Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Monsanto developed a genetic modification in soybean seeds (Roundup Ready® (RR)), known as the 40-3-2 event (RR trait), which enables soybean plants to tolerate application of glyphosate herbicide to kill weeds. Monsanto owns the patent for the RR trait and granted Pioneer a license to produce and sell seeds containing the traits. After Pioneer became a subsidiary of DuPont, Monsanto and Pioneer entered into an amended license, under which DuPont produced and sold RR trait seed. In 2006, DuPont announced that it had developed a glyphosate-tolerant trait, OGAT, expected to confer tolerance to both glyphosate and acetolactate synthase inhibitor herbicide. Testing indicated that OGAT alone did not provide sufficient glyphosate-tolerance for commercial use. DuPont then combined OGAT with the RR trait; the OGAT/RR stack provided increased yields in field trials. DuPont did not sell any OGAT/RR product, however, and discontinued development. Monsanto sued DuPont for breach of the license and patent infringement. The district court granted partial judgment to Monsanto, holding that the license was unambiguous and did not grant the right to stack non-RR technologies with the licensed” trait, but allowed DuPont to amend its answer to assert reformation counterclaims and defenses. The court ultimately told DuPont to “either voluntarily dismiss these reformation claims or produce … all documents … previously withheld.” DuPont continued litigating its reformation counterclaims and produced previously withheld internal e-mails that showed its awareness that it did not have the right to commercialize the OGAT/RR stack. The court found that DuPont’s position was not rooted in fact, that DuPont made misrepresentations and had perpetrated a fraud on the court, struck DuPont’s reformation defense and counterclaims, and awarded limited attorney fees to Monsanto. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

Endo sells Opana® ER extended-release tablets containing a painkiller, oxymorphone. In earlier litigation, Endo sued Roxane and Actavis for patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A), based on their Abbreviated New Drug Applications to market generic versions of Opana® ER. The lawsuits settled; Endo granted defendants a license and a covenant not to sue. After making the agreements the 122 and 216 patents issued to Endo. They are continuations of the same parent application and directed to extended-release oxymorphone compositions and methods of treating pain using those compositions. Endo also acquired the unrelated 482 patent, concerning purified oxymorphone compositions and methods of making those compositions. The asserted patents are listed in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) entry for Opana® ER. Endo again sued for infringement and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent marketing or sales of generic oxymorphone formulations. The district court held that Endo was estopped from claiming that the activity of defendants, “which has gone on for a substantial period of time, is now suddenly barred because of these new patents.” The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the defendants did not have an express or implied license to practice the patents at issue.View "Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Actavis, Inc." on Justia Law

Hauge and his former employer, ERI, disputed ownership of intellectual property rights related to “pressure exchangers,” a type of energy recovery device used in reverse osmosis. In 2001 they entered into an Agreement. The district court adopted the Agreement, holding that ERI was to be the sole owner of three U.S. patents and one pending patent application. After expiration of the Agreement’s non-compete clause, in 2004, Hauge filed a patent application, titled “Pressure Exchanger,” and a utility application. The patent issued in 2007, describing “[a] pressure exchanger for transferring pressure energy from a high-pressure fluid stream to low-pressure fluid stream.” In 2009, Hauge’s new company, Isobarix, unsuccessfully attempted to reach a new agreement with ERI. Isobarix began selling a pressure exchanger, called “XPR.” Hauge entered into a consulting agreement with two ERI employees. ERI sought an Order to Show Cause, in 2012, submitting an expert’s declaration that Isobarix was using pressure exchanger technology from pre-March 19, 2001 in design and manufacture of XPR, which is “virtually identical to the ERI pressure exchanger” in operation. The court entered a Contempt Order, finding that allowing Hauge to develop new products using technology he assigned to ERI solely because the new inventions post-date the Agreement would render the Agreement useless. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that Hauge did not violate the “four corners” of the 2001 Order. View "Energy Recovery, Inc. v. Hauge" on Justia Law

Access sells software for mobile communication, owns the patents at issue, and entered into an exclusive license agreement with APAC, a subsidiary of Acacia. The agreement gave APAC the exclusive right to grant sublicenses, to sue for damages and to seek relief for infringement of the patents. The agreement disclaims third-party-beneficiary rights, states that APAC may not enforce the patents against, or seek licenses to practice the patents from, Access’s customers and end-users in connection with Access’s products and services, and states that APAC and Access consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of any California state or federal court. APAC assigned all of its rights and liabilities in the patents to a wholly owned subsidiary, SmartPhone. SmartPhone sued Huawei, which makes mobile handsets and tablets, in Texas, alleging that Huawei products infringe the patents. Huawei then sued SmartPhone, Acacia Research, and Access in California, alleging that Huawei has been an Access customer for more than 10 years and seeking declaratory judgments of noninfringement. Based on the Texas filing, the district court dismissed the noninfringement and invalidity counts under the first-to-file rule. Dismissing remaining counts, the court stated that.an allegation that the parties intended Huawei to benefit from the license agreement conflicted with its terms. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Futurewei Tech., Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp." on Justia Law

In 1997 Wawrzynski was awarded the 990 patent, entitled “Method of Food Article Dipping and Wiping in a Condiment Container.” The description illustrates a condiment container that has a flexible cap with a slitted opening. A user introduces a food article, such as a French fry, into the container through the slit and dips it into the condiment. As the food article is removed, the flexible cap wipes away excess condiment , reducing the likelihood of a drip or spill. . Wawrzynski presented his “Little Dipper” concept, permitting a consumer to either dip or squeeze, to Heinz in a 2008. Heinz indicated that the company was not interested in the product, but months later, released its new “Dip & Squeeze®” packet. Wawrzynski filed a lawsuit asserting breach of an implied contract and unjust enrichment. Heinz counterclaimed that Heinz did not infringe the patent and that the patent was invalid. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that federal patent law preempted the state law claims and that Wawrzynski failed to prove infringement. The Federal Circuit transferred to the Third Circuit, stating that its subject matter jurisdiction over patent disputes derives solely from the complaint, not from any counterclaim. View "Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

Jang, a doctor and inventor, sued BSC, the company to which Jang assigned his coronary stent patents, for breach of the patent assignment agreement, which required BSC to share profits from the patents with Jang, including any damages it recovers from third-party infringers. In 2010, BSC settled a claim against Cordis for infringement in combination with anther claim that Cordis had against BSC. BSC made a payment to Cordis, and the parties exchanged several patent licenses. BSC then denied that it had recovered any damages that it was obligated to share with Jang. The Third Circuit reversed judgment on the pleadings in favor of BSC. Two of Jang’s claims are sufficient to survive judgment on the pleadings: that BSC breached the contract because the cash offset qualifies as a “recovery of damages” and that BSC violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by structuring a settlement to thwart the agreed purpose of the patent assignment. View "Jang v. Boston Scientific SciMed Inc." on Justia Law

Taurus sued DaimlerChrysler, alleging that external websites infringed its patent for “a computer system for managing product knowledge related to products offered for sale by a selling entity.” Daimler Chrysler asserted license and release defenses, asserted a breach of contract counterclaim, and filed a contract claim against third-party defendants (including Orion), which, it claimed violated a 2006 patent licensing agreement between DaimlerChrysler and Orion, to settle prior patent infringement suits. The district court entered summary judgment, finding that the accused websites did not infringe any asserted claims and that certain claims were invalid as anticipated by prior art. The district court found the DaimlerChrysler suit to be exceptional under 35 U.S.C. 285, and awarded damages of $1,644,906.12, for costs incurred in Chrysler’s defense. With respect to remaining issues, the district court: found that certain third parties were alter egos and declined to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; held that the 2006 agreement did not provide a release to the infringement alleged in the patent suit; held that issues of fact remained as to whether certain third parties had breached a warranty in the 2006 agreement; held that Orion had breached the warranty; and imposed sanctions on Orion and another for pre-trial witness tampering (those parties were not permitted to present evidence to support their defense that Chrysler did not rely on the warranty). The Federal Circuit affirmed, except with respect to attorney fees. View "Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp." on Justia Law

This case involved disputes over licensing agreements for, inter alia, the RS 3400 blood irradiation device. At issue was whether the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a breach of contract claim that would require the resolution of a claim of patent infringement for the complainant to succeed. The court concluded that it did not have appellate jurisdiction and resolved dispositive issues in favor of Rad Source, leaving a single dispositive issue for certification: When a licensee enters into a contract to transfer all of its interests in a license agreement for an entire term of a license agreement, save one day, but remains liable to the licensor under the license agreement, is the contract an assignment of the license agreement, or is the contract a sublicense? View "MDS (Canada) Inc., et al. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Wilson Sporting Goods agreed to pay Frolow royalties for “Licensed Article(s),” defined as “tennis rackets which are covered by one or more unexpired or otherwise valid claims” of Frolow’s 372 patent. After conducting an audit, Frolow concluded that Wilson was not paying royalties on all the Licensed Articles and filed suit alleging that Wilson breached the License Agreement and infringed the 372 patent. Due to an arbitration provision in the Agreement, the court limited the breach of contract case to determining which Wilson racket models were Licensed Articles and summarily dismissed the patent infringement claim. The court ultimately entered summary judgment for Wilson. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect whether certain rackets were Licensed Articles, reasoning that the fact that Wilson marked their products with Frolow’s patent number supports his allegation that Wilson’s products fall within the claims. View "Frolow v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a contract dispute between Verint and Tekelec where Tekelec sought a right to payment stemming from a patent dispute between two corporate entities not directly involved in this appeal. The district court awarded summary judgment to Tekelec and denied Verint's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court rejected Verint's claims that Tekelc lacked constitutional standing to enforce its right to the payments at issue. Because the court concluded that Verint's fixed, contractual payment obligations under the Blue Pumpkin/IEX Agreement unambiguously fell outside of the scope of the subsequent Verint/NICE Settlement's boilerplate Non-Accrual Clause, the court need not consider Tekelec's alternative argument that the disputed payments accrued prior to the effective date of the Verint/NICE Settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Tekelec, Inc. v. Verint Systems, Inc." on Justia Law