Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was arrested and released on a surety bond provided by Big Bubba’s. Plaintiff was formally charged with the same offense in April 2016, but due to an epileptic seizure, he was hospitalized before receiving notice of the indictment. As a result, he was incapacitated for several months, but according to Plaintiff, his wife stayed in touch with Big Bubba’s on his behalf. Big Bubba’s filed a petition with the trial court, requesting an arrest warrant for Plaintiff on the grounds that he had failed to fulfill his contractual obligations by neglecting to check in and provide contact information. The trial court granted the request, and Plaintiff was arrested pursuant. Plaintiff sued Big Bubba’s, alleging that it violated their agreement and caused him to be wrongfully arrested by presenting misleading information to the court. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation and granted Big Bubba’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that his false imprisonment and contract claims were wrongly dismissed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court as to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, and the court reversed and remanded his contract claim. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim was properly dismissed, his contract claim was not. The district court held that principals, such as Plaintiff, who seek to contest a surrender, are “limited to the remedy” set out in Tex. Occ. Code Section 1704.207(b)–(c). Thus the court concluded that Plaintiff is not limited to this remedy and therefore reverse the dismissal of his claim. View "Jeanty v. Big Bubba's" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition seeking relief from fraudulent transfers Respondent made to hinder collection of her judgments against him, holding that Petitioner adequately alleged facts that, if true, entitled her to relief under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.005 to 428.059.On appeal, Petitioner argued that she alleged facts that, if taken as true, demonstrated that she was Respondent's creditor and that he made two transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her and, regarding one of the transfers, without receiving an equivalent value in exchange and either was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case, holding that Petitioner adequately pleaded a claim for relief under both Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.024.1(1) and Mo. Rev. Stat. 928.029.1. View "Konopasek v. Konopasek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the former codefendants who settled Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion.In granting Defendant's motion to compel production, the trial justice concluded that the amount paid in accordance with the settlement agreement was not discoverable "pursuant to Rhode Island and federal law." When Plaintiffs failed to comply with the order the superior court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and remanded the case, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of the settlement agreement. View "Noonan v. Sambandam" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases involving claims brought against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) the Supreme Court answered, among other questions, that ERCOT is a governmental unit as defined in the Texas Tort Claims Act and is thereby entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.CPS Energy sued ERCOT and several of its officers for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court denied ERCOT'S plea to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that ERCOT was a governmental unit entitled to take an interlocutory appeal. In the second case, Panda sued ERCOT for, inter alia, fraud. The trial court denied ERCOT's pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals ultimately held that ERCOT was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in the first case and reversed in the other, holding (1) ERCOT was entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the Public Utility Commission of Texas has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' claims against ERCOT; and (3) ERCOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "CPS Energy v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas" on Justia Law

This dispute began in 2016 when Defendants sued a motorist in state court for damages stemming from an automobile accident. The motorist fled the scene of the accident, was criminally charged for failing to provide his name, address, and insurance information, and pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal misdemeanor. The motorist was insured by Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”). Allstate paid Defendants claims for property damages, but Defendants rejected Allstate’s offers to resolve their physical injury claims, demanding the policy limit of $50,000. The district court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). It subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, finding that the motorist’s failure to cooperate in the underlying suit prejudiced Allstate and barred any legal obligation to pay Defendants the judgment amount of $163,822.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that where the claim under the policy exceeds the value of the policy limit, courts considering declaratory judgments should ask whether there is a legal possibility that the insurer could be subject to liability in excess of the policy limit. The party seeking diversity jurisdiction should establish this possibility by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Allstate Fire and Casualty v. Allison Love" on Justia Law

In this case alleging defective design and development of a commercial property the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the running of limitations was equitably tolled while the suit was on appeal, holding that there was no tolling.The suit in this breach of contract and negligence action was eventually dismissed for failure to file a certificate of merit. Plaintiff nonsuited its claims and refiled. The court of appeals held that the certificate of merit was deficient as to the breach of contract claim but complied with the statute with respect to the negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the certificate of merit failed to satisfy Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 150.002 as to Plaintiff's negligence claim. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a new suit against Defendant that included a new certificate of merit. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the grounds that Plaintiff's claims were time-barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no tolling during the appeal of the earlier-filed lawsuit. View "Levinson Alcoser Associates, LP v. El Pistolon II, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of Supreme Court in favor of Plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB in this case involving a dispute over payments due under a promissory note relating to Defendants' mortgage, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted under the terms of this case.Plaintiff's predecessor filed a complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants appealed, arguing that the issue of whether Plaintiff complied with the note's notice provisions was a question of material fact precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that Plaintiff's failure to send the notice of default to the property address referred to in the note was not in accordance with the terms of the note, and therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Cavalloro" on Justia Law

Dr. Robert P. Rothenberg (Rob) tragically suffered a fatal heart attack prior to paying the initial premium on his term life insurance policy issued by Principal National Life Insurance Company (Principal). Principal filed this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant— the policy’s intended beneficiary—was not owed death benefits in light of the nonpayment. Appellant filed a counterclaim, asserting claims against Principal for breach of contract, vexatious denial of proceeds, and negligence, as well as claims against Appellee, the couple’s insurance broker and financial planner, for negligence. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Principal and Appellee, finding, in part, that the policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding (1) that the Policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death and (2) that, assuming the Policy was not in effect, neither Principal nor Appellee were negligent because neither owed a duty to Appellant.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant did not pay the initial premium until after Rob’s death, at which time he was not in a similar state of health as when he applied for the policy. Moreover, any “privileges and rights” Rob (or Appellant) had to retroactively effectuate the Policy were terminated at Rob’s death pursuant to the Policy’s termination provision. Second, Rob’s signature on the EFT Form alone did not render the Policy effective on April 26, 2019, or earlier. View "Principal National Life Insurance Company v. Donna Rothenberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or other supervisory writ, holding that the circuit court did not misinterpret the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure in the underlying discovery matter.Respondents filed a complaint against Monsanto Company alleging claims for design defect, failure to warn, negligence, breach of implied warranties, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and loss of consortium. After Respondents served Monsanto with a deposition notice Monsanto moved for a protective order arguing that the deposition was not permitted. The circuit court denied Monsanto's motion for protective order. Monsanto then brought this petition. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Monsanto was seeking to control the circuit court's exercise of its discretion in this discovery matter and that mandamus will not lie for this purpose. View "Monsanto Co. v. Kilgore" on Justia Law

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) stopped providing “Rapid Delivery”1 to Amazon Prime (“Prime”) subscribers. Because Prime subscribers were not notified of the suspension and continued to pay full price for their memberships, Plaintiff and others brought a putative class action against Amazon alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”), and unjust enrichment. The district court granted Amazon’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim with prejudice because it found that Amazon did not have a duty to provide unqualified Rapid Delivery to Prime subscribers.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court first wrote that it is allowed to use its “experience and common sense” to acknowledge the COVID-19 pandemic even though it was not included as a factual allegation in the First Amended Complaint. The court dispensed with this argument because Amazon’s prioritization of essential goods during the COVID-19 pandemic obviously did not harm the public interest. Further, the court explained that Plaintiffs specifically incorporated the terms of their contract with Amazon as part of their unjust enrichment count. So, while Plaintiffs may plead breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative, they have not done so. Instead, Plaintiffs pleaded a contractual relationship as part of their unjust enrichment claim, and that contractual relationship defeats their unjust enrichment claim under Washington law. View "Andrez Marquez, et al v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law