Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Jesse Hubbell was hired to film a scuba-diving campaign advertisement. He and John Mues rented scuba gear from Gull Scuba Center. Gull’s instructor, Chris Hanson, asked for their diving certification cards. Mues provided his “Advanced Diver” certification, but Jesse did not have his card. Jesse claimed he was PADI certified, and Hanson either did not verify this or did not recall doing so. Jesse drowned three days later while using the rented gear.Ellen Hubbell, Jesse’s widow, sued several defendants, including Gull, alleging negligence for renting the equipment without verifying Jesse’s certification. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, granted summary judgment in favor of Gull, finding no dispute of material fact regarding Gull’s liability.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the PRA Membership Standards to establish Gull’s duty to Jesse, as both parties’ experts indicated these standards were generally accepted in the scuba rental industry. The court also upheld the exclusion of Ellen’s expert, Thomas Maddox’s, opinion on industry standards, as it differed substantively from the prior expert’s report, which was beyond the scope allowed by the District Court’s amended scheduling order.Finally, the court agreed with the District Court’s determination that Hanson’s failure to check Jesse’s certification did not cause his death. The court found that even if Hanson had checked Jesse’s certification, Mues, who was of legal age and held an Advanced Diver certification, could have rented the equipment for Jesse. Therefore, the failure to check the certification was not the cause-in-fact of Jesse’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of Gull. View "Hubbell v Gull Scuba Center" on Justia Law

Torrey Kath brought a personal injury lawsuit against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms, alleging that Prochnow moved a semi-truck while Kath was underneath, causing significant injury. Kath and Prochnow entered into a Miller-Shugart agreement, where Prochnow accepted damages, and Kath agreed to collect solely from Prochnow’s insurers. The case was dismissed with prejudice after a stipulation of dismissal was filed.Kath then filed a declaratory judgment action against Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), which insured Prochnow under a farm liability policy. Kath sought declarations that the policy covered his injuries and that the Miller-Shugart agreement was reasonable and binding on FUMIC. The District Court of Stutsman County granted Kath summary judgment on the coverage issue, interpreting the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion as not applying to the coverage added by a farm employer liability endorsement.FUMIC moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty to indemnify Prochnow because the personal injury action had been dismissed with prejudice. While this motion was pending, Kath and Prochnow successfully moved to vacate the dismissal and entered a $2 million judgment against Prochnow, to be paid solely by FUMIC. The district court then denied FUMIC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the judgment in the personal injury action rendered FUMIC’s motion moot and granted summary judgment in favor of Kath on the second count of his complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion applied to Kath’s injuries, and thus, the policy did not provide coverage. The court concluded that the endorsement did not supersede the motor vehicle exclusion and that the policy, when read as a whole, excluded coverage for injuries related to the use of motor vehicles. View "Kath v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A swine producer experienced a disease outbreak in its sow facility and sued two manure management companies, alleging the outbreak was caused by their failure to follow biosecurity protocols. The swine producer sought $1.5 million in damages under breach of contract and negligence theories. The claims against one company were dismissed, and the remaining company, Frost, moved for summary judgment on both theories.The district court for Burt County granted summary judgment in favor of Frost, finding no contractual relationship between Frost and the swine producer and concluding that Frost owed no duty to the producer. The swine producer appealed, and Frost cross-appealed on the issue of causation.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim but reversed on the negligence claim, finding that Frost owed a duty of reasonable care. The court noted that the standard of care and whether Frost breached it were factual questions for the jury. However, it declined to address Frost’s cross-appeal on causation, as the district court had not ruled on that issue.On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the district court that Frost was entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claims. It found no evidence of an industry standard prohibiting manure pumpers from pumping at a sow facility after a hog finishing facility and concluded that Frost did not breach the standard of care by failing to inform the producer of his previous pumping location. The case was remanded with directions to affirm the grant of summary judgment. View "Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp" on Justia Law

Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC supplied Pavestone, LLC with aggregate used to manufacture pavers. After customers complained about efflorescence on the pavers, Pavestone determined that sodium carbonate in Hi-Tech’s aggregate caused the issue. Pavestone sued Hi-Tech for negligence, products liability, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court ruled in favor of Pavestone on the breach of warranty and products liability claims.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and found that Hi-Tech breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and was liable under products liability. Hi-Tech appealed the decision, arguing that it did not know of Pavestone’s specific need for sodium-free aggregate and that the economic loss doctrine barred Pavestone’s tort claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that Hi-Tech’s sale of aggregate carried an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because Hi-Tech had reason to know Pavestone’s intended use. The court adopted the reasoning of UCC § 2-315, which does not require proof of a seller’s actual knowledge if the seller had reason to know the product’s intended purpose. The court also held that Pavestone was excused from testing the aggregate for sodium carbonate because the defect was latent and not detectable through a simple examination.However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on the products liability claim, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Pavestone’s noncontractual claims. The doctrine applies when the damage is to the product itself and not to other property. Pavestone did not provide sufficient evidence of damage to property other than the pavers. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s judgment on the warranty claim but reversed its judgment on the products liability claims. View "Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC v. Pavestone, LLC" on Justia Law

Wanda Bowling entered into a contract with the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission to manage its information technology functions. When the contract ended, Bowling allegedly withheld login information for three online accounts, leading the Commission to sue for breach of contract. Bowling counterclaimed for libel and misclassification of her employment status. The district court dismissed the misclassification counterclaim and granted summary judgment to the Commission on all other claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Bowling's counterclaim for misclassification and denied her motion to amend it, citing untimeliness. The court also granted summary judgment to the Commission on its breach of contract claim, concluding that Bowling's login information constituted intellectual property and that she had breached the contract by not certifying the erasure of confidential information. The court awarded the Commission $956.67 in damages. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment on Bowling's libel counterclaim, citing a qualified privilege defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's finding of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission had adequately alleged damages exceeding $75,000. However, the appellate court found that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether the login information constituted intellectual property or other materials covered by the contract, and that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the damages. Therefore, it reversed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Bowling's motion to amend her counterclaim for misclassification, finding no abuse of discretion.On the libel counterclaim, the appellate court agreed that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on a qualified privilege without giving Bowling notice. However, it affirmed the summary judgment on the grounds that the Commission's statements were substantially true. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission v. Bowling" on Justia Law

Cave Quarries, Inc. hired Warex LLC to conduct a controlled explosion to blast a rock wall at its quarry. The explosion went wrong, destroying Cave Quarries' asphalt plant. Cave Quarries sued Warex, claiming strict liability and negligence. The oral contract between the parties did not cover this scenario, so Cave Quarries turned to tort law.The Orange Circuit Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The court held that strict liability did not apply because Cave Quarries was not an innocent bystander but a participant in the blasting. The court ruled that the negligence standard should apply and found material issues of fact precluding summary judgment. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the negligence standard should apply.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that strict liability for blasting does not extend to customers who hire the blaster, as they are participants in the activity and benefit from it. The court maintained that strict liability applies to damage caused to neighbors and bystanders but not to customers. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the negligence claim, directing the trial court to enter judgment for Warex on the strict liability claim and proceed with the negligence claim. View "Cave Quarries Inc. v. Warex, LLC" on Justia Law

RCBA Nutraceuticals, LLC, a Florida-based nutritional supplements company, contracted with Western Packaging, Inc. for the manufacture of plastic zipper pouches to hold its protein powder. These pouches were produced by PolyFirst Packaging, Inc. in Wisconsin, which was later acquired by ProAmpac Holdings, Inc. The pouches were shipped to companies in New York and Texas for filling. RCBA discovered that the pouches were defective, with seams splitting and spilling the protein powder, leading to a lawsuit against ProAmpac in federal court in Wisconsin. RCBA's claims included breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, negligence, civil conspiracy, and fraudulent misrepresentation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed RCBA’s complaint. The court found that the claims were "foreign" under Wisconsin’s borrowing statute, WIS. STAT. § 893.07, and applied the statutes of limitations from New York and Texas for the contract claims, and Florida for the negligence claim. The court concluded that the contract claims were time-barred under the four-year statutes of limitations of New York and Texas, and the negligence claim was time-barred under Florida’s statute of limitations. The remaining tort claims were precluded by the economic loss doctrine. RCBA’s motion to reconsider was denied, with the court ruling that RCBA had waived its equitable arguments by not raising them earlier.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the final significant event for the contract claims occurred where the defective pouches were delivered, in New York and Texas, making the claims foreign and subject to those states' statutes of limitations. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny the motion to reconsider, noting that RCBA had waived its equitable arguments by not presenting them in response to the motion to dismiss. The court concluded that RCBA’s claims were either time-barred or precluded. View "RCBA Nutraceuticals, LLC v. ProAmpac Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between William Good and Uber Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber), and one of its drivers, Jonas Yohou. Good, a chef, used Uber's mobile application to secure a ride. On April 25, 2021, when Good opened Uber's app, he was presented with a screen notifying him of Uber's updated terms of use. The screen required Good to check a box indicating that he had reviewed and agreed to the terms before he could continue using the app. Five days later, Good used Uber's app to order a ride home from work. During the ride, Yohou's car collided with another vehicle, causing Good to suffer severe injuries.Good filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and Yohou in the Superior Court Department. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the terms of use that Good had agreed to. The motion judge denied the motion, finding that a contract had not been formed because Good neither had reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use nor had manifested assent to the terms.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Uber's "clickwrap" contract formation process provided Good with reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use, including the agreement to arbitrate disputes. The court also found that Good's selection of the checkbox and his activation of the "Confirm" button reasonably manifested his assent to the terms. The court remanded the case for entry of an order to submit the claims to arbitration. View "Good v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, Albert Omstead contracted BPG Inspection, LLC to inspect a property he and his wife, Jessique Omstead, intended to purchase. The contract included a one-year limitation clause preventing Mr. Omstead from suing BPG Inspection or its employees more than one year after the inspection. After the inspection, the Omsteads purchased the property. Over a year later, Mr. Omstead died when a retaining wall on the property collapsed. Mrs. Omstead filed a wrongful death suit against BPG Inspection and one of its inspectors.The trial court found the one-year limitation unenforceable, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted review to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in approving the one-year limitation and whether the limitation is void as against public policy.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court found that the one-year limitation was enforceable and not void as against public policy. The court rejected Mrs. Omstead's arguments that the limitation only applied to contract claims and not claims involving bodily injury or wrongful death, that the limitation functioned as a “contractually-effectuated statute of repose,” and that the limitation impermissibly voided “professional standards of conduct.” The court concluded that the one-year limitation did not violate OCGA § 13-8-2 (b) and was not void as against public policy. View "OMSTEAD v. BPG INSPECTION, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a ski lift accident that left a minor, Annalea Jane Miller, a quadriplegic. The plaintiff, Michael D. Miller, acting as the parent and guardian of Annalea, sued the defendant, Crested Butte Mountain Resort, alleging negligence per se based on violations of the Ski Safety Act of 1979 and the Passenger Tramway Safety Act, as well as a claim for negligence-highest duty of care. The plaintiff argued that the defendant could not absolve itself of statutory duties through private release agreements that purported to release negligence claims against it.The district court dismissed the negligence per se claim, ruling that the defendant could absolve itself of liability through private release agreements. It also dismissed the negligence-highest duty of care claim, finding that the release agreements signed by the plaintiff were enforceable and barred the claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the district court's dismissal of the negligence per se claim. It held that the defendant could not absolve itself of liability for violations of statutory and regulatory duties through private release agreements. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the negligence per se claim.However, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's dismissal of the negligence-highest duty of care claim. It found that the district court correctly applied the factors set forth in Jones v. Dressel, determining that the release agreements signed by the plaintiff were enforceable and barred the claim. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence-highest duty of care claim.The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to reinstate the plaintiff’s negligence per se claim and for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC" on Justia Law