Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Bruce G. Harris appealed a district court judgment awarding Linda A. Smestad $30,025 plus interest on the theory of unjust enrichment. Harris argued the district court erred by: (1) deciding the issue remanded without notifying him or holding a hearing, (2) considering unjust enrichment because Smestad's complaint did not include an unjust enrichment claim and (3) finding Smestad proved unjust enrichment. Upon review,the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "Smestad v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants Timothy and Elizabeth Lamb appealed a summary judgment cancelling their contract for deed with EVI Columbus, LLC ("EVI") and awarding EVI its costs incurred in cancelling the contract for deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Lambs' motion to amend their answer to include counterclaims against EVI and refusing to construe the Lambs' affirmative defenses as counterclaims; the trial court properly granted EVI's motion for summary judgment awarding a $150 personal judgment against the Lambs to EVI for its costs and disbursements; and the Court denied EVI's request for double costs and attorney's fees related to the appeal.

Defendant Helen Cupido appealed a trial court's summary judgment entered in favor of Recovery Resources, LLC. Helen and David Cupido married in January 1993. In March 2010, David Cupido incurred medical expenses at St. Alexius Medical Center. The parties divorced in April 2011. Under the divorce judgment, the trial court ordered David Cupido responsible for payment of the debt owed to St. Alexius Medical Center. The divorce judgment also required Helen and David to indemnify one another from any and all collection activities, which may arise regarding debts awarded to a party. Recovery Resources, LLC, a collection company, sued Helen and David for $9,494.61 owed to St. Alexius Medical Center for medical care provided to David while he and Helen were married and living together. David did not answer Recovery Resources' claim and a default judgment was entered against him. Helen answered denying liability and cross-claimed for indemnity against David. Helen then moved for summary judgment arguing she was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because the divorce judgment allocated the debt to David. Recovery Resources resisted and moved for summary judgment arguing it was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because Helen was liable for the debt. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Recovery Resources. On appeal, Helen contended the trial court erred: (1) by concluding she is jointly and severally liable for the debt David incurred, and (2) by failing to dismiss her from the lawsuit based on the indemnification language in the divorce judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the indemnification language in the divorce judgment between Helen and David Cupido did not affect Recovery Resources' statutory right to recover the debt. Accordingly the trial court did not err in failing to dismiss Helen from the collection action.

Plaintiffs, a majority group of limited partners of Magic 2 x 52 Limited Partnership appealed their post-judgment motion to pierce the corporate veil of several corporate Defendants and to recover punitive damages. The Limited Partners' investment in the Magic partnership did not go as planned, and they initiated this lawsuit, seeking to remove Magic Corporation as the general partner of the partnership and requesting monetary damages. The Limited Partners also sought to pierce the corporate veil of the corporate Defendants to hold Kenneth Herslip personally liable for the corporate Defendants' conduct and to recover punitive damages. May 2010 amended judgment awarded Magic Partnership $146,153.99 against Magic Corporation, B K Properties, and Herslip Construction; awarded Magic Partnership $144,263.80, and prejudgment interest of $77,783.88, against Magic Corporation and Herslip Construction; and awarded Magic Partnership costs and disbursements of $46,201.47 against Magic Corporation, B K Properties, and Herslip Construction. None of the parties appealed from the May 2010 judgment. The Limited Partners' subsequent efforts to collect on the judgment were unsuccessful. In June 2010, both Herslip Construction and Magic Corporation filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7. The district court denied the Limited Partners' post-judgment motion, concluding they had not shown an appropriate basis for granting their request to pierce the corporate veil and to recover punitive damages. The court stated its prior opinion after trial had specifically denied the plaintiffs' requests to pierce the corporate veil and to recover punitive damages with a detailed analysis. The court concluded the May 2010 amended judgment was final as to all issues decided by the court after trial and refused to revisit piercing the corporate veil and punitive damages.

Come Big or Stay Home, LLC (CBSH) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of EOG Resources, Inc. dismissing its claims for refusing to provide it with oil and gas well information unless CBSH agreed to not disclose the information to third parties without EOG's consent. EOG owned and developed oil and gas interests in North Dakota and has drilled and operated numerous oil and gas wells in the state. CBSH owned mineral or leasehold interests in the state, including interests in spacing units where wells have been drilled and operated by EOG. In late 2008, EOG sent CBSH an invitation to participate in drilling a horizontal oil and gas well in Mountrail County, ending with a joint operating agreement (JOA) for that well. CBSH refused to execute subsequent JOAs for several additional wells. After each refusal by CBSH to execute a JOA, EOG sent letters to CBSH explaining it was willing to provide well information to CBSH if it would agree to the nondisclosure provision contained in the JOA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that CBSH's theories of recovery were not viable under the circumstances.

Defendant-Appellee Barbara McDermott appealed a district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Kevin Pifer when the court concluded that Defendant's mother Dorothy Bevan, validly gifted Plaintiff an option to purchase land. In 2001, Ms. Bevan executed a durable power of attorney in favor of Plaintiff who was a distant relative. Thereafter, Plaintiff assisted Bevan with managing her farmland and performing miscellaneous other tasks. Ms. Bevan granted Plaintiff the option to purchase that land in 2004. Ms. Bevan died in 2010, and Plaintiff recorded a notice of his intent to exercise the option. Defendant rejected the attached cashier's check, questioning Ms. Bevan's capacity to execute the purchase option agreement. Plaintiff subsequently sued for specific performance of the purchase option. The district court granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment, concluding the purchase option agreement was valid and enforceable. In its judgment, the district court stated, "This Judgment shall be final for appeal purposes, and there is no just reason for delay." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court inappropriately certified the partial summary judgment under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court abused its discretion in directing an entry of final judgment. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and directed the district court to vacate its portion of the partial summary judgment certifying the judgment as final.

Defendant-Appellant Rodney Brossart appealed a default judgment entered against him in a collection action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Raymond J. German, Ltd. for legal services allegedly rendered to him. On appeal, Appellant argued the district court erred in granting German a default judgment, and German failed to prove the existence of an attorney-client agreement between itself and Appellant, precluding the default. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the default and affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in entering a default in favor of German, because Appellant "appeared" under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a) and German provided him with notice of the motion for a default judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a)(3). Furthermore, the Court held that it was reasonable for the trial court to ask for written proof of the attorney-client relationship prior to entering the default judgment.

Sisters of Mary of the Presentation Long Term Care, d/b/a Ave Maria Village ("Sisters of Mary"), appealed, and Northern Excavating Co., Inc. ("Northern") cross-appealed a trial court's judgment awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent and costs at $743.33, and awarding Sisters of Mary $3,231.00 in attorney's fees. In October of 2009, Sisters of Mary and Northern executed a contract wherein Northern agreed to repair a water main break on Sisters of Mary's property for the cost of its "[t]ime and [m]aterials[.]" The contract did not contain a specific price. Following completion of the repairs, Northern submitted a bill for $103,244.11 to Sisters of Mary. Sisters of Mary found the bill excessive and refused to pay, asserting the repairs only had a value of approximately $40,000. Northern filed a construction lien covering the repaired property and sued Sisters of Mary seeking $98,806.98 for breach of contract and foreclosure of the lien. Sisters of Mary answered and counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, unlawful sales practices, and invalid construction lien/slander of title. Sisters of Mary also sought a jury trial. By stipulation, issues relating to the foreclosure of the construction lien were reserved and not submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent for time and materials provided under the contract. After the verdict was rendered, Sisters of Mary applied for its costs and attorney's fees. In its post-trial brief, Sisters of Mary claimed it successfully challenged Northern's lien and argued the court was required to award it all of its attorney's fees and costs associated with the action. In its own post-trial brief, Northern argued it was unreasonable to require lienholders to pay costs and attorney's fees when a lienholder does not recover the precise amount claimed in a lien. The trial court ultimately awarded Sisters of Mary a portion of its attorney's fees, explaining it was a reasonable award given Sisters of Mary failed to specify "any fees that were directly related to the construction lien issue[.]" The trial court also found Northern was the prevailing party and awarded its costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature intended to award an owner literally all of the costs and attorney's fees arising out of a lawsuit when challenging a lien was not the only disputed cause of action: "[t]here is nothing in the statute or the legislative history to support that conclusion. We recognize that Sisters of Mary must provide the court with an itemization of its attorney's fees and costs in order for the trial court to determine those related to the successful contest of the accuracy of the lien." The Court reversed the award of attorney's fees and costs and remanded that issue to the trial court. Because the district court misconstrued the fees and costs statute, the Court reversed in part and remanded for the district court to determine the reasonable amount of attorney's fees associated with contesting the accuracy of the construction lien.

Plaintiff-Appellant Sean Weeks appealed a summary judgment that dismissed his claims against Michael Geiermann and Collection Center, Inc. (collectively "Collection Center") for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. In 2009, Plaintiff brought this action against the Center for its attempt to collect $3,034.21 in interest on a debt he owed to Medcenter One for clinic and hospital services. Plaintiff obtained medical services from Medcenter's clinic and hospital. According to billing records for the clinic, Plaintiff received services between 2002 and 2008 and was billed $6,752.46, of which his insurance paid $4,698.72. After an insurance adjustment of $1,427.26, Weeks was responsible for $626.48. Weeks paid $453.40, and after another adjustment of $2.03, $171.05 remained unpaid. In July 2009, attorney Geiermann on behalf of Collection Center sent Plaintiff a letter, demanding payment to the hospital for $4,481.22 and to the clinic for $171.05. The letter also demanded $3,003.28 in interest for the hospital and $30.93 in interest for the clinic. The district court granted Collection Center's summary judgment motion and dismissed Plaintiff's action, stating the case was "fairly straightforward." The court held there was no disagreement that Plaintiff had incurred a debt to Medcenter for medical services that remained unpaid which constituted a "legal indebtedness." The court further held that, according to Plaintiff's affidavit, he never received anything in writing from Medcenter indicating any interest would be assessed in the event of nonpayment of this debt after a specified period of time. The court concluded "as a matter of law, that [Collection Center was] rightfully entitled to collect interest from Weeks at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the legal indebtedness owed by Weeks to [Collection Center], as the assignee of Medcenter One." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that a "medical services provider," who does not make disclosures required under N.D.C.C. 13-01-15 to charge the "late payment charge" allowed under N.D.C.C. 13-01-14.1, is still entitled to prejudgment interest under N.D.C.C. 47-14-05 at the legal rate of six percent per annum.

Richard and Elaine Benson, Bill and Mary Bliven, Don and Annette Feist, Pat Lynch, and Lloyd and Donna Tribitt ("Bensons") appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed their claim that SRT Communications, Inc.,was contractually obligated to provide them post-retirement health and medical benefits. The Bensons are four retired employees of the Minot telephone business, their spouses, and Pat Lynch, the widow of a deceased retiree, Thomas Lynch. Richard Benson, Bill Blevin, Don Feist, Lloyd Tribitt, and Thomas Lynch worked for NSP before it sold its telephone business to Minot Telephone in 1991, and they all retired from Minot Telephone between 1991 and 1994, before Souris River purchased Minot Telephone from Rochester. With the exception of Don Feist, the retired employees belonged to Local Union No. 949 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers when the labor union and NSP entered into a collective bargaining agreement in 1991. Feist previously had been a member of the labor union, but did not belong to the union when it entered into the 1991 collective bargaining agreement with NSP. The district court concluded the 1991 collective bargaining agreement expired on December 31, 1993, and although SRT Communications continued to provide post-retirement health benefits to the Bensons for over fourteen years after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, it did so as a matter of business discretion and not because of a contractual obligation. The district court dismissed the Bensons' claims against SRT Communications. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the Bensons' action was governed by federal law and they failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact.