Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in North Dakota Supreme Court
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Constellation Development, LLC, appealed dismissal of its claims against Western Trust Company and its trustee, Gary Hoffman (collectively "Western"), for breach of contract and equitable and promissory estoppel, and against Dabbert Custom Homes, LLC, for tortious interference with a business contract. In 2013, Constellation agreed in writing to purchase about 24 acres of land in Cass County from Western, with the remaining balance to be paid on October 14, 2013. A check was tendered with the agreement, but was returned for insufficient funds. When Constellation tendered a cashier's check to cover the earlier check, Western refused it. In it s suit against Wester, Constellation claimed there had been an oral extension of the purchase agreement. The Supreme Court found the district court did not err in finding there was no breach of any agreement Western had with Constellation, it affirmed dismissal of Constellation's claims. View "Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Co." on Justia Law

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Susan Lundberg, as Trustee of the Gabriel J. Brown Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in a tract of land to Greg Holverson, directing the Trust to convey the land to Holverson, and dismissing the Trust's counterclaims for rescission or for damages for breach of contract. In May 1980, Holverson owed a balance on a contract for deed. Robert Lundberg, as original Trustee, released 5.09 acres from the contract and deeded that land to Holverson. Holverson executed a mortgage on the 5.09 acres as additional security for the contract for deed and the single indebtedness of $39,018.40 under the same repayment terms as the contract for deed. Holverson made sporadic payments under the amended contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she wrote Holverson multiple times asking him to make required payments. In December 2012, the Trust initiated proceedings to cancel the contract for deed and served Holverson with a notice of default. Holverson agreed to pay the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she reviewed records at the Burleigh County Recorder's Office and learned Holverson had obtained and satisfied several other mortgages on the land while making sporadic payments to the Trust since 1978. Susan Lundberg claimed she discovered Holverson had executed five mortgages on the land and satisfied three of the mortgages between 1978 and 1997, and he had obtained six mortgages and satisfied seven mortgages after 1997. She claimed she also discovered Holverson's stated reason for amending the contract for deed and mortgage on November 10, 1997, was false, because the record in the recorder's office reflected he had obtained the Capital Credit Union mortgage several days before Holverson's contract for deed and mortgage with the Trust were amended on November 10, 1997. Holverson made a timely tender of a certified check for the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage, and the Trust refused to accept the check and execute a warranty deed for the land. Holverson sued the Trust to quiet title and determine ownership of the land. Holverson generally denied the Trust's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and affirmatively pled accord and satisfaction, estoppel, laches, payment, release, statute of limitations, and waiver. The district court granted Holverson's motion for summary judgment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Trust's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Holverson v. Lundberg" on Justia Law

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26th Street Hospitality, LLP appealed a district court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration; order lifting a stay in the proceedings, confirming the arbitration award, and awarding post-judgment interest; and final judgment. The Partnership argued the district court erred in ordering arbitration because the court was required to determine the validity of the contract before arbitration could be ordered and not all of the claims and parties were subject to arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "26th Street Hospitality v. Real Builders" on Justia Law

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Jerry and Linda Lumley appealed a judgment dismissing their action against Elaine Kapusta for specific performance of an oral contract to convey real property located in Mountrail County. The Lumleys were long-time tenant farmers of Kapusta's property in Mountrail County. Kapusta resided in Virginia and wanted to sell her North Dakota property. Linda Lumley and Kapusta had telephone conversations in 2012 about the Lumleys purchasing some of the property. Linda Lumley told Kapusta she would obtain an appraisal of the property. Dacotah Bank conducted an "Agricultural Real Estate In-House Evaluation," which specifically warned "[t]his evaluation is not an appraisal," and valued the property at $525,827. Butch Haugland, who is not a licensed appraiser, also conducted an evaluation and valued the property $60,000 higher than the bank's valuation. Based on the bank's valuation, the Lumleys sent Kapusta a cashier's check for $525,827, deeds to be executed by Kapusta, and a note instructing her that "[t]he purchase of all the property is contingent upon all documents being signed, notarized, and returned the same day as signed." Kapusta endorsed and deposited the check in a bank and signed the deeds, but did not return the executed deeds to the Lumleys. According to Kapusta and her daughter, they telephoned Linda Lumley and told her they did not understand why there had been no appraisal of the property and they wanted one performed. Shortly afterward, Kapusta returned the money to the Lumleys. The Lumleys thereafter sued Kapusta for specific performance of their alleged oral contract to convey the property. Because the district court's finding that there was no enforceable oral contract between the parties was not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Lumley v. Kapusta" on Justia Law

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Linh Duc Duong, doing business as Classy Nails, appealed after a bench trial awarded Welch Construction & Excavating, LLC, $30,825, plus interest, for the balance due on a construction contract. Welch Construction sued Duong, alleging the parties contracted for Welch Construction to remodel a vacant retail space in Kirkwood Mall into a Classy Nails salon for $92,225. Welch Construction alleged it completed the work and Duong failed to pay the balance of $30,825 due under the contract. Duong answered and counterclaimed, denying he owed an outstanding balance under the contract and alleging Welch Construction breached the contract by failing to remodel the retail space in a timely and workmanlike manner according to his specifications. Duong claimed he was entitled to a setoff against any balance owed under the contract for his damages caused by Welch Construction's failure to complete the work before Thanksgiving 2013 and failure to construct the salon according to his specifications. Duong sought lost profits and damages for repairing the work according to his specifications. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding: (1) the parties did not orally contract for a specific completion date for the construction project; (2) Welch Construction did not unreasonably delay completion of the project; and (3) Duong failed to establish his damages for costs to repair and lost profits for Welch Construction's claimed failure to complete the project according to his specifications. View "Welch Construction & Excavating, LLC v. Duong" on Justia Law

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APM, a property management company, sought a builders risk insurance policy from TCI Insurance Agency, Inc. to cover an apartment building under construction in Fargo. Jay Alsop, APM's president, discussed insurance policies with TCI's agent Devin Gaard. One policy in particular, from Philadelphia Insurance Company, covered lost rent and other "soft costs," such as interest. Alsop also received a quote from a different insurance agency for another policy from Travelers Insurance Company, which was cheaper than the Philadelphia policy. The Travelers policy did not have coverage for lost rent and soft costs. Alsop informed Gaard about the Travelers policy and requested Gaard to procure the policy as it was quoted by the other agency, without change. A fire at the construction site delayed the opening of the apartment building for five months. APM filed a claim under the insurance policy for damages caused by the fire, including lost rent and interest charges. Travelers paid part of the claim, but denied the claim for lost rent and interest because the policy did not provide coverage for those costs. APM sued TCI, alleging TCI and Gaard were negligent for failing to offer APM a policy endorsement that provided additional coverage for lost rent and soft costs. TCI denied liability and moved for summary judgment, claiming that APM did not request the additional coverage for lost rent and soft costs and that TCI and Gaard were not required to offer the additional coverage to APM. The district court granted TCI's motion, concluding APM failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gaard breached his duty to APM. The court also concluded Gaard's duty was not enhanced because APM failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact indicating a special relationship existed between APM and TCI. On appeal, APM argued the district court erred in deciding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether: (1) Gaard breached his duty to APM; and (2) a special relationship existed between APM and TCI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to TCI. View "APM, LLP v. TCI Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

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Patterson Enterprises, Inc., appealed and Titan Machinery, Inc., cross-appealed a judgment and an order denying their post-judgment motions after the district court ordered Patterson to pay Titan $88,707.75 due under several oral equipment leases. Patterson argued the district court erred in admitting into evidence an exhibit summarizing amounts Patterson owed Titan under the oral leases, the court erred in awarding Titan $5,617.63 for finance charges and the court erred in finding the equipment did not breach an implied warranty of merchantability. In its cross-appeal, Titan argued the court clearly erred in calculating the amount Patterson owed Titan for three items of leased equipment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the debt summary into evidence. The Supreme Court was unable to understand the basis for the court's decision regarding late payment charges as a component of Patterson's obligations to Titan, and reversed and remanded for findings addressing this issue. The Court reversed and remanded for findings about the implied warranty of merchantability. The Court was not convinced the trial court erred in calculating Patterson's lease payments for certain items of equipment. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Titan Machinery, Inc. v. Patterson Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

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In January 2010, Kory Clark received a telephone call around 3 a.m. from his brother asking for assistance with his pickup, which was stuck in a snowdrift. According to Clark's deposition, after the brothers were unable to pull the pickup out of the snowdrift, he drove to their grandfather's nearby farm to get a tractor to pull it out. Clark stated that after proceeding a short way down the road, the tractor broke down and he was unable to get over to the shoulder of the road or restart it. He then walked back to the farm to get his pickup and pick up his brother, who took him home and said he would take care of the tractor. Before the tractor was removed from the road, Rita Fred collided with it while driving to work. Fred sued Clark and his grandfather to recover for her injuries. At the time of the accident, Clark's grandfather had a farm liability policy with Farmers Union Mutual Insurance. Farmers Union defended the grandfather in the action brought by Fred, but declined to defend Clark, claiming he was not insured under the policy. Clark sought a declaratory judgment that Farmers Union had a duty to defend or indemnify him. He also sought damages for bad-faith refusal to defend. QBE Americas, Inc., joined as the third-party claims administrator for Farmers Union. Both Farmers Union and QBE moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Clark appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment and holding he was not entitled to coverage under a farm liability policy. He also argued the district court should not have dismissed his claim for breach of duty to defend. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly held Clark failed to present evidence sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact in regard to his claims, it affirmed the judgment. View "Clark v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins." on Justia Law

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Jon Norberg appealed a district court judgment allowing his former parents-in-law, Robert and Cheri Knorr, to buy back certain real property under an alleged oral lease. He argued the district court erred in concluding the Knorrs established promissory estoppel and constructive trust. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court's findings of promissory estoppel were not clearly erroneous. View "Knorr v. Norberg" on Justia Law

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Zachary Johnson and Margie Johnson contracted with Buskohl Construction Inc. as a general contractor to oversee the construction of their new house. John Buskohl was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of Buskohl Construction Inc. Due to a deteriorating relationship with the Johnsons, Buskohl walked off the job before construction was complete, leaving various "odds-and-ends" unfinished on the house. The Johnsons repaired some of the alleged deficiencies themselves and solicited bids from various contractors to fix the remaining issues. The Johnsons sued Buskohl alleging Buskohl negligently constructed the house, breached the contract, and breached the warranty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Johnsons. Buskohl moved for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b), arguing irregularities in the proceedings prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Buskohl argued the district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial because the district court erred by: (1) failing to provide a special verdict form that categorically itemized damages; (2) allowing hearsay into evidence; (3) excluding Buskohl's expert from testifying; and (4) denying Buskohl's motion for mistrial based on improper closing argument. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence that did not fall within an exclusion or exception. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for a new trial, because the district court's error affected Buskohl's substantial right to a fair trial. View "Johnson v. Buskohl Construction, Inc." on Justia Law