Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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Ronald B. Panting, an independent contractor serving as a Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) for the FAA, was conducting a pilot certification checkride for Michael Trubilla in a plane rented from the LeMay Aero Club, a government-affiliated organization. Both men died when the plane crashed during the checkride. Five days prior to the accident, Ronald signed a covenant not to sue the government for injuries sustained while participating in Aero Club activities, applicable to himself and his estate. His spouse, Lynne D. Panting, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligent maintenance of the aircraft.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the covenant not to sue was void as against public policy under Nebraska law. The court did not address Lynne’s alternative argument that the covenant did not apply to Ronald’s activities as a DPE on the day of the crash. Following a bench trial, the district court found the government negligent and entered judgment for Lynne, awarding damages. The government appealed, challenging the district court’s decision regarding the covenant’s validity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment because the enforceability of the covenant was a purely legal issue. Applying Nebraska law, the appellate court determined the covenant was neither clearly repugnant to public policy nor the product of disparate bargaining power, and that the Aero Club did not provide a public or essential service. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the covenant covered Ronald’s activities as a DPE, and for further proceedings as appropriate. View "Panting v. United States" on Justia Law

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A carpenter employed by a subcontractor was injured after falling from a ladder owned by another subcontractor, DAL Electrical Corporation, while working on a renovation project at an office building. The injured worker was using his own employer’s equipment in the morning but, after lunch, returned to the worksite without his equipment and used an unattended DAL ladder, which was defective and marked with blue tape. He was injured when the ladder wobbled and he fell, impaling himself on a tool in his belt. The worker brought claims under New York Labor Law and for common-law negligence against the project’s general contractor, premises owner, and DAL, asserting the defective ladder caused his injuries. The general contractor and owner sought indemnification from DAL under their subcontract.The Supreme Court of Bronx County granted the worker’s motion for partial summary judgment on one Labor Law claim and denied DAL’s motion to dismiss other claims and cross-claims by the general contractor and owner. The court also granted the general contractor and owner summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claim against DAL. The Appellate Division, First Department, modified this order by denying summary judgment on contractual indemnification and granting summary judgment for DAL on all claims and cross-claims against it. The general contractor and owner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that none of the indemnification provisions in the subcontract required DAL to indemnify the general contractor or owner for the worker’s injuries because the injuries did not arise from DAL’s performance of its contractually defined work. The Court also found that DAL did not owe a duty of care in tort to the injured worker, as the facts did not fit within any recognized exception to the general rule against extending contractual duties to non-contracting third parties. The certified question was answered in the affirmative. View "Dibrino v Rockefeller Ctr. N., Inc." on Justia Law

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A Texas truck driver was injured while making roadside repairs in Iowa when his parked semi was struck by another vehicle. After the accident, the driver retained a Texas attorney to pursue his personal injury claim. That attorney negotiated with the insurer for the other driver, ultimately agreeing to a settlement of $125,000 and requesting a release. However, the client did not sign the release and later replaced his attorney, claiming he had not authorized the settlement. The client then filed a lawsuit in Iowa, seeking additional compensation and naming the driver, the driver’s employer, and others as defendants.The defendants responded by moving to enforce the settlement agreement in the Iowa District Court for Warren County. The district court, acting as factfinder with no objection from either party, held a hearing, accepted evidence, and considered the client’s affidavit. The court found that the attorney was presumed to have settlement authority and that the client had not rebutted this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. The court enforced the settlement and dismissed the case upon payment of the agreed sum. The client’s motion to reconsider was denied, and he appealed.The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the district court’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review. The Supreme Court held that, because the client did not object to the district court’s procedure, the court properly acted as factfinder. The Supreme Court further held that the district court’s finding—that the attorney had authority to settle—was supported by substantial evidence, and thus the settlement agreement was enforceable. The court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "Recio v. Fridley" on Justia Law

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A member of the Kuwaiti royal family was defrauded by a Baltimore restaurateur, who convinced her to send nearly $7.8 million under the guise of investing in real estate and restaurant ventures in the United States. The restaurateur used the funds to acquire multiple properties, including a condominium in New York City and a home in Pikesville, Maryland, but secretly held ownership in his own name and for his personal use. After the fraud was uncovered, the investor sued the restaurateur for fraud and sought to impose a constructive trust over the properties purchased with her funds. Around the same time, she attempted to file a notice of lis pendens to protect her interest in the Pikesville property, but the notice was recorded against the wrong property and was thus ineffective.During discovery, the investor learned that World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) had issued three loans to the restaurateur, each secured by properties acquired with her funds. She then filed suit against WBL in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that WBL aided and abetted the restaurateur’s fraud by encumbering the properties with liens, thereby hindering her ability to recover on any judgment. Following a bench trial, the district court found for WBL on two of the loans, but found WBL liable for aiding and abetting fraud in relation to the loan secured by the Pikesville home, awarding compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment for WBL on the first two loans but reversed as to the Pikesville loan. The Fourth Circuit held that WBL was not willfully blind to the restaurateur’s fraud in any of the loans as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for WBL on all claims. View "Al-Sabah v. World Business Lenders, LLC" on Justia Law

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A security services company and its sole shareholder, who is also its president and CEO, provided security services to two Iowa cities under separate contracts. After the shareholder published a letter criticizing media coverage of law enforcement responses to protests, a local newspaper published articles highlighting his critical comments about protestors and the Black Lives Matter movement. Subsequently, a city council member expressed concerns about the shareholder’s views, and the city council voted unanimously to terminate the company’s contract. The council member also pressured officials in the other city to end their contract with the company. Facing negative publicity, the company voluntarily terminated its second contract to avoid harm to a pending business transaction.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against the city, the council member, and other council members, alleging First Amendment retaliation, tortious interference with business contracts, and defamation. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). It found that the shareholder lacked standing to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim for injuries to the corporation, and that the corporation failed to state a retaliation claim because only the shareholder engaged in protected speech. The court dismissed the tortious interference claim for lack of sufficient factual allegations and because the contract was terminated voluntarily. The defamation claim was dismissed for failure to identify any actionable statements by the defendants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the shareholder’s First Amendment retaliation and defamation claims, but directed that these dismissals be without prejudice. The court reversed the dismissal of the corporation’s First Amendment retaliation and tortious interference claims, finding that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, and remanded those claims for further proceedings. View "Conley v. City of West Des Moines" on Justia Law

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A same-sex married couple, one a U.S. citizen residing in California and the other a Saudi citizen, spent part of each year living together in Saudi Arabia, where homosexuality is punishable by death. In 2021, after U.S. travel restrictions eased, they booked tickets with a German airline to fly from Saudi Arabia to San Francisco. The airline, which operates extensively in California, required them to confirm their marital status for entry into the U.S. During check-in in Riyadh, a senior airline employee publicly disclosed and questioned their relationship, and copies of their marriage certificate and passports were sent electronically to airline headquarters despite their concerns about Saudi government surveillance. After the trip, the Saudi government updated one plaintiff’s official status to “married,” and he feared returning to Saudi Arabia due to potential severe penalties. The couple alleged that the airline’s actions led to significant personal, financial, and health consequences.The couple filed suit in California state court against the airline and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging breach of contract and several torts. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially remanded for clarification of the subsidiary’s citizenship, after which the district court allowed amendment of the removal notice to reflect the correct citizenship.Upon renewed review, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had both specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants and subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. The court found that the airline purposefully availed itself of California’s market, the claims arose from the airline’s California-related activities, and exercising jurisdiction was reasonable. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "DOE V. DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT" on Justia Law

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Edward T. Saadi, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, obtained a $90,000 judgment against Pierre Maroun and Maroun’s International, LLC (MILLC) following a jury verdict in a federal defamation suit. Despite the judgment, Saadi was unable to collect payment for nine years. In 2018, Saadi discovered information suggesting Maroun had transferred $250,000 from his personal account to MILLC, allegedly to evade the judgment. Saadi claimed these funds were used to purchase a condominium titled to MILLC but used as Maroun’s residence, and to pay Maroun’s personal expenses. Saadi initiated proceedings supplementary under Florida law, seeking to void the transfer and recover assets.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida allowed Saadi to file an impleader complaint against Maroun and MILLC, asserting claims for fraudulent transfer and actual and constructive fraud under Florida statutes. Saadi also sought sanctions when MILLC failed to produce a representative for deposition, but the district court denied the motion, finding the individual was not a managing agent of MILLC. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for Maroun and MILLC, ruling that Saadi’s claims were time-barred under Florida’s statutes of repose and limitations, and that tolling provisions did not apply. The court also found that the remedies Saadi sought were unavailable under the relevant statutes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. Finding that several dispositive questions of Florida law lacked controlling precedent and were subject to conflicting interpretations by Florida’s intermediate appellate courts, the Eleventh Circuit certified five questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The court deferred its decision pending the Florida Supreme Court’s response to the certified questions. View "Saadi v. Maroun" on Justia Law

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Delta Airlines contracted with Lands’ End to supply new uniforms for its employees, which were manufactured overseas and distributed to approximately 64,000 workers. After the uniforms were issued, many employees reported that the garments transferred dye onto other surfaces and caused a range of health symptoms, including skin irritation and respiratory issues. Two groups of Delta employees filed lawsuits: one group sought damages for property damage and breach of express warranty as intended beneficiaries of the contract between Delta and Lands’ End, while the other group pursued personal injury claims, alleging the uniforms were defectively manufactured or designed and that Lands’ End failed to warn of these defects.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin consolidated the actions and, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of Lands’ End on all claims. For the personal injury claims, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony on defect and causation, finding the opinions unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that the uniforms were defective or that any defect caused their injuries. On the breach of warranty claim, the court determined that Lands’ End had not breached the contract’s satisfaction guarantee because plaintiffs had not returned their uniforms as required by the contract’s terms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, as the experts failed to reliably establish defect or causation. The court also held that summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim was proper because the contract’s return requirement was reasonable and not an unlawful limitation on the express warranty. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. View "Gilbert v Lands' End, Inc." on Justia Law

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A pet food manufacturer, Sunshine Mills, had a longstanding business relationship with Nutra-Blend, a supplier of animal nutrient products. For years, Sunshine Mills ordered a specific concentration of Vitamin D3 (Vitamin D3 7500) from Nutra-Blend for use in its dog food. In 2017, due to a miscommunication, Nutra-Blend shipped a different, much more concentrated product (Vitamin D3 500) instead. Sunshine Mills, unaware of the difference and believing Nutra-Blend only sold one type of Vitamin D3, accepted and used the product, resulting in several dogs developing Vitamin D toxicity, with some becoming ill or dying.After the incident, Sunshine Mills sued Nutra-Blend in the Lee County Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, a claim under the Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA), and common-law negligence. Nutra-Blend moved for summary judgment, arguing that all claims were subsumed by the MPLA and failed on other grounds. Sunshine Mills abandoned its tort-based claims, leaving only the contract-based claims. The Lee County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Nutra-Blend on all claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and held that the MPLA does not govern Sunshine Mills’ remaining claims because they do not allege damages caused by a defective product, but rather by breach of contract and implied warranty. The court clarified that the MPLA applies only to claims for damages caused by defective products, not to contract-based claims between commercial entities. The court also found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding both the breach of contract and implied warranty claims, precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sunshine Mills, Inc. v. Nutra-Blend, LLC" on Justia Law

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In May 2022, Garry Douglas Seaman shot and killed James Preston Freeman and seriously wounded Heidi Gabert, following the end of his romantic relationship with Gabert, with whom he shares a minor child. Seaman was criminally charged, and Gabert and Dawn Freeman, James’s spouse, filed a civil suit for damages. To prevent Seaman from transferring or selling assets during the litigation, Gabert and Freeman successfully sought a receivership over all of Seaman’s property. After negotiations, the parties reached a settlement memorialized in a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which included $10 million judgments for Gabert and Freeman, liquidation of Seaman’s assets, and a homestead exemption for Seaman.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, approved the creation of a designated settlement fund (DSF) to facilitate asset liquidation. Initially, the court’s DSF Order required the Liquidation Receiver to reserve funds from asset sales to pay Seaman’s capital gains taxes, interpreting the MOU’s tax payment provision as unambiguous. Gabert and Freeman moved to amend this order under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing the court erred in its interpretation and that the parties did not intend to reserve funds for Seaman’s capital gains taxes. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court agreed, finding the MOU ambiguous and, based on extrinsic evidence, concluded the parties did not intend to reserve such funds. The court amended its order, striking the provision requiring reservation for capital gains taxes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in amending the DSF Order. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, correctly found the MOU ambiguous, and its factual finding regarding the parties’ intent was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s amended order. View "Gabert v. Seaman" on Justia Law