Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In a case involving the denial of coverage for an automobile accident, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether uninsured motorist coverage can be denied simply because the driver, who was the son of the insured, was not listed on the policy? The court answered that question “no.” The other is whether the policy can be voided because the insured committed a material misrepresentation by failing in her application for insurance to name, as required, those of driving age who lived in her household? The court answered that question, “yes.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting Viking Insurance’s motion for summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ suit seeking damages for a wrongful denial of benefits. The court concluded that if an insurer declines to exercise the greater power to void a policy, it still retains the lesser power to exercise a contractual right to deny coverage. The court explained that here, a knowing misstatement in the application about the drivers in the household was material if it would have caused Viking either not to issue the policy or to increase the premium. The court accepted that materiality is not affected by the relationship between the false statement and the specific coverage being sought in litigation. It is enough that the falsity was material to the decision of the company to issue the policy at the agreed price. Consequently, Viking could have voided the policy. By not voiding, Viking’s policy remained in effect. Accordingly, Viking had the right to deny Plaintiffs’ claim. View "Bradley v. Viking Insurance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of a group of eastern Montana farmers (Farmers) and against four affiliates of USA Biofuels, LLC (Affiliates) on Farmers' claims on a variety of contract and tort theories, holding that there was no error.In 2018, Farmers entered individual written contracts with USA Biofuels to grow 10,000 acres of hemp. Farmers brought this action alleging that they never received full payment from Defendants, including USA Biofuels and various affiliates. The district court concluded on summary judgment that USA Biofuels breached its contract and awarded damages. Farmers subsequently abandoned their contract claims and secured a tort judgment against Affiliates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it entered judgment on the punitive damages award; (2) did not err in instructing the jury; and (3) did not err in ruling on summary judgment that three shareholders were alter egos of USA Biofuels. View "Romo v. USA Biofuels, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants, who were maimed in a hot air balloon accident in southeastern Pennsylvania in 2015, pursued appellate challenges to the District of Maryland’s rulings against them and in favor of T.H.E. Insurance Company (the “Insurer”) in an insurance coverage dispute. In federal court proceedings initiated in Maryland, Appellants sued certain of the Insurer’s named insureds, and a business called New Horizon Balloon Team (collectively, the “Insureds”) — for the gruesome injuries Appellants’ sustained in the balloon accident (the “damages lawsuit”). While the damages lawsuit was pending, the Insurer initiated these insurance coverage proceedings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, naming as defendants the three Insureds, plus Appellants. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Insurer’s contention with respect to a $100,000 coverage limit for each balloon passenger. The Memorandum Opinion also rejected both of Appellants’ bad faith claims. Appellants appealed those rulings.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Applying Maryland principles of res judicata in this dispute, the court was satisfied that the coverage issue presented by the Insurer in these proceedings is not barred by the settlement agreement in the damages lawsuit. As such, the court agreed with the district court that Appellants are not entitled to a summary judgment award on the coverage issue on res judicata grounds. Further, the district court thus did not err in ruling Appellants were inside the balloon’s basket at the time of their injuries. As such, Appellants were “passengers” under the Policy and Coverage B’s limit of $100,000 per passenger applies. View "T.H.E. Insurance Company v. Melyndia Davis" on Justia Law

This dispute over UM coverage arose from a motor vehicle accident wherein an uninsured motorist struck and killed Macy Lee Alvey, III, who was in the course and scope of his employment with Rony’s Towing & Recovery, LLC (“Rony’s Towing”). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ to determine whether the failure to include the insurer’s name on an uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage selection form rendered it invalid. Because inclusion of the insurer’s name was an express requirement on the face of the UM form itself, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that the failure to include such information resulted in an invalid waiver of coverage. View "Berkeley Assurance Co. v. Willis, et al." on Justia Law

In this appeal centering on the existence of a valid arbitration agreement the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court erred in compelling arbitration of the question of whether the arbitration clause in the agreements at issue was valid.The arbitration clause in this case stemmed from transactions between lead paint tort plaintiffs who received structured settlements and affiliated factoring companies that specialize in purchasing structured settlement rights. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration and stay the case, but Plaintiffs challenged the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitrator was to determine the issue of arbitrability. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court erroneously compelled arbitration and that the issue of whether a valid arbitration agreement exists is an issue for the court to determine. View "Access Funding, LLC v. Linton" on Justia Law

Pakistan International Airlines (“PIA”) failed to transport the body of N.B. to Pakistan for burial due to a miscommunication by employees of Swissport USA, PIA’s cargo loading agent. N.B.’s family members sued PIA and Swissport in New York state court under state law; PIA removed the action to the district court. Following cross-motions for summary judgment and an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the Montreal Convention, which preempts state-law claims arising from delayed cargo, does not apply because human remains are not “cargo” for purposes of the Montreal Convention and because their particular claims are not for “delay.”   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that human remains are cargo for purposes of the Montreal Convention; and on the facts found by the district court, the claims arise from delay. The claims are therefore preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court further wrote that it was Plaintiffs who cut off PIA’s ability to perform under the terms of the waybill. That decision was understandable given the need to bury N.B. quickly, and it cannot be doubted that Plaintiffs found themselves in a hard situation. But their only recourse against PIA and Swissport was a claim under the Montreal Convention, a claim which they have consistently declined to assert. View "Badar v. Swissport USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the City for its negligence in maintaining the City-owned sidewalk in a dangerous condition. The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that the sidewalk was not a “dangerous condition”. Although the hearing was not transcribed, the trial court concluded the hearing by orally granting the City’s motion for summary judgment. Just four minutes after the summary judgment hearing concluded, Plaintiff’s counsel sent the City an email purporting to accept the City’s 998 offer. The City objected to Plaintiff’s attempt to accept its 998 offer after the trial court had ruled on its summary judgment motion. The trial court entered judgment for the City, implicitly ruling that Plaintiff’s acceptance of the City’s 998 offer was inoperative. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal of the May 7, 2021 judgment.   At issue on appeal is whether a 998 offer automatically expires when a trial court orally grants the offeror’s summary judgment motion. The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the trial court properly concluded that the City’s 998 offer expired by the time plaintiff purported to accept it. Like any other contractual offer, a 998 offer is not accepted until that acceptance is communicated to the offeror. Here, because Plaintiff did not communicate her acceptance of the City’s 998 offer until after the trial court orally granted summary judgment to the City, the acceptance was not effective as there was no longer any operative 998 offer to accept. View "Trujillo v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Nissan, alleging the transmission in a 2013 Nissan Sentra they purchased was defective, bringing statutory claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code 1790) and a common law fraud claim alleging that Nissan, by fraudulently concealing the defects, induced them to purchase the car. The trial court dismissed the fraudulent inducement claim as barred by the “economic loss rule.” The court also struck the plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages.The court of appeal reversed. Under California law, the economic loss rule does not bar the fraudulent inducement claim. The fraudulent inducement exception to the economic loss rule applies; fraudulent inducement is a viable tort claim under California law. The plaintiffs adequately pleaded that the transmissions installed in numerous Nissan vehicles (including the one they purchased) were defective; Nissan knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; Nissan intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known transmission problems; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car. View "Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Barbourville on all of Plaintiff's claims holding that the reasoning of the trial court was sound.Plaintiff sustained burns on the bottom of her feet after visiting a water park owned by the City, requiring eventual amputation of a portion of her foot. Plaintiff sued the City, bringing claims under theories of premises liability, strict liability, and breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all claims. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment on the premises liability claim and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Plaintiff's strict liability, breach of contract, and premises liability claims. View "City of Barbourville v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Two former students of Tulane University, on behalf of a putative class of current and former students, sued the University for failing to provide a partial refund of tuition and fees after Tulane switched from in-person instruction with access to on-campus services to online, off-campus instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court agreed with Tulane that the student's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the claim is not barred as a claim of educational malpractice because the Students do not challenge the quality of the education received but the product received. Second, the court rejected Tulane’s argument that the breach-of-contract claim is foreclosed by an express agreement between the parties because the agreement at issue plausibly does not govern refunds in this circumstance. And third, the court concluded that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Tulane breached an express contract promising in-person instruction and on-campus facilities because Plaintiffs fail to point to any explicit language evidencing that promise. But the court held that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged implied-in-fact promises for in-person instruction and on-campus facilities. Moreover, the court found that the Students’ alternative claim for unjust enrichment may proceed at this early stage. Finally, genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs saw and agreed to the A&DS preclude reliance on the agreement at this stage. Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim of conversion. View "Jones v. Admin of the Tulane Educ" on Justia Law