Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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The parties in this case entered into a real estate agreement thirteen years ago. The trial court concluded that the agreement constituted a contract for deed and that the purchasers had therefore acquired an equitable interest in the property in question. The court initiated a foreclosure on that interest, even though it had not been pled. Plaintiffs, the purchasers as found by the superior court, David and Barbara Prue, appealed the foreclosure. Defendant, the seller as found by the court, Larry Royer, appealed the court’s conclusions that the contract was an enforceable contract for deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s conclusion that the parties entered into a contract for deed and that it was enforceable, but reversed the foreclosure decree as premature. View "Prue v. Royer, Sr." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sued for a declaratory judgment that the lien on their homestead was void and that the mortgage holder was required to forfeit all principal and interest. Plaintiffs also sought damages for defamation. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under Tex. Const. Art. XVI 50(a)(6); because there was no evidence or allegation of defendants' attempting to conceal information, and because the facts that gave rise to any claims were obvious and not hidden, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply in this instance to estop the lenders' assertion of the limitations defense; because the loan was valid, and plaintiffs were delinquent, the statements at issue were true and no defamation occurred; the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the statute of limitations barred only remedies; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the amended complaints. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Priester, Jr., et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs acquired the assets of a restaurant. Defendant owned the real property on which the building was located. Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into an agreement granting Plaintiffs a ten-year lease of Defendant's real property. The lease granted Plaintiffs the option to purchase Defendant's real property in 1999 at the expiration of the lease. Plaintiffs claimed they provided written notice to Defendant of their interest in purchasing the property and that Defendant agreed to the appointment of an independent appraiser in 2000, but Defendant never followed through in procuring an appraisal. In 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment and order requiring Defendant to select an independent appraiser and sell the property. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint on statute of limitations grounds and granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on her unlawful detainer counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a set of facts that would enable them to equitably estop Defendant from raising her statute of limitations defense; and (2) the district court did not improperly consider matters outside the pleadings in reaching its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Situ v. Smole" on Justia Law

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In 2002, U.S. Health entered into a 20-year lease for a nursing home and adjacent property owned by Lock. Before mid-2006, U.S. Health assigned the lease to Americare without obtaining Lock’s written consent, a required by the lease. Two lawsuits followed. One charged that U.S. Health had violated a provision of the lease under which it was required to fund a replacement reserve and resulted in a stipulated judgment in Lock’s favor of $679,287.96, plus prejudgment interest. The next day, U.S. Health filed a motion to set aside the judgment. Days later, the parties stipulated to a new judgment of $485,430.56 with attorneys’ fees to be agreed by June 10, and entry of a supplemental judgment. After extensions, the court entered a final judgment of $485,430.56, plus post-judgment interest at 5.13 percent. The court later granted Lock’s motion for fees of $29,238.85. Weeks later, the court granted Lock’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (3) to modify the judgment to include Americare as a judgment debtor because it had only then learned that U.S. Health, without the necessary authorization from Lock, had assigned its lease to Americare. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that it had jurisdiction. View "Lock Realty Corp. IX v. U.S. Health, LP" on Justia Law

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The Condominium Association’s declaration required Bayside to provide fresh water and wastewater treatment to the Association and made all of the water facilities common property of the Association. Bayside contracted with TSG to construct and operate a system to fulfill its obligations. TSG charged Bayside $0.02 per gallon. By 2005, Bayside owed millions of dollars to creditors including TSG and the Association. Bayside assigned its rights to TSG, permitting TSG to charge $0.05 per gallon. To secure the Association’s consent Bayside and TSG threatened to cease providing services even though it was not feasible to obtain those services elsewhere. The Association’s Board consented and signed a Water Supply Agreement, which provided that Bayside owned the water facilities and contained an arbitration clause. After not receiving payments under the WSA, TSG temporarily stopped producing potable water for the Association, which then filed suit, asserting criminal extortion under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act; breach of obligations under the Declaration; and ownership of the water treatment systems. The district court ordered arbitration. The Third Circuit affirmed in part but vacated in part. The Association raised a bona fide question as to whether its Board had authority to enter into the WSA, a question that requires judicial determination. View "SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort Inc." on Justia Law

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Petitioners and Respondents executed a land contract whereby Respondents agreed to sell a piece of property to Petitioners. After the land contract had been fully consummated, Respondents refused to tender a deed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed suit, seeking a delivery of a general warranty deed for the property, including all oil and gas rights. Two months later, Respondents tendered a deed to Petitioners reserving oil and gas rights. The deed was recorded on February 17, 2010. Petitioners moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the land contract did not contained any language indicating Respondents' intention to except oil and gas rights, any questions of interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grantees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, finding that when the deed was recorded, the land contract was merged in the deed and any cause of action based upon the contract was extinguished. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous, and Respondents failed to establish any legally sufficient basis for varying its terms; and (2) therefore, Respondents were obligated to convey their title and interest to the property, including their vested oil and gas rights. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. View "Spitznogle v. Durbin" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from a dispute in district court over two liens on real property: a deed of trust and a mortgage. Appellants (Insight, LLC and several other companies) are assignees of a mortgage secured by 160 acres of real property owned by Summitt, Inc., which included an 18-acre parcel Summitt purchased from Respondents Patrick and Monica Gunter. The Respondents held a deed of trust on the 18-acre parcel. Summitt defaulted on its obligations to both Insight and the Gunters. Insight filed suit naming Summitt's principals and the Gunters as defendants. The Gunters denied that their deed of trust was junior to the Insight-Summitt mortgage. The district court denied Insight's motion for summary judgment because there was an issue as to who was the initial encumbrancer. After trial, the district court found that the closing of the Gunter-Summitt deed of trust was separate and independent from the Insight-Summitt mortgage. Furthermore, the court found that the Gunters' deed of trust effectively encumbered the Gunter property at the time the transaction between Summitt and the Gunters closed. However, it found that the Insight mortgage on the combined 160-acre parcel did not create an encumbrance on the Gunter property until the Gunter-Summitt transaction closed. On appeal, Insight argued that the mortgage had priority as a matter of law because it was a purchase money mortgage that was first recorded. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's finding that Insight had notice of the Gunters' deed of trust was clearly erroneous. Further, the Insight-Summitt mortgage was a purchase money mortgage , and that the court erred in concluding the deed of trust took priority. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment in this case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Insight LLC v. Gunter" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a commercial lease dispute. Boise Mode, LLC leased space in its building to Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd. (DPP). Timothy Pace executed a personal guarantee for the lease. During the term of the lease, Boise Mode remodeled part of the building for another tenant. After raising concerns to Boise Mode about the adverse effects of the construction to its business, DPP eventually stopped paying rent and vacated the premises prior to the end of the lease. Boise Mode then brought an action against DPP, alleging breach of contract, and against Pace for breaching the guarantee. DPP counterclaimed, alleging that the disruption caused by the construction constituted breach of contract and constructive eviction. After Boise Mode moved for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, DPP requested a continuance to complete discovery. The district court denied DPP's motion and ultimately granted Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment. DPP appealed the grant of summary judgment as well as the district court's denial of its request for a continuance. Upon review, and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace" on Justia Law

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Kristy Johnston, Judy Olsen, and their mother, Joyce Johnston, owned real property as tenants in common. Joyce left her one-third interest in the property to Kristy when she died. Kristy sent a letter to Judy in 2009 in which she offered to buy Judy's interest in the property or to sell her interest to Judy. Judy accepted Kristy's offer to sell. Kristy subsequently attempted to reject Judy's acceptance and revoke her offer to sell. Judy filed a complaint against Kristy. The court granted Judy's motion for summary judgment, determining that the letters exchanged between Judy and Kristy had created an enforceable contract that satisfied the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that the parties' exchange of letters created an enforceable contract. View "Olsen v. Johnston" on Justia Law

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Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law