Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

EdgeRock Development, LLC developed a planned unit development in Westfield, Indiana, comprising retail and residential projects. EdgeRock contracted with C.H. Garmong & Son, Inc. and Fox Contractors Corp. to develop the lots. When EdgeRock fell behind on payments, Garmong and Fox recorded construction liens on all five lots, including those sold to ZPS Westfield, LLC and a nonparty. The contractors sued EdgeRock for breach of contract and sought to foreclose the liens.The Hamilton Superior Court awarded the contractors most of the relief they sought, including foreclosure of the construction liens. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the foreclosure, concluding the liens were overstated as they were not limited to debts for improvements directly benefiting the properties to which the liens attached.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case to address the validity and scope of the construction liens and the priority between the construction liens and First Bank Richmond’s mortgage lien. The court held that a construction lien secures only the debt for improvements directly benefiting the property to which the lien attaches. Therefore, the contractors can foreclose the liens on each property to recover only those amounts. The court also concluded that First Bank’s mortgage lien is senior to the construction liens for the amount loaned to satisfy Garmong’s prior construction lien but junior for the remaining amounts.The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment consistent with its opinion. The court also noted that its holdings do not disturb the in personam judgments against EdgeRock on Garmong’s and Fox’s breach-of-contract claims. View "Edgerock Development, LLC v. C.H. Garmong & Son Inc" on Justia Law

Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. (Cashman) was contracted by Cardi Corporation, Inc. (Cardi) to construct marine cofferdams for the Sakonnet River Bridge project. Cashman then subcontracted Specialty Diving Services, Inc. (SDS) to perform underwater aspects of the cofferdam installation. Cardi identified deficiencies in the cofferdams and sought to hold Cashman responsible. Cashman believed it had fulfilled its contractual obligations and sued Cardi for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Cardi counterclaimed, alleging deficiencies in Cashman's construction. Cashman later added SDS as a defendant, claiming breach of contract and seeking indemnity and contribution.The Superior Court denied SDS's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact. The case proceeded to a jury-waived trial, after which SDS moved for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice granted SDS's motion, finding Cashman failed to establish that SDS breached any obligations. SDS then moved for attorneys' fees, which the trial justice granted, finding Cashman's claims were unsupported by evidence and lacked justiciable issues of fact or law. The trial justice ordered mediation over attorneys' fees, resulting in a stipulated amount of $224,671.14, excluding prejudgment interest.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law, as Cashman failed to provide specific evidence of justiciable issues of fact. The Court also upheld the award of attorneys' fees, finding no abuse of discretion. Additionally, the Court determined that the attorneys' fees were not barred by the Bankruptcy Code, as they arose post-confirmation and were not contingent claims. View "Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc." on Justia Law

A contractor, Flintco, LLC, entered into a subcontract with Total Installation Management Specialists, Inc. (Total) for flooring work on a construction project at Oklahoma State University. Total was required to secure a performance bond from Oklahoma Surety Company (OSC). Flintco later supplemented Total's workforce due to delays and performance issues but did not notify OSC until five weeks after taking over the work.The Tulsa County District Court ruled in favor of Flintco, awarding damages against Total and OSC. OSC appealed, arguing that Flintco failed to meet the performance bond's conditions requiring a declaration of default and reasonable notice before assuming control of the work. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the district court's judgment, finding that the notice requirement was a mandatory condition precedent, and Flintco's failure to provide timely notice relieved OSC of liability.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Civil Appeals. The court held that the performance bond's notice requirement constituted a mandatory condition precedent. Flintco's failure to provide timely notice to OSC so it could exercise its performance options under the bond relieved OSC from liability. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, reversed the district court's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with this decision. The trial court's judgments against Total were not affected by this decision. View "Flintco, LLC v Total Installation Management Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Billings County and its commissioners, who appealed a district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction preventing them from entering the property of Sandra Short, David Short, Donald Short, and Sarah Sarbacker. The dispute centers on the County's attempt to use eminent domain to construct a bridge over the Little Missouri River, known as the Little Missouri River Crossing (LMRC). The Shorts had previously settled a lawsuit with the County in 2021, where the County agreed not to pursue eminent domain for the LMRC project. Despite this, a newly elected Board of Commissioners decided to proceed with the project in 2023, leading the Shorts to file a new lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the Shorts, finding that they were likely to succeed on their breach-of-contract claim based on the Settlement Agreement. The court refrained from deciding on the validity of the Settlement Agreement, leaving that issue for the state court to address. The district court also stayed its proceedings, pending the outcome of the state court case, and denied the County's motion to dismiss without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the County could not lawfully contract away its power of eminent domain, as it is an essential attribute of sovereignty. The court concluded that the Settlement Agreement was contrary to law and that the Shorts were not likely to succeed on their breach-of-contract claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Short v. Billings County" on Justia Law

Rick Holloway and John Hoskin entered into a Commercial Sales Agreement to purchase the UXU Resort Ranch from Hidden Creek Outfitters, LLC. The sale included a special use permit from the U.S.D.A. Forest Service, which required a bridge inspection and load test before transfer. Due to the inspection's delay, the parties postponed closing and placed $200,000 in escrow for bridge-related expenses. After inspections, Park County Title released the escrow funds to Hidden Creek without H&H's consent, despite unresolved bridge issues.The District Court of Park County found that Hidden Creek and H&H each breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Park County Title breached the escrow agreement by releasing funds without H&H's approval. However, the court determined H&H failed to prove actual damages with sufficient certainty, awarding only nominal damages. The court also denied attorney’s fees to all parties.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's findings. The court held that H&H did not prove actual damages because the inspections did not conclusively identify necessary or required repairs. The court also upheld the denial of attorney’s fees, finding no abuse of discretion, as both parties bore some fault in the litigation. The Supreme Court denied any attorney’s fees associated with the appeal. View "Holloway v. Hidden Creek Outfitters, LLC" on Justia Law

Myers-Woodward, LLC (Myers) owns 160 acres in Matagorda County, Texas. In 1947, Myers’s predecessors retained the surface estate but transferred the mineral estate to the predecessor of Underground Services Markham, LLC and United Brine Pipeline Company, LLC (collectively, USM). The mineral deed granted USM’s predecessor an interest in all oil, gas, and other minerals on the land, along with rights necessary for mining and transporting these minerals. In 2008, USM acquired all of Texas Brine Company’s interest in the salt on the property. Disputes arose over the ownership of caverns created by salt mining and the calculation of royalties owed to Myers.The district court ruled that USM owned the subsurface caverns created by its salt mining activities but denied USM’s request to use the caverns for storing hydrocarbons produced off-site. The court agreed with Myers that USM could only use the land for purposes specified in the 1947 deed. Regarding royalties, the district court ruled that Myers was entitled to a one-eighth royalty based on the market value of the salt at the point of production, which amounted to $258,850.41. Myers appealed, challenging the royalty calculation and the ownership of the caverns. USM cross-appealed, contesting the limitation on its use of the caverns.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision that Myers, as the surface estate owner, retains ownership of the empty spaces within the salt formations. The court held that the mineral estate does not include ownership of the empty spaces created by salt mining. However, the court reversed the lower courts’ calculation of Myers’s royalty payments, ruling that Myers is entitled to an in-kind royalty of one-eighth of the net proceeds from the sale of the salt. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "MYERS-WOODWARD, LLC v. UNDERGROUND SERVICES MARKHAM, LLC" on Justia Law

Neely, acting as his own general contractor, hired Grosvold to perform excavation work on his property under an oral contract. Grosvold worked from April to October 2021, but their relationship deteriorated, and Neely refused to pay for an invoice amounting to $55,858. Neely sent Grosvold a notice of alleged defects in the work, which Grosvold disputed. Grosvold then filed a complaint for breach of contract and prejudgment interest, while Neely counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and construction defect.The District Court of the Third Judicial District in Anaconda-Deer Lodge County tried the case before a jury. The court refused to instruct the jury on Neely’s construction defect and negligence claims, reasoning that the evidence did not substantiate the work was done to a residence and that the case was strictly a breach of contract matter. The jury found Neely had breached the contract and awarded Grosvold $60,512.60 in damages. The court denied Grosvold’s request for prejudgment interest, finding the damages were not certain until the jury’s determination.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision not to instruct the jury on the construction defect claim, holding that the residential construction defect statute did not create an independent cause of action beyond breach of contract or tort. The court also affirmed the refusal to instruct the jury on negligence, finding that Neely’s substantial rights were not affected as the breach of contract instructions adequately covered the disputed subject matter. Finally, the court upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, concluding the amount of recovery was not capable of being made certain until the jury’s verdict. View "Grosvold v. Neely" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Clint Shalla entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch to prevent a foreclosure on his farm. The Kochs agreed to purchase the farm and give Clint an exclusive option to repurchase it by August 15, 2015, with written notice and financing commitment. Clint's wife, Michelle, was not a party to the agreement but conveyed her marital interest in the property. Clint sought financing from Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, who allegedly agreed to secure financing. Clint missed the option deadline, and the Kochs later agreed to sell the farm for a higher price. Goerdt, who had moved to County Bank, secured financing for the Shallas, but was later found to be involved in fraudulent activities.The Iowa District Court for Washington County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank, dismissing Michelle's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court later reconsidered and dismissed the Shallas' negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, citing Iowa Code section 535.17. The court ruled in favor of County Bank in the foreclosure action and found Goerdt liable for conversion. The Shallas appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, with a dissent on the application of the statute of frauds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, barred the Shallas' claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court concluded that the statute applies to all actions related to unwritten credit agreements, regardless of whether the claims are framed in contract or tort. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of County Bank's attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees. View "County Bank v. Shalla" on Justia Law

Shanda Yates was bitten by a pit bull named Yurk while visiting her friend Neah Friar, who rented a property from TLM Investments, LLC. Friar's lease had a no-pet provision, which she disregarded by keeping Yurk and concealing his presence from TLM. Yates filed a personal injury claim against both Friar and TLM, alleging negligence on TLM's part for allowing Yurk on the property and claiming protections under the lease.The Prentiss County Circuit Court denied TLM's motion for summary judgment, leading to an interlocutory appeal. TLM argued that it had no knowledge of Yurk's presence or his dangerous propensities, as Friar had intentionally concealed the dog. TLM also contended that Yates failed to establish herself as an intended third-party beneficiary under the lease.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and found that Yates did not provide evidence that TLM had actual or constructive knowledge of Yurk or his dangerous propensities. The court noted that the no-pet provision in the lease was not an admission that all dogs are dangerous but was intended to prevent property damage. Additionally, the court found that Yates did not have standing to claim protections under the lease as she was not a party to it and was not an intended third-party beneficiary.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, rendered summary judgment in favor of TLM, and remanded the case to the Prentiss County Circuit Court for any necessary further proceedings. The case against TLM was dismissed with prejudice. View "TLM Investments, LLC v. Yates" on Justia Law

In 2005, Island Pointe, LLC contracted Complete Building Corporation (CBC) to construct a condominium project, Palmetto Pointe at Peas Island. CBC subcontracted Tri-County Roofing (TCR) for roofing and related work. In 2014-2015, Palmetto discovered construction defects and sued CBC, TCR, and others for negligence and breach of warranty. Palmetto received $6,800,000 in settlements, including $1,000,000 from CBC's insurer for a covenant-not-to-execute and $1,975,000 from four other defendants.The trial began in May 2019, and the jury found CBC and TCR liable for $6,500,000 in actual damages and $500,000 each in punitive damages. The trial court apportioned 5% liability to two other defendants, making CBC and TCR jointly and severally liable for the remaining 90% of actual damages. TCR sought setoff for the $1,000,000 payment and the settlements from the four other defendants. The trial court denied TCR's motion for setoff, except for partial amounts conceded by Palmetto.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that TCR is entitled to set off the full $1,000,000 paid by CBC's insurer. The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the settlements from Novus, Atlantic, H and A, and Cohen's, agreeing that the trial court reasonably allocated the settlement amounts. The case was remanded to the trial court for the calculation of the judgment against TCR. View "Palmetto Pointe v. Tri-County Roofing" on Justia Law