United States. On appeal, Olin challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of American Home. At issue was whether the $30.3 million attachment point for American Home's excess policies for the years 1966-69 and 1969-72 could be reached by the alleged property damage at Olin's Morgan Hill, California, manufacturing site. The court held that the plain language of Olin's policies with American Home required American Home to indemnify Olin for that damage. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to avail themselves under terms of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA), 15 U.S.C. 1701-20, by bringing suit for revocation of a purchase agreement they executed with defendants for a luxury condominium unit in New York City. Plaintiffs asserted that the agreement failed to comport with ILSA's disclosure requirements. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the purchase agreement was revocable because it did not contain "a description of the lot which makes such lot clearly identifiable and which is in a form acceptable for recording" under section 1703(d)(1) of ILSA. The court held that section 1703(d)(1) required the description and not the agreement itself be "in a form acceptable for recording" and that the description at issue in this case satisfied ILSA's requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions that the district court enter judgment for defendants. View "Bacolitsas v. 86th & 3rd Owner, LLC" on Justia Law

This was the second appeal from a judgment of the superior court finding that Annabelle Robbins had breached implied covenants in her deed when she sold land to David and Vickie Lloyd. On appeal, Robbins' estate argued that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the six-year statute of limitations had not expired, (2) finding that the neighboring landowners never possessed or occupied the disputed land and that it misquoted the neighbor's testimony in its decision, and (3) awarding damages in the amount agreed to by the parties in a stipulated judgment because the court vacated that judgment in 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly found the statute of limitations had not expired at the time when the Lloyds filed their complaint alleging Robbins's breach; (2) the court's misstatement in its decision was harmless; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages because the Estate failed to present any evidence that the stipulated damages were manifestly unjust and should be set aside. View "Lloyd v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Policyholder obtained a title insurance policy from Insurer for a parcel of property it owned. Because an ambiguity in the legal description of the property prevented Policyholder from reselling the property, Policyholder filed an action seeking a declaration of Insurer's obligations under the policy and alleging breach of contract against Insurer. The district court held in favor of Policyholder, concluding that Insurer was liable because the title to the property was unmarketable. The court, however, limited Policyholder's recovery to the face value of the policy. The court of appeals affirmed the finding of liability but held that Policyholder was entitled to recovery in excess of the policy limit. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to Policyholder on the question of Insurer's liability for its failure to defend and indemnify Policyholder; but (2) reversed the court of appeals' award of damages to Policyholder in excess of the policy limit and remanded for reinstatement of the district court's award of damages. View "Mattson Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Tile, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

Bowen's Wharf was a tourist destination including a marina and a variety of retailers, restaurants, and art galleries. In this appeal, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide a question that would clarify the rights and obligations of two adjacent landholders whose combined property comprised the entirety of Bowen's Wharf. The question presented for review was whether the trial justice erred in finding that a right of first refusal granted to Defendant, Bowen's Wharf Company, Inc., by Plaintiff, Ronald Fatulli, in 1969 had expired by expiration of law. The trial justice found the parties' right of first refusal agreement expired in 1979, and accordingly, Plaintiff was not obligated to offer a parcel of the property, a wharf, and a business to Defendant in the event of a bona fide third party's offer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that, on these facts, a wharf or dock may properly be characterized as real property; and (2) Defendant's right of first refusal expired by operation of R.I. Gen. Laws 34-4-26, which governs the expiration of recorded rights affecting real estate. View "Fatulli v. Bowen's Wharf Co." on Justia Law

In this dispute over real property, Roslyn Shephard, in her capacity as personal representative of the estates of real property owners (Lessors), terminated the third lease of Lessees based on an alleged violation of the terms of the lease. Shephard then sued Lessees, seeking to invalidate Lessees' third lease due to the fact that she had not signed it on Lessors' behalf. Shephard alternatively sought an order declaring that Lessees had breached the terms of the lease. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging that Shephard had breached the terms of the lease by wrongfully terminating the lease and by failing to provide notice to them of the alleged breach. The district court found in favor of Lessees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the lease was valid without Shephard's signature; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Lessees had not violated the lease; and (3) the district court correctly determined that the terms of the lease entitled Lessees to notice of their alleged breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Shephard v. Widhalm" on Justia Law

In October 2003, insurance agency Plaintiff Kennedy, Lewis, Renton & Associates, Inc. ("KLR"), secured a property insurance policy with Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ("Citizens") for Plaintiff Kirk Prest on property located in Boothville, Plaquemines Parish. Hurricane Ivan damaged Plaintiffs' buildings in 2004. Plaintiffs subsequently made repairs and undertook new construction on the property insured by Citizens. Because they were penalized for being underinsured for their losses in Hurricane Ivan, Plaintiffs wanted to ensure their property was properly covered by sufficient amounts of insurance in the future. The total amount of insurance coverage on the property was $350,000. As each phase of reconstruction and expansion was completed, Plaintiffs requested increased coverage on their buildings. There was a mistake on the form sent requesting increased coverage, in that the words "renew policy" were typed in rather than "increasing coverage." However, the comments immediately below correctly described the increased amounts of coverage on the buildings requested by the policy holder. Hurricane Katrina hit southeast Louisiana on August 29, 2005, eleven days after an August 2005 policy change request. At that time, Plaintiffs believed they had a total of $540,000 in insurance coverage on their property. The KMR insurance agent assisting Plaintiffs in requesting the coverage increases also believed Plaintiffs had coverage in that amount. In May 2006, Citizens sent a letter to Plaintiffs, advising them the policy had been reviewed and the requested increases in the policy limits would not be honored. According to Citizens, Plaintiffs only had the original $350,000 worth of coverage on their property. Plaintiffs filed suit against Citizens, seeking payment of the full policy amounts, including the amount of the requested coverage increases, attorney fees and penalties. In the alternative, Plaintiffs also sought recovery from KLR. After engaging in pretrial discovery, Plaintiffs and Citizens entered into a settlement agreement in late 2008. Without admitting liability, Citizens settled the claims against it for a total of $540,000 from Citizens. After trial on the merits against KLR, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, finding KLR was negligent in its handling of its clients' requests for coverage increases. KLR appealed both the finding of liability and the award of damages. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding of negligence in part, holding there was manifest error in the trial court's finding the insurance agency failed to exercise reasonable diligence with regard to a July 2005 request for increased coverage. The Supreme Court granted KLR's writ, primarily to determine the correctness of the trial court's award of general damages. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding general damages and reversed that portion of the damage award. View "Prest v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute related to the purchase of a lot in the Bahamas. The court held that the district court erred when it determined that the appraisal fraud claims were within the scope of the lot purchase contract's forum-selection clause. The court also held that the district court erred in applying equitable estoppel to allow the nonsignatories to the lot purchase contract to invoke the lot purchase contract's Bahamian forum-selection clause. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment granting the motion to dismiss for improper venue and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers" on Justia Law