Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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Judith Clinton filed a complaint in the Superior Court for Washington County against Chad Babcock, Lisa Nelson, Regina Foster Bartlett, and Caryn Sullivan, alleging defamation and other misconduct that caused her reputational damage, emotional distress, and monetary losses. Clinton later amended her complaint to include Maria DiMaggio and Toastmasters International, adding a breach of contract claim against the latter. The Superior Court allowed Clinton to file a second amended complaint but denied her third and fourth motions to amend.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to enforce a dismissal stipulation and vacated a scheduling order. Clinton, who had been representing herself after unsuccessful attempts to secure new counsel, signed a Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal with all defendants, which was filed on December 13, 2022. Subsequently, the defendants filed a Stipulation of Dismissal on December 27, 2022, without notifying Clinton, who then alleged fraudulent conduct. The trial justice initially vacated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal and scheduled a trial date but later reconsidered this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly reinstated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal, noting that the agreement was binding and could not be set aside without the consent of all parties, absent extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or mutual mistake. The court found no evidence of duress or other factors that would justify vacating the agreement. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial justice's decision to treat the defendants' motions as motions to reconsider, given the lack of proper notice to the defendants at the initial hearing. View "Clinton v. Babcock" on Justia Law

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JohnsonKreis Construction Company, Inc. ("JohnsonKreis") served as the general contractor on a hotel-construction project in Birmingham, with Howard Painting, Inc. ("Howard") as a subcontractor. The subcontract agreement included an indemnity provision requiring Howard to indemnify JohnsonKreis for personal injury or death arising from Howard's negligence. Domingo Rosales-Herrera, an employee of a subcontractor working for Howard, died after falling from a window while attempting to load equipment into a trash box on a telehandler owned by JohnsonKreis. The personal representative of Rosales-Herrera's estate filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against both JohnsonKreis and Howard.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Howard and its insurers, Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Owners Insurance Company (collectively "Owners"), determining that the indemnity provision in the subcontract agreement was legally unenforceable. The court held that Alabama law does not allow for the apportionment of damages in a wrongful-death case, thus precluding proportional indemnification.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the subcontract agreement's proportional indemnity provision was legally enforceable under Alabama law. The court noted that parties may enter into agreements allowing for indemnification even for claims resulting solely from the negligence of the indemnitee. The court emphasized that such agreements are valid and enforceable if expressed in clear and unequivocal language.The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the trial court to consider the parties' evidentiary submissions and arguments regarding the interpretation and application of the disputed provisions of the subcontract agreement and the additional-insured endorsement. View "JohnsonKreis Construction Company, Inc. v. Howard Painting, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2020, Sarah E. Martin was injured in a car accident involving an 18-wheel tractor-trailer driven by Charles Streeter, an employee of Al-Amin Brothers Transportation, LLC. Martin sued the LLC, several individuals, and 18 fictitiously named defendants. In January 2023, Martin settled with the original defendants, agreeing to release them and related parties from any claims arising from the accident. Subsequently, Martin amended her complaint to add PEI Ohio, Inc. and Premium Transportation Group, Inc. (the corporations) as defendants, alleging various negligence and breach of contract claims.The Jefferson Circuit Court enforced the settlement agreement in favor of the corporations, dismissed Martin's third amended complaint, and awarded attorney fees to the corporations. Martin filed a fourth amended complaint, which remains pending. The circuit court certified its orders as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Martin appealed both the enforcement of the settlement and the attorney fee award.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the orders as final under Rule 54(b). The court found that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were closely related, the need for review might be mooted by future developments in the circuit court, and there was a possibility of having to consider the same issue again, particularly regarding attorney fees. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Martin's appeals, emphasizing the preference to avoid piecemeal litigation and the need for a final judgment on all pending claims before appellate review. View "Martin v. PEI Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

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In January 2019, Raymond Robinson and his son sued Emerald Homes, L.L.C., and 21st Mortgage Corporation in the Baldwin Circuit Court. Robinson had contracted with Emerald to purchase a mobile home, financed by a loan from 21st Mortgage. After tearing down his existing house in preparation for the new mobile home, the loan was not completed, allegedly due to Emerald and/or 21st Mortgage's refusal to finalize the transaction. The complaint included claims of breach of contract, misrepresentation, suppression, and negligence, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The trial court compelled arbitration for claims against Emerald and granted summary judgment in favor of 21st Mortgage on Raymond's claims. The case proceeded to a jury trial on Robinson's claims against 21st Mortgage. The jury found in favor of Robinson on promissory fraud and the tort of outrage, awarding him $2,980,000 in total damages. 21st Mortgage's post-trial motions, including for judgment as a matter of law (JML), were denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that Robinson did not present substantial evidence of promissory fraud, as he failed to prove that 21st Mortgage had no intention to perform the loan promise at the time it was made or intended to deceive him. The court also found that Robinson did not meet all the conditions required for the loan, and the failure to close the loan was not due to any fraudulent intent by 21st Mortgage.Regarding the tort of outrage, the court held that the conduct of 21st Mortgage did not meet the extreme and outrageous standard required for such a claim. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "21st Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson" on Justia Law

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Hurricane Katrina destroyed Paul and Sylvia Minor’s home in 2005. The Minors had a homeowner’s insurance policy with United Services Automobile Association (USAA) that covered wind damage but excluded storm surge or flood damage. USAA issued payments for wind damage but not for storm surge or flood damage, leading to a dispute. The Minors claimed a total loss due to wind and demanded policy limits. In 2013, a jury awarded the Minors $1,547,293.37 in compensatory damages.The Minor Estate appealed a pretrial order granting partial summary judgment to USAA on the Minors’ bad faith claim. The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding USAA’s denial and delay of payment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the bad faith claim. On remand, a jury awarded the Minors $10,000,000 in punitive damages and $457,858.89 in extra-contractual damages (attorneys’ fees). USAA appealed, and the Minor Estate cross-appealed the denial of its post-trial motion for additional attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found no reversible error, affirming the jury’s award of $10,457,858.89 in damages. The court also reversed and rendered attorneys’ fees on behalf of the Estate in the amount of $4,500,000, plus post-judgment interest. The court held that the trial judge did not err in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury and that the $10 million punitive damages award was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. The court also found no error in the jury’s award of extra-contractual damages and no errors warranting a new trial. View "United Services Automobile Association v. Estate of Minor" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, the decedent's son and Administrator of her estate, filed a negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death lawsuit in the Supreme Court, New York County, against Dewitt Rehabilitation and Nursing Center and other defendants. The decedent was a resident at Dewitt in February and March 2019. Dewitt moved to transfer the venue to Nassau County based on a forum selection clause in two electronically signed admission agreements. Dewitt supported its motion with the agreements and an affidavit from its director of admissions, Francesca Trimarchi. The plaintiff contested the authenticity of the agreements, claiming the signatures were forged and provided an exemplar of the decedent's handwritten signature for comparison.The Supreme Court granted Dewitt's motion, finding that Dewitt met its initial burden to show the forum selection clause was applicable and enforceable, and that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the alleged forgery. The case was ordered to be transferred to Supreme Court, Nassau County. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Dewitt failed to adequately authenticate the admission agreements as Trimarchi did not witness the signing, and thus the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The dissent argued that the burden should be on the plaintiff to prove the clause should not be enforced.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division's decision, reinstating the Supreme Court's order. The court held that Dewitt met its burden of establishing the authenticity of the agreements through circumstantial evidence, including Trimarchi's affidavit and the agreements themselves. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the authenticity of the signatures. The court also clarified that CPLR 4539(b) was inapplicable as the documents were originally created in electronic form. The certified question was answered in the negative. View "Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp." on Justia Law

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In 2019, Jesse Hubbell was hired to film a scuba-diving campaign advertisement. He and John Mues rented scuba gear from Gull Scuba Center. Gull’s instructor, Chris Hanson, asked for their diving certification cards. Mues provided his “Advanced Diver” certification, but Jesse did not have his card. Jesse claimed he was PADI certified, and Hanson either did not verify this or did not recall doing so. Jesse drowned three days later while using the rented gear.Ellen Hubbell, Jesse’s widow, sued several defendants, including Gull, alleging negligence for renting the equipment without verifying Jesse’s certification. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, granted summary judgment in favor of Gull, finding no dispute of material fact regarding Gull’s liability.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the PRA Membership Standards to establish Gull’s duty to Jesse, as both parties’ experts indicated these standards were generally accepted in the scuba rental industry. The court also upheld the exclusion of Ellen’s expert, Thomas Maddox’s, opinion on industry standards, as it differed substantively from the prior expert’s report, which was beyond the scope allowed by the District Court’s amended scheduling order.Finally, the court agreed with the District Court’s determination that Hanson’s failure to check Jesse’s certification did not cause his death. The court found that even if Hanson had checked Jesse’s certification, Mues, who was of legal age and held an Advanced Diver certification, could have rented the equipment for Jesse. Therefore, the failure to check the certification was not the cause-in-fact of Jesse’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of Gull. View "Hubbell v Gull Scuba Center" on Justia Law

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Torrey Kath brought a personal injury lawsuit against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms, alleging that Prochnow moved a semi-truck while Kath was underneath, causing significant injury. Kath and Prochnow entered into a Miller-Shugart agreement, where Prochnow accepted damages, and Kath agreed to collect solely from Prochnow’s insurers. The case was dismissed with prejudice after a stipulation of dismissal was filed.Kath then filed a declaratory judgment action against Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), which insured Prochnow under a farm liability policy. Kath sought declarations that the policy covered his injuries and that the Miller-Shugart agreement was reasonable and binding on FUMIC. The District Court of Stutsman County granted Kath summary judgment on the coverage issue, interpreting the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion as not applying to the coverage added by a farm employer liability endorsement.FUMIC moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty to indemnify Prochnow because the personal injury action had been dismissed with prejudice. While this motion was pending, Kath and Prochnow successfully moved to vacate the dismissal and entered a $2 million judgment against Prochnow, to be paid solely by FUMIC. The district court then denied FUMIC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the judgment in the personal injury action rendered FUMIC’s motion moot and granted summary judgment in favor of Kath on the second count of his complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion applied to Kath’s injuries, and thus, the policy did not provide coverage. The court concluded that the endorsement did not supersede the motor vehicle exclusion and that the policy, when read as a whole, excluded coverage for injuries related to the use of motor vehicles. View "Kath v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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A swine producer experienced a disease outbreak in its sow facility and sued two manure management companies, alleging the outbreak was caused by their failure to follow biosecurity protocols. The swine producer sought $1.5 million in damages under breach of contract and negligence theories. The claims against one company were dismissed, and the remaining company, Frost, moved for summary judgment on both theories.The district court for Burt County granted summary judgment in favor of Frost, finding no contractual relationship between Frost and the swine producer and concluding that Frost owed no duty to the producer. The swine producer appealed, and Frost cross-appealed on the issue of causation.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim but reversed on the negligence claim, finding that Frost owed a duty of reasonable care. The court noted that the standard of care and whether Frost breached it were factual questions for the jury. However, it declined to address Frost’s cross-appeal on causation, as the district court had not ruled on that issue.On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the district court that Frost was entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claims. It found no evidence of an industry standard prohibiting manure pumpers from pumping at a sow facility after a hog finishing facility and concluded that Frost did not breach the standard of care by failing to inform the producer of his previous pumping location. The case was remanded with directions to affirm the grant of summary judgment. View "Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp" on Justia Law

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Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC supplied Pavestone, LLC with aggregate used to manufacture pavers. After customers complained about efflorescence on the pavers, Pavestone determined that sodium carbonate in Hi-Tech’s aggregate caused the issue. Pavestone sued Hi-Tech for negligence, products liability, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court ruled in favor of Pavestone on the breach of warranty and products liability claims.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and found that Hi-Tech breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and was liable under products liability. Hi-Tech appealed the decision, arguing that it did not know of Pavestone’s specific need for sodium-free aggregate and that the economic loss doctrine barred Pavestone’s tort claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that Hi-Tech’s sale of aggregate carried an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because Hi-Tech had reason to know Pavestone’s intended use. The court adopted the reasoning of UCC § 2-315, which does not require proof of a seller’s actual knowledge if the seller had reason to know the product’s intended purpose. The court also held that Pavestone was excused from testing the aggregate for sodium carbonate because the defect was latent and not detectable through a simple examination.However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on the products liability claim, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Pavestone’s noncontractual claims. The doctrine applies when the damage is to the product itself and not to other property. Pavestone did not provide sufficient evidence of damage to property other than the pavers. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s judgment on the warranty claim but reversed its judgment on the products liability claims. View "Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC v. Pavestone, LLC" on Justia Law