Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

American General Contractors, Inc. ("AGC"), appealed a judgment assessing liability and awarding damages and interest for the cost of delays in the construction of the Williams County Law Enforcement Center in Williston. C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP ("C&C"), the successful bidder for the mechanical prime contract, filed suit when construction the center was delayed approximately two years after "substantial completion" was supposed to have happened. The district court concluded it was appropriate for the County and AGC to share responsibility for providing temporary shelter and heat on the project. The court apportioned 47 percent of the liability for the costs of the delay for the three and one-half months of active interference to the County and 53 percent to AGC, for the four months delay inherent to the industry. The court awarded C&C approximately $73,000 on its claim against the County. After offsetting amounts owed between the parties, the court awarded AGC approximately $424,000 on its claim against the County. The court awarded Davis Masonry approximately $96,000 from AGC for masonry work completed under its subcontract with AGC, and rejected AGC's claimed offsets to that amount. Davis had provided heat, cover and shelter for the project during cold weather and sought $649,000 from the County and AGC for that expense including prompt payment interest. Davis had settled with the County for $530,000, and the court ruled AGC was responsible for 53 percent of the remaining $119,000, or $63,070. AGC argues the district court erred in determining AGC was liable for any of the costs incurred from the delay under its contract with the County. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant S.G.'s vehicle collided with a motorcycle driven by John Allmer. S.G. was fifteen years old at the time. The parties stipulated Allmer suffered significant injuries, had medical expenses in excess of $1 million and continued to incur medical expenses for his care and treatment. Defendant Sandy Goetz and S.G.'s father were divorced, and S.G.'s father owned and insured the vehicle S.G. was driving. S.G. had exclusive possession of the car for six months prior to the accident. Her father's policy had an underlying liability limit of $250,000 and an umbrella policy of $1 million, which her father's insurance company offered in settlement of the claims against him. Goetz had an insurance policy with State Farm that listed Goetz and her vehicle as covered under the policy. Goetz signed S.G.'s driver's license application sponsorship form for drivers under the age of eighteen, assuming financial liability for S.G.'s negligent acts arising from operation of a motor vehicle under sections 39-06-08 (2011) and 39-06-09 (2011), N.D.C.C. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing no dispute existed that S.G.'s vehicle was not covered under Goetz's policy. Goetz and S.G. filed a motion for summary judgment and Allmer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the language in Goetz's State Farm's insurance policy should be construed to provide coverage for the accident. State Farm did not dispute Goetz was liable for S.G.'s negligent acts; therefore, the district court addressed only whether State Farm's policy provided coverage for the claim. The district court found for the purposes of Goetz's policy that S.G. was considered a "resident relative" and S.G.'s Oldsmobile was a "non-owned" vehicle. The district court also determined State Farm was not required to cover S.G.'s vehicle because the vehicle was not designated on the policy. The district court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment, and denied Goetz and S.G.'s motion for summary judgment and Allmer's motion for summary judgment. Allmer appealed, arguing that Goetz's signature on S.G.'s sponsorship form for her driver's license application imputed S.G.'s negligence to Goetz and created coverage for S.G.'s accident under Goetz's insurance policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gruebele" on Justia Law

Tharaldson Ethanol Plant I, LLC and Tharaldson Financial Group, Inc. appealed a judgment and amended judgment ordering Tharaldson Financial to pay VEI Global, Inc., $1,150,000 plus interest, and an order granting certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). VEI provided design and construction management services for an ethanol plant owned and operated by Tharaldson Ethanol. In 2009, Tharaldson Ethanol and VEI reached a settlement on disputed fees, agreeing Tharaldson Ethanol would pay VEI $1,350,000 for all work VEI performed through February 28, 2009. The agreement also provided Tharaldson Financial would enter into a $1,350,000 promissory note payable to VEI, and a copy of the note was attached and incorporated into the agreement. Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial sued VEI, claiming VEI negligently designed and constructed the ethanol plant. The complaint sought damages for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence claims; and sought a declaratory judgment that Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial did not owe VEI anything under the settlement agreement or promissory note because of damages VEI caused by its breaches of contract and warranty and other wrongful acts. VEI answered and counterclaimed, including a breach of contract claim against Tharaldson Financial for failing to make payments on the promissory note. The district court ultimately granted VEI's motion for partial summary judgment, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact and VEI was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and ordered VEI was entitled to judgment against Tharaldson Financial in the amount of $1,150,000, with interest. The Supreme Court dismissed Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial's appeal, holding that "[c]ertification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) must be reserved for 'the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.'" The Court concluded this case did not present "out-of-the-ordinary circumstances" or the "infrequent harsh case" warranting its immediate review. Consequently, the Court did not reach the merits of Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial's appeal. View "Tharaldson Ethanol Plant I, LLC v. VEI Global, Inc." on Justia Law

Allen Kraft and Jim Kost operated a custom combining partnership. They ceased doing business as a partnership in early 2003, but continued to share equipment and work in 2003 and 2004. In 2008, Kost sued Kraft to formally dissolve the partnership. Kraft counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that after the partnership was terminated in 2003, Kost had orally agreed to lease some of Kraft's combining equipment in 2003 and 2004. Kraft alleged Kost owed $150,000 under the oral lease. Kraft also claimed that the parties had entered into an oral agreement for Kraft to do certain work for Kost in 2005, and that Kost owed him $10,000 for the work. Kraft appealed the a district court judgment dissolving the partnership and dismissing his counterclaim seeking damages for breach of an oral agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the equitable theories of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit and did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion in limine precluding evidence or argument of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. View "Kost v. Kraft" on Justia Law

In 2004, Robert and Cheri Knorr bought a lot and built a home on Lake Audubon. They owned the lake home debt free. When the national real estate market soured in the late 2000s, the Knorrs had to mortgage the lake property and other property to satisfy loan commitments. They were unable to make the mortgage loan payments on the property, so they turned to family members for assistance. According to the Knorrs, family members agreed to help them by purchasing their homes in Arizona and North Dakota and leasing them to the Knorrs with options to repurchase. The Knorrs' eldest daughter and her husband purchased the Arizona home and leased the property to the Knorrs with an option to repurchase. The Knorrs' daughter, Alonna, and her husband, Jon Norberg, allegedly agreed in late 2010 to also purchase the North Dakota lake home and lease it to the Knorrs with an option to repurchase. A lease agreement containing an option to purchase the lake home was executed by the Knorrs and sent to the Norbergs for their signatures. Alonna signed the agreement and claimed Jon did too, but that document was lost. Jon claimed the lake home was leased to the Knorrs but did not include a buy-back option. After transferring the lake home to the Norbergs, the Knorrs continued to live in the home, made monthly payments to Jon for an amount equal to the Norbergs' mortgage payments, paid all real estate taxes on the property, maintained the property, and paid all utilities and other expenses associated with the property. The Knorrs gave notice to the Norbergs, who were then experiencing marital difficulties, that they were exercising the option to purchase the lake property. Jon refused to recognize the option. Jon appealed the trial court's judgment allowing his in-laws to exercise the option. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in holding partial performance of an oral lease agreement with an alleged option to purchase removed the oral agreement from the statute of frauds. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for the court to consider the Knorrs' alternative theories of recovery based on equitable principles of promissory estoppel and constructive trust. View "Knorr v. Norberg" on Justia Law

In 2010, Mary Gwyther was in a multi-vehicle accident while driving a pickup she co-owned with her mother, Peggy Gwyther, who died in the accident. The claimants allegedly suffered injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Gwyther vehicle was insured under a policy issued by Nodak Mutual Insurance Company, issued to Peggy as the named insured. Peggy lived in a home she co-owned with Mary in Bismarck. Although Mary was listed as a co-owner of the Bismarck property, she had never actually lived in the home, and had not lived with her parents since 1972. Mary had been living in Switzerland since 2000. She owned a business in Switzerland, owned and insured a vehicle there, and had a Swiss driver's license and residence permit. However, Mary voted by absentee ballot in North Dakota as a resident, declaring in applications and affidavits that she was a resident at her mother's Bismarck address. She also designated the Bismarck address as her permanent home address with the State Department. Nodak brought an interpleader action seeking a declaration it was only liable to pay the reduced step-down policy limits because Mary was not a resident of Peggy's household at the time of the accident and therefore was not a "family member" under the policy. The case was tried as a bench trial on stipulated facts. The district court found Mary was not a resident of Peggy's household, concluded the policy did not violate North Dakota law, and concluded Nodak was required to pay only the lower step-down policy limits. The claimants appealed that decision, but the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and the step-down endorsement to the insurance policy did not violate North Dakota law. View "Nodak Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bahr-Renner" on Justia Law

Balvitsch and Weisgram sued Tollefson for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment, and other claims. Balvitsch and Weisgram moved to hold Tollefson in contempt, alleging Tollefson failed to obey a February 8, 2013 court order that instructed Tollefson not to make any further attacks on the parties and other non-party individuals during the course of the litigation. Balvitsch and Weisgram alleged the court ordered Tollefson at the scheduling conference to stop all attacks against a non-party individual and to stick to the facts of the case during the litigation. They alleged Tollefson ignored the court's order by threatening to launch websites defaming Weisgram and the non-party individual. The trial court entered an order to show cause noting the time and place for the contempt hearing and ordered that Tollefson appear and show why he should not have been held in contempt. The hearing took place, and the court found Tollefson in contempt and ordered sanctions. Tollefson appealed that order and sanction, arguing he did not receive proper notice of the hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding Tollefson did not have adequate notice of the contempt proceeding. View "Balvitsch v. Dakota Burger N Fries Corp." on Justia Law

The Zavadils alleged they loaned Jon and Hollie Rud $32,000 under an April 2008 verbal agreement. The loan was to be repaid when the Ruds sold their home or within six months. When the Ruds failed to repay the loan, the Zavadils agreed to renew and extend the original verbal loan agreement. In 2009, the Ruds executed a third mortgage on their property in favor of the Zavadils, and on a few months later, the Ruds executed a promissory note for $32,000 plus interest due and payable to the Zavadils a year later. The Ruds divorced in June 2009, between executions of the third mortgage and the promissory note. The Zavadils sued the Ruds to foreclose the third mortgage after the Ruds failed to make all payments required under the promissory note. Wells Fargo Bank subsequently brought an action against the Ruds, the Zavadils and others to foreclose its first position mortgage on the property. The Zavadils admitted their third mortgage was subordinate to the bank's mortgage on the property and stipulated to dismissal of their foreclosure action against the Ruds. Jon Rud appealed the grant of summary judgment that awarded Zavadils $33,490.19 in their action to recover on the promissory note. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in ruling no genuine issues of material fact existed and the Zavadils were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Zavadil v. Rud" on Justia Law

Roger Sundsbak, George Bitz and Northern Livestock Auction appealed a district court judgment granting Craig Anderson's motion for summary judgment and denying Northern Livestock's motion to amend their counterclaim. Anderson was First Western Bank & Trust's assignee. Northern Livestock argued the district court erred as a matter of law by entering summary judgment in favor of Anderson, by failing to enter summary judgment in favor of Northern Livestock's counterclaim for specific performance and by failing to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow judicial review of its decision denying Northern Livestock's cross-motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Zimbelman" on Justia Law

From 1998 through 2009, Keith Jensen owned a cattle feedlot in South Dakota. Jensen did not personally operate the feedlot but used it for his cattle-brokering business. Jensen leased the feedlot to Arden Sieh under a five-year written lease agreement. The written lease expired in 2003, but Sieh continued to operate the feedlot under an oral lease agreement with Jensen. While operating the feedlot, Sieh purchased cattle feed from Forbes Equity Exchange, Inc. ("FEE"), a North Dakota cooperative grain elevator. In 2010, FEE filed a complaint against Sieh and Jensen for $166,015.18 worth of corn purchased by Sieh on an open account that was allegedly never paid. FEE alleged Jensen's cattle consumed the feed. In March 2011, FEE withdrew its claim against Sieh for the unpaid feed. In exchange, Sieh assigned to FEE all potential claims he had against Jensen for cattle feed and care services that exceeded Sieh's rent payments. FEE amended its complaint, and raised Sieh's claims for cattle-care costs in addition to its original suit against Jensen for unpaid cattle feed. Jensen filed a third-party complaint against Sieh for the collection of past debts, including bounced checks, missed rent payments, unpaid loans and interest, missing cattle, damaged feedlot property, and other financial obligations arising from Sieh's operation of Jensen's feedlot. Jensen ultimately lost on his contract claims, and he appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in denying Jensen's claim for an offset or in admitting evidence. The Court also concluded that the court did not err in finding in favor of Forbes Equity Exchange on its assigned claim against Jensen. View "Forbes Equity Exchange, Inc. v. Jensen" on Justia Law