Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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James and Amber May hired RES Construction to build their home in Sioux Falls. RES subcontracted First Rate Excavate, Inc. to install the septic system and construct the foundation. The Mays alleged that the foundation was installed several feet below grade level, causing significant drainage and septic issues that damaged their home, yard, and neighboring properties. They sued First Rate for negligence. The circuit court dismissed the claim based on the economic loss doctrine, and the Mays appealed.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County, South Dakota, dismissed the Mays' negligence claim, citing the economic loss doctrine, which limits remedies for purely economic losses to those specified in a contract. The court reasoned that the Mays lacked privity of contract with First Rate and that their claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the economic loss doctrine should not be expanded beyond claims arising from transactions involving the sale of defective goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court noted that the doctrine is designed to prevent parties from circumventing contract remedies by seeking tort remedies for economic losses. Since the Mays' claim was based on negligence and not on a UCC transaction, the economic loss doctrine did not apply. Additionally, the court found that the lack of privity between the Mays and First Rate further precluded the application of the economic loss doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "May v. First Rate Excavate" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the lease of a commercial property that has lasted nearly eight years. The plaintiff brought claims against the defendants for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of G. L. c. 93A. The plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded a monetary judgment of over $20 million. The defendants paid the full amount of the judgment but notified the plaintiff that they intended to exercise their appellate rights.The Superior Court initially handled the case, and the plaintiff prevailed. The defendants appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. The defendants then sought further appellate review, which the Supreme Judicial Court granted, limited to issues related to postjudgment interest.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the exercise of appellate rights does not constitute a condition on the payment of a judgment. Therefore, the judgment was fully satisfied when it was paid in full, and the accrual of postjudgment interest halted upon payment. The court concluded that postjudgment interest is meant to compensate the prevailing party for the loss of the use of money when damages are not paid on time, not to punish or discourage appeals. The court reversed the portion of the lower court's order that allowed for the accrual of postjudgment interest after the defendants' payment in full. View "H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington Street, LLC" on Justia Law

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Charles Bich and the Bruno Bich Trust made a series of loans to WW3 LLC, owned by Curt Waldvogel, for constructing an oil-processing facility in North Dakota. Waldvogel assured the Bichs that their investment would be secured by real and personal property. However, the project failed, and the Bichs did not recover their investment, leading them to sue for breach of contract.The Eastern District of Wisconsin court found that Waldvogel's promise to secure the loans with property was a "special promise" under Wisconsin law, requiring compliance with the statute of frauds. Since there was no written agreement meeting the statute's requirements, the court ruled the loan agreement unenforceable. The court also determined that the promise would have constituted a mortgage, which also needed to satisfy the statute of frauds. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the breach of contract claim but allowed the unjust enrichment claim to proceed to trial. The jury awarded the Bichs $200,000 for unjust enrichment, and the court held Waldvogel and WW3 jointly and severally liable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the promise to secure the loans with property was a mortgage under Wisconsin law and required a written agreement to be enforceable. The court found that the emails exchanged between the parties did not constitute a final agreement and did not meet the statute of frauds' requirements. Consequently, the breach of contract claim failed, and the unjust enrichment award remained the only compensation for the Bichs. View "Bich v WW3 LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute arising from a 2016 real estate transaction in which the Bauers sold residential property in Crawford County to the Beamons. The Beamons filed a complaint with two claims under the theory of fraud and deceit, seeking both monetary damages and equitable rescission of the contract. Before trial, the Beamons elected remedies associated with their equitable claim, leading to a bench trial. The circuit court rejected the rescission claim but awarded damages for breach of contract and granted the Beamons' motion for attorney’s fees.The Bauers appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding damages for breach of contract and attorney’s fees. The Beamons cross-appealed, arguing the court erred in denying their rescission request. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s award of damages for breach of contract, affirmed the denial of rescission, and noted it lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney’s fees award due to the Bauers' failure to file an amended notice of appeal.Following the mandate, the Bauers filed motions for their own attorney’s fees and to set aside the Beamons' attorney’s-fee judgment. The circuit court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider these motions. The Bauers appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction. The court clarified that the mandate did not foreclose the circuit court from ruling on new motions for attorney’s fees, which are collateral matters, or on a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4). Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Bauers' motions. View "BAUER v. BEAMON" on Justia Law

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DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC and DCA Capitol Hill SNF, LLC (collectively, “DCA”) leased a property from Capitol Hill Group (“CHG”) in Northeast Washington, DC, to operate a long-term acute care hospital and skilled nursing facility. In 2015, DCA began withholding rent payments, claiming dissatisfaction with CHG’s installation of a new HVAC system and generator. CHG sued for breach of contract, and DCA counterclaimed for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and fraud, alleging misrepresentations by CHG.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to CHG on DCA’s fraud counterclaims related to pre-lease representations, citing the lease’s integration clauses. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of CHG on its breach-of-contract claim and DCA’s counterclaims, finding that CHG had fulfilled its obligations regarding the HVAC system and generator work. The court also awarded CHG attorneys’ fees based on a provision in the lease.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court held that DCA’s fraud claims related to pre-lease representations failed as a matter of law because DCA’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable. The court also concluded that CHG had not breached the lease, as the term “new HVAC system” did not include distribution components, and CHG had fulfilled its generator-related obligations by replacing one generator. The court upheld the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to CHG, finding no abuse of discretion.The case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award CHG attorneys’ fees associated with the appeal. View "DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC v. Capitol Hill Group" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency" on Justia Law

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Alrig USA Acquisitions LLC, a commercial real estate developer, entered into a purchase and sale agreement with MBD Realty LLC for a property in Portland. MBD was aware that the City of Portland planned to redevelop the area, which would involve condemning part of the property, but did not disclose this to Alrig. The agreement included clauses allowing Alrig to terminate the agreement and receive a refund of its deposit under certain conditions, including eminent domain. Alrig extended the inspection period multiple times, paying additional deposits, and eventually waived its due diligence and title review contingencies, making the deposit nonrefundable except in the event of MBD’s default. Alrig later learned of the redevelopment plans and terminated the agreement, seeking a refund of the deposit, which MBD refused.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted MBD’s motion to dismiss Alrig’s complaint for breach of contract and fraud, concluding that MBD had no duty to disclose the redevelopment plans. Alrig appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the amendment to the agreement unambiguously made the deposit nonrefundable except in the event of MBD’s default, and thus Alrig’s contract claim failed. Additionally, the court found that MBD did not actively conceal the City’s planned condemnation, and there was no special relationship imposing a duty to disclose. Therefore, Alrig’s fraud claim also failed as a matter of law. The court concluded that Alrig was not entitled to relief under any set of facts that might be proven in support of its claims. View "Alrig USA Acquisitions LLC. v. MBD Realty LLC" on Justia Law

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Northstar Center, LLC entered into a real estate contract with Lukenbill Family Partnership, LLLP to purchase a 120-acre parcel of land. The contract was later assigned to Northstar by Templeton Enterprises, LLC. The agreement included an option to purchase an additional 105-acre parcel, which was amended to a commitment to purchase. Northstar provided a promissory note for a tax increase payment due by January 1, 2014, but paid it late. Lukenbill sold the disputed property to Tundra Properties, LLC, leading Northstar to sue for breach of contract and intentional interference with contract.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Northstar on its breach of contract claim against Lukenbill and its intentional interference with contract claim against Tundra. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra and dismissed Tundra’s breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill. The court held a bench trial on Northstar’s damages due to Lukenbill’s breach.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims. The Supreme Court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Northstar breached the contract by failing to make the tax increase payment on time and whether Tundra had knowledge of the contract amendments. The court also found that the district court improperly resolved factual disputes regarding Tundra’s knowledge and intent, and whether Tundra acted without justification.The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Tundra’s breach of warranty claim but reversed the summary judgments on Northstar’s breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as well as Lukenbill’s indemnification claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership" on Justia Law

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CEZ Prior, LLC ("CEZ") entered into a purchase agreement with 755 N Prior Ave., LLC ("Prior") to buy a property for $26 million. The agreement required Prior to cooperate in obtaining tenant estoppel certificates. Errors in square footage measurements led to rent discrepancies, prompting an amendment to reduce the purchase price to $15.1 million and the cash required at closing to $3.8 million. CEZ later requested to delay closing due to financial issues, but Prior did not agree. Prior sent estoppel certificates that did not address rate increases, and CEZ proposed edits that Prior rejected. CEZ demanded satisfactory certificates on the closing date, but Prior terminated the agreement, alleging CEZ failed to tender cash.CEZ sued Prior for breach of contract in Minnesota state court and sought to enjoin the termination. Prior removed the case to federal court and counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court stayed the matter and later denied CEZ's motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court found that CEZ was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim, as Prior had reasonably cooperated in obtaining the estoppel certificates. The balance of harms favored Prior, given CEZ's insufficient evidence of its ability to pay. The public interest did not favor CEZ due to its low probability of success on the merits.The court also addressed CEZ's argument under Minnesota law, finding that the district court's stay order was not an injunction and did not extend statutory deadlines. Consequently, CEZ was not entitled to additional time to close under Minnesota statutes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "CEZ Prior, LLC v. 755 N Prior Ave. LLC" on Justia Law

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Phillip and Sara Alig, along with Daniel and Roxanne Shea, filed a class action lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC) and Title Source, Inc. (now Amrock, Inc.). They alleged that during the refinancing of their home mortgage loans, they paid for appraisals that were not independent because the defendants had provided appraisers with the homeowners' estimates of their homes' value. They claimed this made the appraisals worthless and asserted statutory, breach of contract, and conspiracy claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia certified a class of West Virginia citizens who refinanced mortgage loans with Quicken and received appraisals that included an estimate of the property's value. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarding over $10.6 million in damages. The court found that the plaintiffs had established a conspiracy between the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the class certification and summary judgment on the statutory and conspiracy claims but vacated and remanded the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which emphasized that every class member must have Article III standing to recover damages.On remand, the district court reinstated its original judgment, stating that TransUnion did not affect the class's standing. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that class members suffered concrete harm from the defendants' actions. The court reversed the district court's judgment certifying the class and awarding damages, affirming the judgment on the named plaintiffs' statutory and conspiracy claims, and vacating the judgment on the breach of contract claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law