Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in this appeal concerning damage caused to an airplane owned by Plaintiff, holding that this Court had jurisdiction and that there was no error in the damages award and decision to award prejudgment interest.In the first appeal in this negligence case the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial on the limited issue of damages on the ground that the circuit court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on damages. On remand, the court awarded Plaintiff $131,735 in damages, prejudgment interest, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court had appellate jurisdiction; (2) the circuit court did not err in the method it chose to calculate Plaintiff's damages; and (3) the circuit court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest. View "Wright v. Temple" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court determining that Plaintiff could not recover under a commercial general-liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by United Specialty Insurance Company, holding that when a CGL insurance policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of an "assault or battery," the subjective intent of the person who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant.Brown County Care Center, an adult care facility, contracted with United for CGL insurance. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from "any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery." Plaintiff was living at the Center when he was attacked by another resident, who was later found by the trial court to be not guilty of felonious assault by reason of insanity. Plaintiff sued, and he and the Center entered into a settlement. Plaintiff later brought a declaratory judgment action against United to collect on the judgment. The trial court determined that Plaintiff could not recover under the policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attack on Plaintiff qualified as a civil-law assault; and (2) because the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries arising for civil assaults the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Krewina v. United Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that in the instant cases, where the decedents had no right to bring a cause of action for the injuries that caused their deaths at the time that they died as a result of the running of the statute of limitations on the decedents' underlying tort and breach of warranty claims, Plaintiffs, as personal representatives of the decedents' estates, had no right to bring wrongful death actions based on those injuries.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts dismissing these separate actions for wrongful death under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, 2. Both superior court judges ruled that, because wrongful death recovery is derivative of a decedent's own cause of action, the underlying wrongful death claims were precluded, as each decedent could not have brought claims based on the injuries that caused his death had he survived. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, thus following the majority approach precluding recovery for wrongful death where the statute of limitations on the decedent's underlying claims ran before the decedent's death. View "Fabiano v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing this putative action asserting various state law claims in relation to a data breach that allegedly exposed Plaintiffs' personally identifiable information (PII) and that of more than 75,000 other patients of Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC (IWP), holding that remand was required.Plaintiffs brought a class action complaint against IWP, a home-delivery pharmacy service registered and headquartered in Massachusetts, asserting state law claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of United States residents whose PII was compromised in the data breach at issue. The district court granted IWP's motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the complaint plausibly demonstrated Plaintiffs' standing to seek damages; and (2) Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief because their desired injunctions would not likely redress their alleged injuries. View "Webb v. Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) petitioned for review of a decision of the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board), the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) charged with authorizing certain rail carrier transactions under the Interstate Commerce Act. Norfolk Southern is a rail carrier that owns a 57.14 percent share of the Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company (Belt Line), the operator of a major switching terminal in Norfolk, Virginia. Norfolk Southern’s majority interest goes back to 1982, when its corporate family acquired and consolidated various rail carriers with smaller ownership interests in the Belt Line. Norfolk Southern’s competitor, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), owns the remainder of the Belt Line’s shares (42.86 percent). This case involves a different question raised before the Board for the first time:  whether the ICC/Board approvals of Norfolk Southern’s subsequent corporate-family consolidations in 1991 and 1998 authorized Norfolk Southern to control the Belt Line. The Board again answered no. Norfolk Southern petitioned for review.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Board’s decision regarding the 1991 and 1998 transactions is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board reasonably sought to avoid an absurd interpretation of 49 C.F.R. Section 1180.2(d)(3)’s corporate-family exemption that would allow a carrier to gain control of a new entity without following the Board’s review requirements and then “cure that unauthorized acquisition by reorganizing the corporate family.” The Board reasonably rejected Norfolk Southern’s claim that, by reshuffling the pieces of its corporate family, it acquired control authority of the Belt Line sub silentio. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. STB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the county court denying a motion to rescind and unwind a agreement entered into to settle Maronica B.'s personal injury claim against Davion Brewer and his automobile insurance carrier, holding that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Maronica sustained serious injuries when a car that Davion was driving and in which Maronica was a passenger collided with a school bus. Maronica's mother and then-conservator applied to the county court for permission to settlement Maronica's claims against Davion and his insurer. The county court authorized the settlement. Thereafter, Maronica's father, the successor conservator, moved to rescind and unwind the agreement on the grounds that the settlement potentially limited Maronica's recovery against non-settling parties. The county court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the county court's order and dismissed this appeal, holding that the county court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Maronica B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested and released on a surety bond provided by Big Bubba’s. Plaintiff was formally charged with the same offense in April 2016, but due to an epileptic seizure, he was hospitalized before receiving notice of the indictment. As a result, he was incapacitated for several months, but according to Plaintiff, his wife stayed in touch with Big Bubba’s on his behalf. Big Bubba’s filed a petition with the trial court, requesting an arrest warrant for Plaintiff on the grounds that he had failed to fulfill his contractual obligations by neglecting to check in and provide contact information. The trial court granted the request, and Plaintiff was arrested pursuant. Plaintiff sued Big Bubba’s, alleging that it violated their agreement and caused him to be wrongfully arrested by presenting misleading information to the court. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation and granted Big Bubba’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that his false imprisonment and contract claims were wrongly dismissed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court as to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, and the court reversed and remanded his contract claim. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim was properly dismissed, his contract claim was not. The district court held that principals, such as Plaintiff, who seek to contest a surrender, are “limited to the remedy” set out in Tex. Occ. Code Section 1704.207(b)–(c). Thus the court concluded that Plaintiff is not limited to this remedy and therefore reverse the dismissal of his claim. View "Jeanty v. Big Bubba's" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition seeking relief from fraudulent transfers Respondent made to hinder collection of her judgments against him, holding that Petitioner adequately alleged facts that, if true, entitled her to relief under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.005 to 428.059.On appeal, Petitioner argued that she alleged facts that, if taken as true, demonstrated that she was Respondent's creditor and that he made two transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her and, regarding one of the transfers, without receiving an equivalent value in exchange and either was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case, holding that Petitioner adequately pleaded a claim for relief under both Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.024.1(1) and Mo. Rev. Stat. 928.029.1. View "Konopasek v. Konopasek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the former codefendants who settled Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion.In granting Defendant's motion to compel production, the trial justice concluded that the amount paid in accordance with the settlement agreement was not discoverable "pursuant to Rhode Island and federal law." When Plaintiffs failed to comply with the order the superior court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and remanded the case, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of the settlement agreement. View "Noonan v. Sambandam" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases involving claims brought against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) the Supreme Court answered, among other questions, that ERCOT is a governmental unit as defined in the Texas Tort Claims Act and is thereby entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.CPS Energy sued ERCOT and several of its officers for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court denied ERCOT'S plea to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that ERCOT was a governmental unit entitled to take an interlocutory appeal. In the second case, Panda sued ERCOT for, inter alia, fraud. The trial court denied ERCOT's pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals ultimately held that ERCOT was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in the first case and reversed in the other, holding (1) ERCOT was entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the Public Utility Commission of Texas has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' claims against ERCOT; and (3) ERCOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "CPS Energy v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas" on Justia Law