Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Patrick Kofmehl bought a piece of land from Baseline Lake, LLC. By closing, the parties disputed the amount of land to be covered by their sales contract. Petitioner was willing to close only if the disputed parcel was included; the sale ultimately failed to close. The trial court invalidated the contract for failing to comply with the statute of frauds and denied specific performance to either party. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether Petitioner was entitled to recover his down payment before the dispute arise. Upon review, the Court concluded that because neither party breached the contract. The Court affirmed the appellate court which reversed the grant of summary judgment that granted restitution. View "Kofmehl v. Baseline Lake, LLC" on Justia Law

Bruce Nelson subdivided property in the 1970s. Appellant claimed he purchased tract eighteen from Nelson ten days after Nelson filed the plat. Appellant claimed that at the time of the conveyance, Nelson guaranteed that it would not sell adjoining tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee filed a notarized declaration four years later. In 2005, however, Nelson sold tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee purchased tracts sixteen and seventeen in 2008. Appellee filed a quiet title action to clear her title of any cloud that may have arisen as a result of Appellant's declaration. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee, concluding that Appellant's declaration did not create a restriction on development and that there was no restriction on the property prohibiting the sale of the disputed tracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Appellee. View "Pennington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the interpretation of a clause concerning the allocation of real estate taxes contained in a written lease between Inland American Retail Management and Cinemaworld of Florida. Inland and Cinemaworld were successors-in-interest to a ground lease for the rental of what is now a movie theater in a shopping center. Under the terms of the lease, Cinemaworld incurred certain liabilities and expenses. Pursuant to a clause in the lease, Cinemaworld was required to pay an amount equal to the real estate taxes "levied, assessed, or otherwise imposed" against the movie theater. Inland filed a complaint for breach of the lease for Cinemaworld's alleged failure to make timely payments as required by the lease. The superior court granted partial summary judgment in Cinemaworld's favor with respect to its motion seeking an accounting, ruling that the formula allocating Cinemaworld's reasonable share of real estate taxes should be based on the square footage of its leased premises. Inland appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the interpretation of the parties' lease. View "Inland Am. Retail Mgmt. LLC v. Cinemaworld of Fla., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1907, Florence conveyed her 1/7 interest in "the surface only" of a 225-acre tract of land to Walter, her brother, who was vested with an undivided 6/7 interest in the tract. The subject tract was subsequently conveyed several times. In 1967, Respondent purchased the interest in the 225-acre tract that was previously owned by Walter. Respondent asserted that he was the sole owner of all oil and gas rights under the tract. Petitioners, successors to Florence, contended that they owned a portion of the 1/7 interest in the oil and gas under the tract. The circuit court ruled in favor of Respondent after declaring that the term "surface only" was ambiguous and relying on contemporary testimony to interpret the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "surface," when used as a term of conveyance, is not presumptively ambiguous and does have a definite and certain meaning; (2) the deed clearly conveyed from Florence to Walter her share of "the surface only" to the tract and reserved to Florence the remainder of the tract, including the oil and gas underlying the tract; and (3) accordingly, Petitioners were owners of a portion of Florence's 1/7 interest in the minerals underlying the tract. View "Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan " on Justia Law

Tenant-Defendant Bhole, Inc. terminated its commercial lease before the lease expired. Before the end of the lease, Plaintiff-landlord Shore Investments, Inc. filed suit to recover the entire unpaid rent for the balance of the term. The lease agreement did not contain an acceleration clause. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that though defendants breached the lease, the trial court erred by not considering the lease did not have an acceleration clause. The trial court's award of damages and attorney's fees was inappropriate, and its decision regarding the landlord's claim for tortious interference with the lease (with a punitive damages award) was also made in error. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bhole, Inc., at al. v. Shore Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased property from Charles Johnson. During the pendency of the sale of the property, Johnson misrepresented the condition of the property and failed to disclose its prior use as a junkyard. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Johnson alleging various causes of action and seeking damages for loss of investment, undisclosed physical problems with the property, and emotional distress. While he owned the disputed property, Johnson maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate refused to defend or indemnify Johnson on Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs and Johnson subsequently reached an agreement resolving the underlying complaint, and the superior court entered a judgment against Johnson for $330,000. Plaintiffs then initiated a reach and apply action against Allstate. The trial court granted summary judgment for Johnson, determining that the policy did not cover the damages Plaintiffs suffered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' damages did not constitute covered "bodily injury" or "property damage" pursuant to the Allstate homeowners insurance policy. View "Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

SEECO, Inc. owned oil-and-gas leases and possessed rights authorizing it to explore for and develop minerals from several tracts of land. SEECO filed an interpleader action to determine the ownership of the oil, gas, and minerals in the land. Appellee requested that the circuit court quiet title and confirm title in Appellees. Several defendants were named in the action. The circuit court ruled that a 1929 mineral deed, even with a blank left empty in the granting clause, conveyed one hundred percent of the mineral interest in three tracts of land to J.S. Martin. Appellees included the Stanton Group, as Martin's heirs and successors in interest, and SEECO. Appellants appealed, arguing that the 1929 mineral deed was void because the description of the interest was so vague that it was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1929 mineral deed was unambiguous, and the circuit court did not err by refusing to consider the parol evidence of a subsequent 1930 deed. View "Barton Land Servs., Inc. v. SEECO, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purchase and sales agreement agreeing to buy Defendant's property and deposited ten percent of the purchase price with Defendant's real estate agent until closing. Defendant signed the agreement but also made certain handwritten alterations to the contract. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's handwritten alterations were material changes that constituted a counter-offer, not an acceptance of Plaintiffs' offer to purchase the property. The jury found there was never a valid contract between the parties and Plaintiffs were entitled to the return of their deposit. The trial court added prejudgment interest to the judgment. Defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs were not entitled to interest on their deposit. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the award of prejudgment interest in this case, holding that Plaintiffs' deposit did not fall within the category of "pecuniary damages" under R.I. Gen. Laws 9-21-10(a), and therefore, Plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest. View "Andrews v. Plouff" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Patrick and Terese Ayer appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to Frances Harris and Louis Hemmingway, III. The dispute arose over plaintiffs' attempts to collect a debt from defendant Hemmingway individually, and doing business as Hemmingway Construction. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Hemingway in February 2001. Plaintiffs subsequently secured a nonpossessory writ of attachment against Hemingway's nonexempt goods and estate. In 2010, Frances Harris brought an unrelated action against Hemingway for damages. The trial court issued a stipulated judgment order that, among other things, awarded Harris judgment against Hemingway plus interest from September 8, 2005 until the release of the lien in favor of plaintiffs, required Hemingway to keep current on payments to plaintiffs pursuant to a written payment agreement signed by Hemingway and plaintiff Terese Ayer, and provided that if Hemingway defaulted on the lien, he would be liable to Harris for any costs, including attorney's fees, to obtain a release of the lien. In May 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on their judgment lien. Plaintiffs cited a 2006 trial court order as controlling and asked the court to renew or revive it. Hemingway filed an unverified answer to plaintiffs' complaint, acknowledging his debt to plaintiffs and offering to make immediate payments pursuant to the 2010 agreement. Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment, but the court denied their request. Harris responded to this order; Hemingway did not. Harris later moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and default.  In January 2011, the trial court granted Harris's motion, and found that plaintiffs' judgment lien was no longer effective because more than eight years had elapsed from the issuance of the original final judgment on which it was based. In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the 2001 judgment had been renewed or revived by the 2006 stipulated amended order. This appeal followed. Agreeing with the trial court's reason to dismiss plaintiffs' motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ayer v. Hemingway" on Justia Law

Respondent awarded Petitioner a contract to develop an affordable housing development project. The parties entered into a development services agreement (DSA) that contained a provision stating that the parties would proceed to arbitration under state law in the event of a dispute. Petitioner was subsequently terminated from the project. Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioner asserting several causes of action, including intentional misrepresentation and negligence. Petitioners counterclaimed. Petitioners later filed an arbitration motion, which the circuit granted. The intermediate court of appeals denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the order compelling arbitration in this case was sufficiently final under the collateral order doctrine to be appealable under the general civil matters appeal statute; (2) the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the DSA encompassed all claims of Respondent and counterclaims of Petitioners; and (3) the circuit court correctly granted the motion to compel alternative dispute resolution and to stay proceedings. Remanded. View "County of Hawaii v. UniDev, LLC" on Justia Law