Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting a new trial on plaintiffs' claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and its denial of defendants' request for attorney fees at trial. Plaintiffs Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed purchased a home from Robert and Jorja Shippen via warranty deed. After the basement of the home flooded, the Goodspeeds filed suit against the Shippens, alleging breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The district court denied a request for a jury instruction on the requirements for disclaiming the implied warranty of habitability and the case went to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Shippens, and the Goodspeeds moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing the disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability in the purchase and sale agreement was ineffective because it was not conspicuous. The district court granted a new trial after determining it had excluded the disclaimer instruction based upon its incorrect belief that the Goodspeeds had actual knowledge of the disclaimer. View "Goodspeed v. Shippen" on Justia Law

Appellee sought to void or reform a deed resulting from a sale of property through Appellant's real estate company. Specifically, Appellee claimed that the deed grossly misrepresented the amount of land he contracted to buy. The deed's description called for 300 acres but showed the property was being sold by tract, not acreage. Appellee learned through other sources that the property did not consist of 300 acres. After closing, a survey showed the tract contained forty-four acres. The trial court ruled in favor of Appellants, concluding that, because Appellee was aware at the time of closing that the tract did not contain 300 acres of land, no fraud existed that warranted reforming the deed. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because Appellee was aware there was a deficiency in acreage, Appellee was on notice regarding the deficiency in the property, and the common law doctrine of caveat emptor applied. View "Manning v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action alleging that he was the owner of certain mineral rights in the land previously sold to the Sabine River Authority. The court disagreed, concluding that the language used in the conveyance deeds did not demonstrate that the disputed mineral rights were transferred to plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest. Therefore, defendant owned the disputed mineral rights and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Temple v. McCall, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants Tommy and Erin Dorsey contended that they were conveyed beachfront property when they bought "Lot 1." Respondents, who own the other lots in the subdivision, contended that the property was dedicated to the use and benefit of the entire subdivision. The district court agreed with Respondents. Plaintiffs appealed. But after a review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Ross v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

The Bank of Commerce filed suit to foreclose on two mortgages against properties under development by Jefferson Enterprises, LLC. Jefferson raised a variety of counterclaims. Ultimately the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, ordering the foreclosures. Jefferson raised numerous issues on appeal, but finding no error or abuse of the district court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Ent" on Justia Law

Petitioner Patrick Kofmehl bought a piece of land from Baseline Lake, LLC. By closing, the parties disputed the amount of land to be covered by their sales contract. Petitioner was willing to close only if the disputed parcel was included; the sale ultimately failed to close. The trial court invalidated the contract for failing to comply with the statute of frauds and denied specific performance to either party. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether Petitioner was entitled to recover his down payment before the dispute arise. Upon review, the Court concluded that because neither party breached the contract. The Court affirmed the appellate court which reversed the grant of summary judgment that granted restitution. View "Kofmehl v. Baseline Lake, LLC" on Justia Law

Bruce Nelson subdivided property in the 1970s. Appellant claimed he purchased tract eighteen from Nelson ten days after Nelson filed the plat. Appellant claimed that at the time of the conveyance, Nelson guaranteed that it would not sell adjoining tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee filed a notarized declaration four years later. In 2005, however, Nelson sold tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee purchased tracts sixteen and seventeen in 2008. Appellee filed a quiet title action to clear her title of any cloud that may have arisen as a result of Appellant's declaration. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee, concluding that Appellant's declaration did not create a restriction on development and that there was no restriction on the property prohibiting the sale of the disputed tracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Appellee. View "Pennington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the interpretation of a clause concerning the allocation of real estate taxes contained in a written lease between Inland American Retail Management and Cinemaworld of Florida. Inland and Cinemaworld were successors-in-interest to a ground lease for the rental of what is now a movie theater in a shopping center. Under the terms of the lease, Cinemaworld incurred certain liabilities and expenses. Pursuant to a clause in the lease, Cinemaworld was required to pay an amount equal to the real estate taxes "levied, assessed, or otherwise imposed" against the movie theater. Inland filed a complaint for breach of the lease for Cinemaworld's alleged failure to make timely payments as required by the lease. The superior court granted partial summary judgment in Cinemaworld's favor with respect to its motion seeking an accounting, ruling that the formula allocating Cinemaworld's reasonable share of real estate taxes should be based on the square footage of its leased premises. Inland appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the interpretation of the parties' lease. View "Inland Am. Retail Mgmt. LLC v. Cinemaworld of Fla., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1907, Florence conveyed her 1/7 interest in "the surface only" of a 225-acre tract of land to Walter, her brother, who was vested with an undivided 6/7 interest in the tract. The subject tract was subsequently conveyed several times. In 1967, Respondent purchased the interest in the 225-acre tract that was previously owned by Walter. Respondent asserted that he was the sole owner of all oil and gas rights under the tract. Petitioners, successors to Florence, contended that they owned a portion of the 1/7 interest in the oil and gas under the tract. The circuit court ruled in favor of Respondent after declaring that the term "surface only" was ambiguous and relying on contemporary testimony to interpret the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "surface," when used as a term of conveyance, is not presumptively ambiguous and does have a definite and certain meaning; (2) the deed clearly conveyed from Florence to Walter her share of "the surface only" to the tract and reserved to Florence the remainder of the tract, including the oil and gas underlying the tract; and (3) accordingly, Petitioners were owners of a portion of Florence's 1/7 interest in the minerals underlying the tract. View "Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan " on Justia Law

Tenant-Defendant Bhole, Inc. terminated its commercial lease before the lease expired. Before the end of the lease, Plaintiff-landlord Shore Investments, Inc. filed suit to recover the entire unpaid rent for the balance of the term. The lease agreement did not contain an acceleration clause. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that though defendants breached the lease, the trial court erred by not considering the lease did not have an acceleration clause. The trial court's award of damages and attorney's fees was inappropriate, and its decision regarding the landlord's claim for tortious interference with the lease (with a punitive damages award) was also made in error. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bhole, Inc., at al. v. Shore Investments, Inc." on Justia Law