Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of a contract dispute between Verint and Tekelec where Tekelec sought a right to payment stemming from a patent dispute between two corporate entities not directly involved in this appeal. The district court awarded summary judgment to Tekelec and denied Verint's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court rejected Verint's claims that Tekelc lacked constitutional standing to enforce its right to the payments at issue. Because the court concluded that Verint's fixed, contractual payment obligations under the Blue Pumpkin/IEX Agreement unambiguously fell outside of the scope of the subsequent Verint/NICE Settlement's boilerplate Non-Accrual Clause, the court need not consider Tekelec's alternative argument that the disputed payments accrued prior to the effective date of the Verint/NICE Settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Tekelec, Inc. v. Verint Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

SEL owns the 463 patent, which names Nagata as a co-inventor. During prosecution in 1991, Nagata assigned his rights to applications and patents related to the patent to SEL’s founder Yamazaki, and subsequently signed a substitute Declaration and Assignment of those applications and patents. From 2002 to 2003, Nagata assisted SEL in a patent infringement suit against another party and was paid for his cooperation and services. In 2009, SEL sued Samsung and others for infringement and contacted Nagata for further assistance, but learned that Nagata had agreed to assist Samsung as a fact witness. Nagata gave testimony repudiating his signature on the 1991 Declarations and Assignments. Samsung then claimed that the patents, including the 463 patent, were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. SEL sued Nagata, alleging violation of patent law, anticipatory breach of contract, slander of title, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed; there is no federal cause of action based on assignor estoppel. View "Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., Inc. v. Nagata" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, Motorola appealed from the district court's preliminary injunction to enjoin Motorola temporarily from enforcing a patent injunction that it obtained against Microsoft in Germany. The underlying case before the district court concerned how to interpret and enforce patent-holders' commitments to industry standard-setting organizations (SSOs), which established technical specifications to ensure that products from different manufacturers were compatible with each other. Specifically, the case involved the H.264 video coding standard set by International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the 802.11 wireless local area network standard set by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). The court held that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the district court's narrowly tailored preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Defense contractor Raytheon, specializes in infrared imaging. Indigo, also specializing in infrared imaging, was founded by former Raytheon employees including Woolaway, who promised not to recruit Raytheon employees. Indigo began consulting for Raytheon, governed by Confidential Disclosure Agreements. In 1997, Raytheon became concerned that Indigo was recruiting Raytheon personnel to gain access to trade secrets. The companies settled the matter by agreement. The relationship between Raytheon and Indigo terminated in 2000. In 2000, Indigo won a military contract; in 2003, Indigo was selected over competitors, including Raytheon, to receive another subcontract. In 2004, Raytheon acquired and disassembled an Indigo infrared camera and found what it believed was evidence of patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation. In 2007, Raytheon found a correlation with the expertise of former employees who had departed for Indigo. The district court dismissed claims of trade secret misappropriation as time barred. The Federal Circuit reversed. The district court erred by resolving genuine factual disputes in favor of Indigo, the moving party, and concluding that Raytheon should have discovered its claims before March 2, 2004. View "Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Sys. Inc." on Justia Law

RTI owns patents relating to the automatic routing of telephone calls based upon cost. Aware of infringement by Speakeasy, a telecommunications company, RTI offered to release Speakeasy from liability in exchange for a one-time payment under RTI’s tiered pricing structure. In 2007, the companies entered a “Covenant Not to Sue” with a payment of $475,000 to RTI, and a provision barring Speakeasy from challenging, or assisting others in challenging, the validity of the patents. The agreement defined “Speakeasy” to include both Speakeasy and Best Buy, which had previously announced plans to acquire Speakeasy. Three years later, Best Buy announced a plan to sell Speakeasy and merge it into Covad. RTI again learned of an infringement and notified Covad. Covad sought a declaratory judgment that the patents were invalid. The action was later dismissed voluntarily. RTI initiated the present lawsuit. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of licensee estoppel, under which a licensee of intellectual property “effectively recognizes the validity of that property and is estopped from contesting its validity,” is unenforceable in the context of challenges to patents, and that the no-challenge clause was contrary to the public interest in litigating the validity of patents. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff alleged infringement of patents covering systems and devices for testing blood samples against a competitor in the diagnostic field. The patents at issue name defendant as the assignee. Plaintiff claimed ownership based on confidentiality and non-competition clauses in employment and consulting contracts between its predecessor and an employee, the inventor. The district court dismissed, finding that plaintiff lacked standing because the 1999 Consulting Agreement did not continue the 1984 Agreement’s Disclosure and Assignment Covenant. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the company lacked standing with respect to rights assigned long after the inventor resigned from the company.

In 1992 two companies began a joint venture to develop peptide compounds. The agreement provides that inventions created by joint efforts are jointly owned, but inventions attributable to a single party are owned by that party and that disputes will be arbitrated. In court-ordered arbitration, a panel decided that a certain group of patents are jointly owned, but that another group is owned by defendant. The district court confirmed those rulings, but vacated a ruling in defendant's favor on foreign patents. Holding that appeal is authorized by 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1)(E), and that the dispute does not concern patent law, but is a contract issue, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a court to vacate an award for any of four reasons, 9 U.S.C. 10(a); a conclusion that the arbitrators disregarded the law by failing to discuss the foreign patents separately from the domestic patents did not justify vacating the award. The judge mistakenly inferred from silence that the arbitrators must have had an extra-contractual ground; the arbitrators had no reason to discuss the foreign patents separately from the domestic patents.

This suit stemmed from the efforts of plaintiff and its owner and founder to obtain a patent for an invention related to personalized postage stamps and the suit involved state law claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a patent application. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff's claims were time-barred such that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that in the alternative, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the causation elements of plaintiff's claims. The court held that this case raised issues of patent law, and those issues were substantial because of the special federal interest in developing a uniform body of patent law in the Federal Circuit as recognized in Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co. and expressed by Congress's grant of exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases to that court. Therefore, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and transferred the suit to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631.

The Board of Trustees of Stanford University filed suit against Roche Molecular Systems ("Roche") claiming that their HIV test kits infringed upon Stanford's patents. The suit stemmed from Stanford's employment of a research fellow who was arranged by his supervisor to work at Cetus, a research company developing methods to quantify blood-borne levels of HIV. The research fellow subsequently devised a PCR-based procedure for measuring the amount of HIV in a patient's blood while working with Cetus employees. The research fellow had entered into an agreement to assign to Stanford his "right, title and interest in" inventions resulting from his employment there and subsequently signed a similar agreement at Cetus. Stanford secured three patents to the measurement process. Roche acquired Cetus's PCR-related assets and commercialized the procedure into HIV test kits. At issue was whether the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. 200 et seq., commonly referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act ("Act"), displaced the basic principle that rights in an invention belonged to the inventor and automatically vested title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors. The Court held that the Act did not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions and therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that the research fellow's agreement with Cetus assigned his rights to Cetus, and subsequently to Roche; that the Act did not automatically void an inventor's rights in federally funded inventions; and thus, the Act did not extinguish Roche's ownership interest in the invention and Stanford was deprived of standing.

The owner of patents for computer modems and methods of identifying modems licensed the patents to Rockwell; a related agreement gave Rockwell sub-licensing rights. Rockwell reorganized and assigned its rights. The patent owner acknowledged the assignment. Defendants obtain modem chips from a "spin off" of the companies formed in the Rockwell reorganization. The patent owner sued for infringement. The district court held that the defendants are licensed and entered summary judgment that certain patents are invalid. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, first holding that the assignment was within Rockwell's sub-licensing rights without further consent. Two patent claims were invalid for indefiniteness, but there was a material issue of fact on whether two others were invalid for failure to disclose necessary algorithms.