Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Samantha Gillespie and her mother, Tina Taylor, appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their lawsuit against Taylor's motor vehicle insurer, National Farmers Union, for underinsured motor vehicle coverage. Gillespie and Taylor sued Farmers Union for underinsured motor vehicle coverage, alleging Gillespie was insured under her mother's motor vehicle policy with Farmers Union and was driving a motor vehicle owned by another person when Gillespie lost control of the vehicle and it overturned, resulting in significant injuries to her. According to Gillespie and Taylor, the motor vehicle was owned by Angela Ayers, Gillespie's aunt, and insured by GEICO. Ayers died as a result of the accident and another passenger in the motor vehicle sustained significant injuries. Gillespie and Taylor asserted GEICO paid Gillespie $25,000 in no-fault benefits, but denied her request for liability coverage based on a claim that Ayers negligently entrusted the vehicle to Gillespie, an alleged inexperienced driver who received her learner's permit two days before the accident. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Gillespie and Taylor failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether Gillespie was legally entitled to collect for bodily injury from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, and affirmed. View "Gillespie v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

A stock transfer agent gave a stockholder an allegedly incomplete and misleading answer to a question about its requirements for removing a restrictive legend on the stockholder’s stock. The stockholder sued the transfer agent, asserting claims for violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.8401 and 104.8407, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. Under sections 104.8401 and 104.8407, a transfer agent must, on proper request, register a transfer of securities without unreasonable delay. The district court granted the transfer agent’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sections 104.8401 and 104.8407 did not support liability in this case because the stockholder did not ask the transfer agent to remove the legend and reissue him clean shares, and because the stockholder never submitted a transfer request, the agent’s statutory duty to register a requested transfer did not arise; and (2) the stockholder’s common law claims failed on the grounds that they were not supported by competent evidence.View "Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer" on Justia Law

A.H. Meyer & Sons, Inc. produced honey and beeswax at a plant in Winfred, South Dakota. Barton Solvents, Inc. sold the heptane to A.H. Meyer that A.H. Meyer used in its beeswax rendering process. The heptane was manufactured by CITGO Petroleum Corporation. In 2009, A.H. Meyer suffered a heptane explosion at its plant. Nationwide Mutual Insurance paid for the damage. Nationwide subsequently filed suit seeking subrogation from Barton Solvents and CITGO on causes of action alleging strict liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. All theories were premised on the theory that Defendants failed adequately to warn of heptane’s dangers. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no material issues of disputed fact existed with respect to the adequacy of the warnings.View "Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barton Solvents, Inc." on Justia Law

Following a two-day trial in May 2013, a Bullock County jury returned a $450,000 verdict in favor of Michael Shepherd on a breach-of-warranty claim he asserted against Barko Hydraulics, LLC. Shepherd purchased a Barko 495ML knuckle boom loader ("the 495ML loader") from G&S Equipment Company in 2008 for use in his logging operation. In November 2010, when the 495ML loader had approximately 4,300 hours on its clock, Shepherd transported it to G&S Equipment for repairs after the hydraulic pumps began making noise. G&S Equipment confirmed that the hydraulic pumps had failed and notified Shepherd that the needed repairs, costing approximately $10,000, would not be covered under the warranty because the warranty period had expired. At Shepherd's request, G&S Equipment contacted Barko, which confirmed that it would not authorize or reimburse G&S Equipment for making the needed repair because of the expiration of the warranty. At that point, Shepherd told G&S Equipment that he could not afford to pay for the repairs to the 495ML loader, nor could he continue to meet his obligation to Wells Fargo (the bank that lent him the purchase money for the loader). He left the loader with G&S Equipment, notified Wells Fargo of its location, and of his intention to make no further payments on it. Wells Fargo subsequently repossessed the loader, sold it, and obtained a $124,184 deficit judgment against Shepherd. Shepherd then sued Barko, G&S Equipment, and Cummins Mid-South, LLC, the manufacturer of certain component parts of the 495ML loader, asserting fraud, negligence and/or wantonness, and multiple breach-of-warranty claims. Shepherd sought both compensatory damages for lost profits and mental anguish and punitive damages. Ultimately, G&S Equipment and Cummins Mid-South were dismissed from the action, and, during the course of the trial, all of Shepherd's claims against Barko except a breach-of-express-warranty claim were withdrawn or dismissed. Barko's subsequent postjudgment motion renewing its previous motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied by the trial court. Barko then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court concluded the trial court erred in not granting Barko's postjudgment motions. The case was remanded for entry of an order granting Barko's motion for a new trial. View "Barko Hydraulics, LLC v. Shepherd " on Justia Law

Debtors contracted with Builder to finish construction on a house. After Debtors defaulted on progress payments, Builder sued Debtors and Bank, claiming that Defendants falsely represented or concealed material information about whether Debtors could pay for the work. The district court sustained Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Builder’s fraud and conspiracy claims. Debtors then confessed judgment on Builder’s breach of contract claim. After a bench trial, the district court ruled for Defendants on Builder’s equitable and promissory estoppel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court erred in granting summary judgment to Debtors on Builder’s fraud claim and to Debtors and Bank on Builder’s civil conspiracy claim; and (2) during trial, the court did not err in finding that Builder had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Bank promised to fund Builder’s work that was definite enough to induce Builder’s foreseeable reliance on the statement, but these factual findings did not preclude Builder’s proof of the same facts for its fraud claims. Remanded.View "deNourie & Youst Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

Appellant entered into a contract with Appellee specifying that Appellee would provide Appellant with software development services. Appellant later terminated the parties’ contract based on its alleged belief that three separate provisions of the parties’ agreement entitled it to terminate the contract. Appellee filed this breach-of-contract action against Appellant. Appellant counterclaimed for breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual relationship or business expectancy. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages. Appellant appealed the judgment and Appellee cross-appealed from the circuit court’s postjudgment denial of its motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal and reversed and on cross-appeal, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the jury’s breach-of-contract verdict; and (2) because the circuit court did not adequately explain its denial of attorneys’ fees, the case must be remanded for the limited purpose of making findings to allow for appellate review of the fee decision. View "Ark. Realtors Ass'n v. Real Forms LLC" on Justia Law

Mercury Casualty Company filed an action seeking declaratory relief regarding its obligation to students Hung Chu and his roommate Tu Pham. Mercury issued an automobile policy to Chu insuring his 1995 Honda Accord. Chu was driving, and Pham was a passenger, when Chu collided with a vehicle driven by Krystal Nguyen Hoang. Pham filed a personal injury action against Chu and Hoang and obtained a $333,300 judgment against Chu. Mercury sought a judicial determination confirming Mercury’s decision Chu’s policy excluded coverage for Pham’s judgment under a “resident exclusion.” Mercury also sought an order requiring Chu to reimburse Mercury the fees and costs it incurred in defending him against Pham’s lawsuit. Chu cross-complained against Mercury for breach of contract, bad faith, and general negligence. Mercury prevailed on the issue of whether the policy provided coverage for Pham’s judgment. The court determined Mercury had no duty to indemnify Chu with respect to the judgment. It granted Mercury’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (JOP) on Chu’s cross-complaint but determined Mercury could not seek reimbursement of its attorney fees and costs in defending Chu because such damages were not sought in the JOP. Both parties appealed. Chu and Pham appealed the determination that Mercury’s policy excluded coverage for Pham’s personal injury lawsuit against Chu. Mercury appealed the court’s ruling Chu was not required to reimburse Mercury for the defense fees and costs. After its review of the record, the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the policy provision excluding Pham from coverage was an overbroad expansion of the statutorily permitted exclusion and was also contrary to public policy. Based on this ruling, the Court did not address the issue raised in Mercury’s cross-appeal regarding its entitlement to defense costs and fees.View "Mercury Casualty v. Chu" on Justia Law

Defendants DISH Network LLC, AT&T Corporation, and EchoStar Satellite LLC appealed a judgment and two postjudgment orders in favor of plaintiffs Manuel and Deborah Holguin following a jury trial on the Holguins' complaint for breach of contract, negligence, and other torts. DISH, AT&T, and EchoStar argued that the trial court erred by denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial and by granting contractual attorney fees to the Holguins. The Holguins cross-appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion in making an award of attorney fees that allegedly did not fully compensate the Holguins' attorneys. The Holguins ordered a bundle consisting of telephone, Internet, and satellite television services. A DISH technician arrived at the Holguins' home to install the satellite dish and related equipment. The installation did not go as planned. The DISH technician drilled through a sewer pipe in the wall, fed a satellite television cable through it, and patched the wall without repairing the pipe. The Holguins did not discover the improper installation until 14 months later. In the intervening time, the damaged pipe leaked sewer water into the surrounding wall cavity and caused mold buildup in the Holguins' home. As a result, the Holguins suffered respiratory problems and other health issues. A DISH representative told the Holguins that DISH would reimburse them if they did not want to live in their house pending repair work, but the Holguins never received reimbursement. The Holguins retained an attorney and an industrial hygienist, who told the Holguins that there was still extensive mold growth even after remediation work. In particular, there was evidence of mold growth in other areas of the Holguins' home, in addition to the area immediately surrounding the damaged pipe. The Holguins asked DISH to complete the remediation and repair, but DISH did not do any additional work. The Holguins eventually hired their own contractor, who performed the remediation and repair at the Holguins' expense. DISH California admitted that the Holguins' satellite television equipment was negligently installed, but it denied that it was responsible for damages beyond the cost of repairing the pipe and certain incidentals. Aside from DISH California's admission of negligence, the defendants denied all of the Holguins' claims. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendants' posttrial motions, and the trial court's order awarding attorney fees. View "Holguin v. Dish Network LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee Yvonne Butler was a principal at a DeKalb County elementary school. Appellant DeKalb County School District notified appellee it would be terminating her employment for: (1) incompetency; (2) insubordination; (3) wilful neglect of duties; and (4)for other good and sufficient cause. Appellee was placed on suspension while the charges were pending. A hearing was scheduled pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act (FDA), but the parties agreed to a continuance. The record revealed the hearing never took place. Appellant offered appellee, in lieu of termination, a contract for a classroom teaching position for the 2011- 2012 school year and required that she sign and return the contract before May 19, 2011, if she chose to accept the offer. On May 31, 2011, appellee responded to the May 11 letter by asserting that she had a right to an FDA hearing. In her May 31 response, appellee never indicated she would be accepting the offered position of classroom teacher. On June 30, 2011, upon hiring new counsel, appellee returned the signed teaching contract "under protest." In July, appellant issued appellee a separation notice indicating appellee’s employment had ended as of June 30, 2011. The following March, appellee filed this mandamus action, requesting an FDA hearing, a name-clearing hearing, and damages for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in regard to the proffered 2011-2012 teaching contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted and denied in part both parties’ motions: the decision effectively granted appellee’s petition for a writ of mandamus and held that appellee was entitled to an FDA hearing because she was a tenured employee and had been demoted from an administrator to a teacher. In addition, the trial court held that the request for a separate name-clearing hearing was moot as appellee could clear her name at the FDA hearing. Finally, the trial court denied appellee’s claim of damages for breach because it found that appellee had not timely accepted the contract to be a classroom teacher for the 2011-2012 school year. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since appellee had earned tenure as a teacher, at the time of her suspension from the position as principal in 2010, the only right she had under the FDA was continued employment as a teacher. Therefore, the School District complied with the FDA when it offered appellee a teaching position for the 2011-2012 school year rather than insisting upon her termination. At that point, the FDA did not require any additional action by appellant. Thus, it was error for the trial court to conclude that appellant was required to hold a demotion hearing pursuant to the FDA in addition to offering appellee continued employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court in all other respects. View "Dekalb County Sch. Dist. v. Butler" on Justia Law

Manuel Lainez had been independently driving commercial vehicles for eight and a half years. He owned his own truck and his own business, Lainez Trucking. He purchased a trucker’s liability policy from Scottsdale Indemnity Company with a $1 million liability limit. Lainez entered into a motor carrier agreement with Western Transportation Services. Western did not own tractors or trailers, but contracted with owner/operators or drivers. The agreement provided that Lainez was an independent contractor and was responsible for all costs and expenses incidental to the performance of transportation services. He agreed to maintain liability insurance and to name Western Transport as an additional insured. Western Transport, through the California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan (CAARP), purchased a commercial assigned risk policy from National Continental Insurance Company (NCI), which stated "'Named Insured’s Business: 1 Trucker for Hire-Excess'" and named Lainez as a driver. It did not list, describe, or rate any vehicle. It was rated on an excess cost of hire basis at a premium that was 4 to 10 percent of the cost of a policy rated on a primary cost of hire basis. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the two insurance companies were coprimary insurers or whether NCI was an excess insurer for an underlying fatality involving Lainez. The trial court granted NCI’s motion for a summary judgment, concluding that Scottsdale was the primary insurer pursuant to California Insurance Code section 11580.9, subdivisions (d) and (h). The Court of Appeal agreed that Scottsdale was the primary insurer and NCI was the excess insurer and affirmed the judgment. View "Scottsdale Indemnity v. National Continental Insurance Co." on Justia Law