Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Manuel Lainez had been independently driving commercial vehicles for eight and a half years. He owned his own truck and his own business, Lainez Trucking. He purchased a trucker’s liability policy from Scottsdale Indemnity Company with a $1 million liability limit. Lainez entered into a motor carrier agreement with Western Transportation Services. Western did not own tractors or trailers, but contracted with owner/operators or drivers. The agreement provided that Lainez was an independent contractor and was responsible for all costs and expenses incidental to the performance of transportation services. He agreed to maintain liability insurance and to name Western Transport as an additional insured. Western Transport, through the California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan (CAARP), purchased a commercial assigned risk policy from National Continental Insurance Company (NCI), which stated "'Named Insured’s Business: 1 Trucker for Hire-Excess'" and named Lainez as a driver. It did not list, describe, or rate any vehicle. It was rated on an excess cost of hire basis at a premium that was 4 to 10 percent of the cost of a policy rated on a primary cost of hire basis. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the two insurance companies were coprimary insurers or whether NCI was an excess insurer for an underlying fatality involving Lainez. The trial court granted NCI’s motion for a summary judgment, concluding that Scottsdale was the primary insurer pursuant to California Insurance Code section 11580.9, subdivisions (d) and (h). The Court of Appeal agreed that Scottsdale was the primary insurer and NCI was the excess insurer and affirmed the judgment. View "Scottsdale Indemnity v. National Continental Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Western Horizons sued Dakota Travel Nurse, a North Dakota corporation that contracts with healthcare facilities to provide licensed nursing staff, alleging Western Horizons and Dakota Travel Nurse entered a 2008 contract for Dakota Travel Nurse to provide licensed nursing staff for Western Horizons Care Center, a nursing home in Hettinger owned and operated by Western Horizons. Western Horizons claimed the parties' contract required Dakota Travel Nurse to "indemnify, hold harmless and defend Western Horizons against any and all claims, losses, demands, actions, administrative proceedings, liabilities and judgments, including reasonable attorneys fees, court[] costs and other expenses, arising from or associated with the action or inaction of [Dakota Travel Nurse] personnel." Western Horizons alleged Dakota Travel Nurse refused to defend or indemnify Western Horizons in a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons for injuries allegedly arising from the actions or inactions of Dakota Travel Nurse personnel providing care to the resident at the time of his injury. Dakota Travel Nurse was not a party to the resident's prior lawsuit, and Dakota Travel Nurse refused Western Horizons' tender of a defense in that action. Western Horizons thereafter settled the resident's lawsuit and brought this action against Dakota Travel Nurse, seeking a monetary judgment equal to the amount paid to settle the resident's lawsuit, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Western Horizons in defense of that action. Western Horizons Living Centers petitioned the Supreme Court for a supervisory writ directing the district court to reverse an order compelling Western Horizons to answer discovery requests by Dakota Travel Nurse, Inc., for information involving a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons. Western Horizons argued that its insurer's claims file in the prior lawsuit was protected by the lawyer-client privilege and that settlement negotiations and related documents from the prior lawsuit are not subject to discovery in this action. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded this was an appropriate case to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed the district court to vacate its order compelling discovery. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Western Horizons Living Centers v. Feland" on Justia Law

Petitioner granted Respondent a right of way to construct a pipeline across Petitioner’s property. The parties signed an agreement requiring Respondent to install the pipeline by boring underground in order to preserve the trees on the property. The construction company Respondent hired, however, cut down several hundred feet of trees. A jury found Respondent liable for damage to Petitioner’s property on both breach of contract and trespass theories and awarded damages both to compensate Petitioner for the reasonable cost to restore the property and for the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees. The court of appeals reversed based on the trial court’s failure to submit a jury question on whether the injury to the property was temporary or permanent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the general rule that temporary injury to real property entitles the owner to damages commensurate with the cost of restoring the property and permanent injury to the property entitles the owner commensurate with the loss in the fair market value to the property as a whole applies when the wrongful conduct causing the injury stems from breach of contract rather than tort; (2) the common law exception to this general rule that entitles the landowner to damages in keeping with the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees applies in this case; and (3) any error in the jury charge related to such damages was harmless. Remanded.View "Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines, LP" on Justia Law

William Weber and Dixie Weber irrigated eight tracts of water from the upper Taylor-Ord Canal under contract with North Loup Public Power and Irrigation District. In June 2010, flooding occurred that destroyed a diversion dam that North Loup had utilized to deliver water to irrigators. Due to the extent of the damage, North Loup concluded that water would not be provided to irrigators on the upper Canal during the 2010 irrigation season. At the time of the flooding, the Webers had not yet paid their 2010 irrigation charges. The Webers sued North Loup, alleging breach of contract and negligence and claiming damages resulting from reduced crop yields. The district court granted summary judgment for North Loup, concluding that because the Webers had not paid the 2010 irrigation charges, North Loup had no duty under the contracts to deliver water to the Webers during 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Webers’ failure to pay was both a nonfulfillment of a condition and a material breach of contract that relieved North Loup of its duty to perform; and (2) the Webers’ negligence claim failed as a matter of law because North Loup owed no duty to the Webers.View "Weber v. N. Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

A Homeowner contracted with a Builder to build a home on property owned by the Homeowner. The Builder contracted with a Plumber to put in the plumbing at the house. After the home was completed, the Builder and the Homeowner sued the Plumber for damages allegedly caused by plumbing leaks, alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Plumber, reasoning (1) the Homeowner could not recover contract damages because it was not a party to the plumbing subcontract, nor could the Builder recover contract damages because it had not suffered any compensable damage; and (2) the plaintiffs did not have a negligence claim because they did not allege violation of any tort duty independent of the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the pleadings and summary judgment evidence negated the existence of a negligence claim. View "Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging fraud, defamation, abuse of process, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims. Plaintiff also requested declaratory judgment, accounting, and injunctive relief. Pursuant to the parties’ prior agreement, which included an arbitration clause, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on all counts with the exception of claims involving defamation and abuse of process. Because Defendants appealed, the trial court refrained from ruling on Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Consequently, Plaintiff petitioned the court of appeals, without success, for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed. Plaintiff also appealed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ appeals were consolidated. The court of appeals affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal because Plaintiff attempted to appeal from a non-final order; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the abuse of process and defamation claims fell outside the agreement to arbitrate.View "Linden v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Helena Murphy appealed a superior court judgment in favor of defendant, Patriot Insurance Company, her homeowner’s insurer. The dispute between the parties stemmed from storm damage done to plaintiff's house in 2007, and the subsequent claims she made on her insurance policy. On appeal of the superior court's ruling in Patriot's favor, plaintiff argued: (1) Patriot was estopped from denying coverage for the removal and replacement of a chimney on her home; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing claims for negligence and bad faith. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murphy v. Patriot Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Progressive Casualty Insurance Company insured the vehicle involved in the accident at issue in this case. Given the number of victims, the policy’s liability coverage did not fully compensate at least one of the injured passengers. The parties disputed whether the injured passenger was therefore entitled to UIM benefits under Progressive’s policy. Progressive argued that coverage was barred by certain exclusions in its policy. The trial court found Progressive’s exclusions unenforceable as inconsistent with the definition of an "underinsured vehicle" set forth in 23 V.S.A. 941(f). Progressive appealed, arguing that its exclusions should be enforced, and that it should not have to provide both liability and UIM benefits to the injured passenger. The Supreme Court agreed with Progressive after its review of the case, and therefore, reversed the trial court’s decision.View "Progressive Casuality Insurance Co. v. MMG Insurnace Co." on Justia Law

Kreisers Inc., a Subchapter S corporation, hired First Dakota Title to assist it with a like-kind property exchange in order to receive tax deferred benefits under 26 U.S.C. 1031. The like-kind exchange partially failed. Kreisers subsequently sued First Dakota for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The circuit court rejected Kreiser’s negligent misrepresentation claim but determined that First Dakota was negligent in assisting Kreisers with the exchange. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in applying tort law rather than contract law to determine the duty that First Dakota owed to Kreisers; (2) did not err in concluding that Kreisers was not contributorily negligent; and (3) did not err in its calculation of damages.View "Kreisers Inc. v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

In Spring 2008, Williams Company Construction, Inc. entered into a construction contract to remodel the Friendly Smiles Cosmetic Dentistry Office owned by Dr. Brenda Barfield. Dr. Barfield previously leased the building from Williams Company owner Glen Williams for approximately five years before she purchased the property from him in 2008. Dr. Barfield hired Williams to remodel the building because of its construction experience and familiarity and knowledge of the building. When Dr. Barfield hired Williams, she did not know whether the remodeling work would be done by Williams or subcontractors. Dr. Barfield did not deal directly with any subcontractors during the remodeling project nor did she direct Williams to hire any specific subcontractors. During the remodel, Williams served as the general contractor and hired subcontractors to do various construction tasks. In December 2008, a section of a copper water pipe froze and burst. The frozen water pipe caused minor water damage and was repaired by plumbing subcontractor Home Heating. During the repair process, a Home Heating employee cut a hole in the wall to locate the leak and discovered that the air in the plumbing wall was cold. The employee was concerned the pipe could freeze again and notified the Friendly Smiles Cosmetic Dentistry Office about the cold air. Dr. Barfield contacted Williams to express her concern about the pipes re-freezing from the cold air. According to testimony, Williams told Dr. Barfield not to worry about the pipes freezing again because of circulating warm air around the hole. Dr. Barfield also wanted the hole in the wall patched, but had difficulty in securing Williams or Home Heating to fix it. Dr. Barfield made repeated requests for Williams or Home Heating to resolve the cold air issue, but they did not fix the problem. Approximately one week after the pipe was fixed, the water pipe froze and broke again, this time causing extensive water damage to the dental office. Dr. Barfield and her insurance company, Travelers Insurance, brought suit against Williams, Home Heating (and other subcontractors) for negligence, and breach of contract. Before trial, the parties stipulated that the total amount of damages was $220,046.09. Williams requested the trial court to include a jury instruction concerning the independent contractor distinction (C-55.25), and a jury instruction pertaining to the failure of a party to produce witnesses (C-80.30). The court denied the two requests. At the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated that the case would be tried before the jury based on comparative fault. The jury was given a special verdict form and found Williams seventy percent at fault, Home Heating twenty-five percent at fault, and Dr. Barfield five percent at fault. Judgment was entered against Williams. Williams subsequently filed a motion for a new trial arguing the court erred in denying its requested jury instructions and there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find Williams seventy percent at fault for the damages. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Williams appealed the district court's judgment, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of America v. Williams Co. Construction" on Justia Law