Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

While she was a student at Harvard Law School (HLS), Megon Walker was a member of the staff of the Journal of Law and Technology. During Walker’s final semester, concerns arose regarding a draft article (the Note) that Walker had written. After a hearing, the HLS Administrative Board (Board) found that the Note contained plagiarism. Walker received a formal reprimand, which ultimately appeared on her transcript. Walker graduated from HLS despite the reprimand, but the notation placed on transcript caused the loss of a lucrative employment offer. Walker filed suit against the President and Fellows of Harvard College, the then-Dean of Students at HLS, and the former Chair of the Board, seeking to have the notation removed from her transcript. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly granted summary judgment against Walker on her claims of breach of contract and defamation. View "Walker v. Harvard University Fellows" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lend Lease, the construction manager of the Chicago River Point Tower Project, hired Cives as a subcontractor. Cives hired Midwest Steel. Midwest had, years before, hired AES to supply Midwest with additional workers, who were co‐employed by Midwest and AES. Lend Lease entered into a “contractor-controlled insurance program” with Starr Liability with a $500,000 deductible. All subcontractors were to join in the policy. AES had, several years earlier, obtained workers’ compensation for its workers from TIC, so that injured AES‐Midwest workers could obtain workers’ compensation from either Starr (or Lend Lease under the deductible) or TIC. Four ironworkers, jointly employed by Midwest and AES and performing work for Midwest were injured on the job and sought workers’ compensation. The claims exceeded $500,000, so Lend Lease had to pay its full deductible. Starr paid the remaining claims. Lend Lease filed suit against TIC, AES’s insurer, and AES, seeking reimbursement of the $500,000. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lend Lease made a deal with Starr and is bound by it. The court rejected an argument that AES has been unjustly enriched; AES was not obligated to purchase an insurance policy that would cover Lend Lease's deductible. View "Lend Lease (US) Construction, Inc. v. Administrative Employer Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Customers of an indoor trampoline park, of Sky Zone Lafayette, must complete a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” document (“Agreement”) prior to entering the facility. The Agreement contains a clause waiving the participant’s right to trial and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff, James Duhon, was such a customer, and was injured in the course of participating in the park’s activities. After plaintiff filed suit seeking damages, Sky Zone moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The district court overruled Sky Zone’s exception, but the court of appeal reversed, finding the arbitration provision should be enforced. After review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause in the Sky Zone agreement was adhesionary and therefore unenforceable. View "Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC" on Justia Law

Customers of an indoor trampoline park, of Sky Zone Lafayette, must complete a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” document (“Agreement”) prior to entering the facility. The Agreement contains a clause waiving the participant’s right to trial and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff Theresa Alicea executed the Agreement prior to her husband, Roger Alicea, taking their minor sons to Sky Zone. The Aliceas’ son, Logan, was injured while jumping on a trampoline. The Aliceas filed suit against Sky Zone, individually and on behalf of Logan. Sky Zone moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The district court overruled Sky Zone’s exception and the court of appeal denied Sky Zone’s writ application. After review, the Supreme Court held the arbitration clause in the Sky Zone agreement was adhesionary and therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Alicea v. Activelaf, LLC" on Justia Law

Samantha Gillespie and her mother, Tina Taylor, appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their lawsuit against Taylor's motor vehicle insurer, National Farmers Union, for underinsured motor vehicle coverage. Gillespie and Taylor sued Farmers Union for underinsured motor vehicle coverage, alleging Gillespie was insured under her mother's motor vehicle policy with Farmers Union and was driving a motor vehicle owned by another person when Gillespie lost control of the vehicle and it overturned, resulting in significant injuries to her. According to Gillespie and Taylor, the motor vehicle was owned by Angela Ayers, Gillespie's aunt, and insured by GEICO. Ayers died as a result of the accident and another passenger in the motor vehicle sustained significant injuries. Gillespie and Taylor asserted GEICO paid Gillespie $25,000 in no-fault benefits, but denied her request for liability coverage based on a claim that Ayers negligently entrusted the vehicle to Gillespie, an alleged inexperienced driver who received her learner's permit two days before the accident. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Gillespie and Taylor failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether Gillespie was legally entitled to collect for bodily injury from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, and affirmed. View "Gillespie v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

A stock transfer agent gave a stockholder an allegedly incomplete and misleading answer to a question about its requirements for removing a restrictive legend on the stockholder’s stock. The stockholder sued the transfer agent, asserting claims for violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.8401 and 104.8407, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. Under sections 104.8401 and 104.8407, a transfer agent must, on proper request, register a transfer of securities without unreasonable delay. The district court granted the transfer agent’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sections 104.8401 and 104.8407 did not support liability in this case because the stockholder did not ask the transfer agent to remove the legend and reissue him clean shares, and because the stockholder never submitted a transfer request, the agent’s statutory duty to register a requested transfer did not arise; and (2) the stockholder’s common law claims failed on the grounds that they were not supported by competent evidence.View "Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer" on Justia Law

A.H. Meyer & Sons, Inc. produced honey and beeswax at a plant in Winfred, South Dakota. Barton Solvents, Inc. sold the heptane to A.H. Meyer that A.H. Meyer used in its beeswax rendering process. The heptane was manufactured by CITGO Petroleum Corporation. In 2009, A.H. Meyer suffered a heptane explosion at its plant. Nationwide Mutual Insurance paid for the damage. Nationwide subsequently filed suit seeking subrogation from Barton Solvents and CITGO on causes of action alleging strict liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. All theories were premised on the theory that Defendants failed adequately to warn of heptane’s dangers. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no material issues of disputed fact existed with respect to the adequacy of the warnings.View "Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barton Solvents, Inc." on Justia Law

Following a two-day trial in May 2013, a Bullock County jury returned a $450,000 verdict in favor of Michael Shepherd on a breach-of-warranty claim he asserted against Barko Hydraulics, LLC. Shepherd purchased a Barko 495ML knuckle boom loader ("the 495ML loader") from G&S Equipment Company in 2008 for use in his logging operation. In November 2010, when the 495ML loader had approximately 4,300 hours on its clock, Shepherd transported it to G&S Equipment for repairs after the hydraulic pumps began making noise. G&S Equipment confirmed that the hydraulic pumps had failed and notified Shepherd that the needed repairs, costing approximately $10,000, would not be covered under the warranty because the warranty period had expired. At Shepherd's request, G&S Equipment contacted Barko, which confirmed that it would not authorize or reimburse G&S Equipment for making the needed repair because of the expiration of the warranty. At that point, Shepherd told G&S Equipment that he could not afford to pay for the repairs to the 495ML loader, nor could he continue to meet his obligation to Wells Fargo (the bank that lent him the purchase money for the loader). He left the loader with G&S Equipment, notified Wells Fargo of its location, and of his intention to make no further payments on it. Wells Fargo subsequently repossessed the loader, sold it, and obtained a $124,184 deficit judgment against Shepherd. Shepherd then sued Barko, G&S Equipment, and Cummins Mid-South, LLC, the manufacturer of certain component parts of the 495ML loader, asserting fraud, negligence and/or wantonness, and multiple breach-of-warranty claims. Shepherd sought both compensatory damages for lost profits and mental anguish and punitive damages. Ultimately, G&S Equipment and Cummins Mid-South were dismissed from the action, and, during the course of the trial, all of Shepherd's claims against Barko except a breach-of-express-warranty claim were withdrawn or dismissed. Barko's subsequent postjudgment motion renewing its previous motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied by the trial court. Barko then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court concluded the trial court erred in not granting Barko's postjudgment motions. The case was remanded for entry of an order granting Barko's motion for a new trial. View "Barko Hydraulics, LLC v. Shepherd " on Justia Law

Debtors contracted with Builder to finish construction on a house. After Debtors defaulted on progress payments, Builder sued Debtors and Bank, claiming that Defendants falsely represented or concealed material information about whether Debtors could pay for the work. The district court sustained Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Builder’s fraud and conspiracy claims. Debtors then confessed judgment on Builder’s breach of contract claim. After a bench trial, the district court ruled for Defendants on Builder’s equitable and promissory estoppel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court erred in granting summary judgment to Debtors on Builder’s fraud claim and to Debtors and Bank on Builder’s civil conspiracy claim; and (2) during trial, the court did not err in finding that Builder had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Bank promised to fund Builder’s work that was definite enough to induce Builder’s foreseeable reliance on the statement, but these factual findings did not preclude Builder’s proof of the same facts for its fraud claims. Remanded.View "deNourie & Youst Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

Appellant entered into a contract with Appellee specifying that Appellee would provide Appellant with software development services. Appellant later terminated the parties’ contract based on its alleged belief that three separate provisions of the parties’ agreement entitled it to terminate the contract. Appellee filed this breach-of-contract action against Appellant. Appellant counterclaimed for breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual relationship or business expectancy. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages. Appellant appealed the judgment and Appellee cross-appealed from the circuit court’s postjudgment denial of its motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal and reversed and on cross-appeal, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the jury’s breach-of-contract verdict; and (2) because the circuit court did not adequately explain its denial of attorneys’ fees, the case must be remanded for the limited purpose of making findings to allow for appellate review of the fee decision. View "Ark. Realtors Ass'n v. Real Forms LLC" on Justia Law