Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In a putative class action involving a water main break the Supreme Court denied a requested writ of prohibition sought by West Virginia-American Water Company (WVAWC) to preclude enforcement of the circuit court's order certifying an "issues" class pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4), holding that WVAWC failed to demonstrate that the circuit court's class certification was clearly erroneous.The water break in this case and its ensuing repair resulted in water service interruptions that caused outages, inadequate water pressure, and boil water advisories affecting 25,000 WVAWC customers. Respondents filed this putative class complaint on behalf of the putative class asserting breach of contract and other claims. The circuit court certified the "issues" class to determine "the overarching common issues" as to WVAWC's liability, resulting in WVAWC bringing this action. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition, holding that WVAWC failed to demonstrate that the circuit court's class certification was clearly erroneous. View "State ex rel. West Virginia-American Water Co. v. Honorable Webster" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for a company later acquired by the Paradies Shops. He, like many employees, entrusted his employer with sensitive, personally identifiable information (PII). In October 2020, Paradies suffered a ransomware attack on its administrative systems in which cybercriminals obtained the Social Security numbers of Plaintiff and other current and former employees. Shortly after learning of the data breach, Plaintiff brought claims for negligence and breach of implied contract on behalf of himself and those affected by the data breach, arguing Paradies should have protected the PII. He now appeals from the district court’s order granting Paradies’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. He contends the district court demanded too much at the pleadings stage.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the breach of implied contract claim and reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that, as the Georgia Supreme Court has noted, “traditional tort law is a rather blunt instrument for resolving all of the complex tradeoffs at issue in a case such as this, tradeoffs that may well be better resolved by the legislative process.” Nevertheless, having applied Georgia’s traditional tort principles, the court concluded Plaintiff has pled facts giving rise to a duty of care on the part of Paradies. Getting past summary judgment may prove a tougher challenge, but Plaintiff has pled enough for his negligence claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. View "Carlos Ramirez v. The Paradies Shops, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court dismissing Defendants' appeals from the order of the trial court denying their specials motions to dismiss the underlying civil action brought against them by Plaintiff, holding that a trial court's denial of a colorable special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-196a is an appealable final judgment under State v. Curcio, 453 A.2d 566 (Conn. 1983).Plaintiff brought this action against claiming that Defendants breached a nondisparagement provision of the parties' settlement agreement, caused him to suffer economic damages, and deprived him of the benefit of the agreement. Defendants filed separate special motions to dismiss the action as a SLAPP suit pursuant to Conn. Gen. Conn. 52-196a. The trial court denied the special motions. The appellate court reversed and granted Plaintiff's motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's denial of Defendants' colorable special motions to dismiss constituted an appealable final judgment under State v. Curcio, 463 A.2d 566 (Conn. 1983). View "Pryor v. Brignole" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of India, worked as a crew member on the Stargate, a merchant ship managed by the Singapore-based shipping company Eastern Pacific. Plaintiff brought suit against Eastern Pacific in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging tort claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law, as well as contract claims arising from a collective bargaining agreement. In March 2020—after Plaintiff brought his complaint and Eastern Pacific consented to federal court jurisdiction, but before Plaintiff perfected service—Eastern Pacific sued Plaintiff in Goa, India. In the Indian suit, Eastern Pacific sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent Plaintiff from litigating in American court. Plaintiff sought an anti-suit injunction to prohibit Eastern Pacific from prosecuting its Indian suit against him. Finding the Indian litigation vexatious and oppressive and determining that it need not show comity to the Indian court that had attempted to enjoin the American suit, the district court granted the injunction in favor of Plaintiff. Eastern Pacific appealed the district court’s grant of the anti-suit injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that there is no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting the anti-suit injunction. The court reasoned that the district court was well within its discretion to conclude that the vexatiousness of the Indian litigation outweighed any comity concerns. View "Ganpat v. Eastern Pacific Shipping" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court failing to rule on Plaintiffs' contract claim, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that Plaintiffs waived their breach of contract claim.Plaintiffs, who leased property owned by Defendants, brought this action alleging wrongful eviction, breach of contract, and defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the wrongful eviction claim and then dismissed Plaintiffs' defamation claims. The court of appeals affirmed and ruled that Plaintiffs waived their breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly held that Plaintiffs waived their contract claim. View "Wieland v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Louis DeGidio, the father of Plaintiffs, began purchasing, distributing, and servicing Industrial Combustion, LLC’s (“IC”) burners for institutional boiler systems in a sales area including most of Minnesota. IC’s non-exclusive distributors are responsible for installing and servicing the IC burners they sell. In 1996, the family incorporated Louis DeGidio, Inc. (“LDI”) and Louis DeGidio Services, Inc. (“LDSI”). LDI continued purchasing burners from IC. LDSI installed and serviced the burners LDI sold, purchasing replacement parts from IC. The two corporations shared the same location, officers, and shareholders. Plaintiffs were joint 50% shareholders and key officers of both. Whatever written agreement was then in effect is not in the record, but it is undisputed that LDI was the distributor. At issue is whether a manufacturer collects an indirect “franchise fee” within the meaning of the Minnesota Franchise Act if it charges the distributor a price based on the retail price the manufacturer paid a third-party vendor for the parts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and agreed with the district court the answer is clearly no, and therefore, the distributorship agreement here at issue was not a franchise. The court further agreed that the manufacturer did not breach an oral implied-in-fact contract and was not barred by promissory estoppel when it terminated the DeGidio sales representative without cause. Applying Minnesota law and reviewing de novo, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of IC and its parent company, Cleaver-Brooks, Inc. View "Louis DeGidio, Inc. v. Industrial Combustion, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants Robert and Kelly Franks sought automobile insurance from Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in 2013 for their two vehicles. Appellants included underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM”) in their policy but completed a form rejecting stacked UIM coverage in compliance with Section 1738(d)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”). Absent such waiver, stacked coverage would be the default. Appellants removed one of the original vehicles and added a third vehicle to the policy effective 2014, and again rejected stacked UIM coverage. They made another change to the policy in 2015, removing the other of the original insured vehicles with a different car. No additional form rejecting stacked UIM coverage was offered or sought to be completed on the occasion of the removal of the last vehicle, and the ongoing premiums paid by Appellants reflected the lower rate for non-stacked UIM overage on two vehicles. Robert was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of a third party. That party had insufficient liability coverage to cover Robert's injuries. Appellants initiated a claim for UIM benefits under their policy with State Farm, but the parties disagreed on the limit to their benefits. Appellants contended with the last change to the policy, there was no valid waiver of stacked UIM coverage, resulting in a default stacked coverage mandated by statute. The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review in this matter was whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law by holding that removal of a vehicle from a multiple motor vehicle insurance policy, in which stacked coverage had previously been waived, did not require a renewed express waiver of stacked coverage pursuant to Section 1738(c). The Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not err and affirmed its judgment. View "Franks, et al. v. State Farm Mutual" on Justia Law

Law firm Halscott Megaro, P.A. (“Halscott Megaro” or “the firm”) sued former clients and their guardians (collectively “former clients”), seeking to recover unpaid legal fees and expenses. A district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court took judicial notice of a North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission (“Commission”) decision that found the firm’s lead partner misled the former clients and engaged in other unethical conduct. The court then held the firm was precluded from relitigating issues decided by the Commission. It held that Halscott Megaro failed to plausibly plead claims for which relief could be granted. Halscott Megaro appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered matters outside the pleadings and failed to accept its allegations and all reasonable inferences from them as true in concluding that the Commission’s decision as to its lead partner bound the law firm.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court committed no reversible error in granting the former clients’ motion to dismiss or in denying the law firm’s motion for recusal. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Commission was acting in a judicial capacity when it entered its discipline order against Megaro. The court also agreed that Megaro received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and due process protections. Further, the court held that the firm’s allegations of impartiality were not related to any particular facts, sources or statements. A presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of unsupported or highly tenuous speculation. View "Halscott Megaro, P.A. v. Henry McCollum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants as to some of Plaintiff's claims and the judgment entered on the defense verdicts on Plaintiff's remaining defamation claims, holding that Plaintiff had not shown grounds for reversal.Plaintiff, the former principal at St. Joseph's Catholic School, brought this action against Father Josephs Pins, St. Joseph's Church, and the Diocese of Des Moines after her employment was terminated, alleging fraud and defamation by all defendants and breach of contract against Father Pins. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's fraud, breach of contract, and defamation claims, and then a jury returned defense verdicts on the remaining defamation claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to reversal on his allegations of error. View "Konchar v. Pins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Union Mutual”) appealed from a district court judgment. On March 4, 2017, a fire started at Liberty Avenue in Queens, New York, spreading to and damaging four neighboring buildings insured by Union Mutual. After an investigation, the fire marshals concluded, but could not determine with certainty, that the fire originated in the extension cords used by Ace Caribbean Market. Union Mutual paid proceeds to the damaged neighboring buildings and subrogated into their owners’ tort claims. Union Mutual then sued Ace Caribbean Market and others (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that their negligent use of the extension cords caused the fire. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. At issue on appeal is whether evidence that a fire may have originated in the extension cords is sufficient to show that (a) the owners and proprietors were negligent in their use of the extension cords and (b) if they were negligent, that negligence was the cause of the fire.   The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that such evidence is not sufficient. The court held that, at most, Union Mutual produced weak circumstantial evidence that something wrong with the extension cords caused the fire. But, even assuming a reasonable jury could so conclude, Union Mutual showed no evidence of negligence whatsoever on Defendants’ part, and evidence of causation by itself is not evidence of negligence. The court concluded that there may have been negligence and that negligence may have been the cause of the fire. But no inference that it was Defendants’ negligence is permissible on the facts. View "Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Caribbean Mkt." on Justia Law