Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in North Dakota Supreme Court
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Jerry and Linda Lumley appealed a judgment dismissing their action against Elaine Kapusta for specific performance of an oral contract to convey real property located in Mountrail County. The Lumleys were long-time tenant farmers of Kapusta's property in Mountrail County. Kapusta resided in Virginia and wanted to sell her North Dakota property. Linda Lumley and Kapusta had telephone conversations in 2012 about the Lumleys purchasing some of the property. Linda Lumley told Kapusta she would obtain an appraisal of the property. Dacotah Bank conducted an "Agricultural Real Estate In-House Evaluation," which specifically warned "[t]his evaluation is not an appraisal," and valued the property at $525,827. Butch Haugland, who is not a licensed appraiser, also conducted an evaluation and valued the property $60,000 higher than the bank's valuation. Based on the bank's valuation, the Lumleys sent Kapusta a cashier's check for $525,827, deeds to be executed by Kapusta, and a note instructing her that "[t]he purchase of all the property is contingent upon all documents being signed, notarized, and returned the same day as signed." Kapusta endorsed and deposited the check in a bank and signed the deeds, but did not return the executed deeds to the Lumleys. According to Kapusta and her daughter, they telephoned Linda Lumley and told her they did not understand why there had been no appraisal of the property and they wanted one performed. Shortly afterward, Kapusta returned the money to the Lumleys. The Lumleys thereafter sued Kapusta for specific performance of their alleged oral contract to convey the property. Because the district court's finding that there was no enforceable oral contract between the parties was not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Lumley v. Kapusta" on Justia Law

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Linh Duc Duong, doing business as Classy Nails, appealed after a bench trial awarded Welch Construction & Excavating, LLC, $30,825, plus interest, for the balance due on a construction contract. Welch Construction sued Duong, alleging the parties contracted for Welch Construction to remodel a vacant retail space in Kirkwood Mall into a Classy Nails salon for $92,225. Welch Construction alleged it completed the work and Duong failed to pay the balance of $30,825 due under the contract. Duong answered and counterclaimed, denying he owed an outstanding balance under the contract and alleging Welch Construction breached the contract by failing to remodel the retail space in a timely and workmanlike manner according to his specifications. Duong claimed he was entitled to a setoff against any balance owed under the contract for his damages caused by Welch Construction's failure to complete the work before Thanksgiving 2013 and failure to construct the salon according to his specifications. Duong sought lost profits and damages for repairing the work according to his specifications. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding: (1) the parties did not orally contract for a specific completion date for the construction project; (2) Welch Construction did not unreasonably delay completion of the project; and (3) Duong failed to establish his damages for costs to repair and lost profits for Welch Construction's claimed failure to complete the project according to his specifications. View "Welch Construction & Excavating, LLC v. Duong" on Justia Law

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APM, a property management company, sought a builders risk insurance policy from TCI Insurance Agency, Inc. to cover an apartment building under construction in Fargo. Jay Alsop, APM's president, discussed insurance policies with TCI's agent Devin Gaard. One policy in particular, from Philadelphia Insurance Company, covered lost rent and other "soft costs," such as interest. Alsop also received a quote from a different insurance agency for another policy from Travelers Insurance Company, which was cheaper than the Philadelphia policy. The Travelers policy did not have coverage for lost rent and soft costs. Alsop informed Gaard about the Travelers policy and requested Gaard to procure the policy as it was quoted by the other agency, without change. A fire at the construction site delayed the opening of the apartment building for five months. APM filed a claim under the insurance policy for damages caused by the fire, including lost rent and interest charges. Travelers paid part of the claim, but denied the claim for lost rent and interest because the policy did not provide coverage for those costs. APM sued TCI, alleging TCI and Gaard were negligent for failing to offer APM a policy endorsement that provided additional coverage for lost rent and soft costs. TCI denied liability and moved for summary judgment, claiming that APM did not request the additional coverage for lost rent and soft costs and that TCI and Gaard were not required to offer the additional coverage to APM. The district court granted TCI's motion, concluding APM failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gaard breached his duty to APM. The court also concluded Gaard's duty was not enhanced because APM failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact indicating a special relationship existed between APM and TCI. On appeal, APM argued the district court erred in deciding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether: (1) Gaard breached his duty to APM; and (2) a special relationship existed between APM and TCI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to TCI. View "APM, LLP v. TCI Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

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Patterson Enterprises, Inc., appealed and Titan Machinery, Inc., cross-appealed a judgment and an order denying their post-judgment motions after the district court ordered Patterson to pay Titan $88,707.75 due under several oral equipment leases. Patterson argued the district court erred in admitting into evidence an exhibit summarizing amounts Patterson owed Titan under the oral leases, the court erred in awarding Titan $5,617.63 for finance charges and the court erred in finding the equipment did not breach an implied warranty of merchantability. In its cross-appeal, Titan argued the court clearly erred in calculating the amount Patterson owed Titan for three items of leased equipment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the debt summary into evidence. The Supreme Court was unable to understand the basis for the court's decision regarding late payment charges as a component of Patterson's obligations to Titan, and reversed and remanded for findings addressing this issue. The Court reversed and remanded for findings about the implied warranty of merchantability. The Court was not convinced the trial court erred in calculating Patterson's lease payments for certain items of equipment. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Titan Machinery, Inc. v. Patterson Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

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In January 2010, Kory Clark received a telephone call around 3 a.m. from his brother asking for assistance with his pickup, which was stuck in a snowdrift. According to Clark's deposition, after the brothers were unable to pull the pickup out of the snowdrift, he drove to their grandfather's nearby farm to get a tractor to pull it out. Clark stated that after proceeding a short way down the road, the tractor broke down and he was unable to get over to the shoulder of the road or restart it. He then walked back to the farm to get his pickup and pick up his brother, who took him home and said he would take care of the tractor. Before the tractor was removed from the road, Rita Fred collided with it while driving to work. Fred sued Clark and his grandfather to recover for her injuries. At the time of the accident, Clark's grandfather had a farm liability policy with Farmers Union Mutual Insurance. Farmers Union defended the grandfather in the action brought by Fred, but declined to defend Clark, claiming he was not insured under the policy. Clark sought a declaratory judgment that Farmers Union had a duty to defend or indemnify him. He also sought damages for bad-faith refusal to defend. QBE Americas, Inc., joined as the third-party claims administrator for Farmers Union. Both Farmers Union and QBE moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Clark appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment and holding he was not entitled to coverage under a farm liability policy. He also argued the district court should not have dismissed his claim for breach of duty to defend. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly held Clark failed to present evidence sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact in regard to his claims, it affirmed the judgment. View "Clark v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins." on Justia Law

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Jon Norberg appealed a district court judgment allowing his former parents-in-law, Robert and Cheri Knorr, to buy back certain real property under an alleged oral lease. He argued the district court erred in concluding the Knorrs established promissory estoppel and constructive trust. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court's findings of promissory estoppel were not clearly erroneous. View "Knorr v. Norberg" on Justia Law

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Zachary Johnson and Margie Johnson contracted with Buskohl Construction Inc. as a general contractor to oversee the construction of their new house. John Buskohl was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of Buskohl Construction Inc. Due to a deteriorating relationship with the Johnsons, Buskohl walked off the job before construction was complete, leaving various "odds-and-ends" unfinished on the house. The Johnsons repaired some of the alleged deficiencies themselves and solicited bids from various contractors to fix the remaining issues. The Johnsons sued Buskohl alleging Buskohl negligently constructed the house, breached the contract, and breached the warranty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Johnsons. Buskohl moved for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b), arguing irregularities in the proceedings prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Buskohl argued the district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial because the district court erred by: (1) failing to provide a special verdict form that categorically itemized damages; (2) allowing hearsay into evidence; (3) excluding Buskohl's expert from testifying; and (4) denying Buskohl's motion for mistrial based on improper closing argument. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence that did not fall within an exclusion or exception. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for a new trial, because the district court's error affected Buskohl's substantial right to a fair trial. View "Johnson v. Buskohl Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-appellant Timothy Huether contracted with Nodak Mutual to provide insurance coverage for his house, buildings and structures on his farm. The coverage was under Nodak Mutual's Farm and Ranch Policy. The Farm and Ranch Policy did not provide insurance coverage for grain dryers. Huether added an equipment endorsement insuring his agricultural equipment, which included a grain handler dryer. A fire destroyed the grain handler dryer, fans and parts. Nodak Mutual's agricultural endorsement provided coverage for "direct physical loss or damage caused by perils 1 through 10." Huether's Farm and Ranch Policy listed fire as Peril 1. Damage from fire was a "direct physical loss or damage" and Nodak Mutual paid Huether $278,187.44 for damage to the grain dryer, control room and grain handling equipment. Huether did not contest the coverage or payment for those items, but claimed an additional $82,954.77 in expenses for transporting to and drying his crops at other grain drying facilities. Nodak Mutual denied Huether's claim because the agricultural equipment endorsement covered "direct physical loss or damage" and did not cover loss-of-use. Huether sued Nodak Mutual seeking damages for the denied claim. The district court found Huether's claim was not covered under the policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Nodak Mutual. Huether appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Nodak Mutual because it misinterpreted the terms of the insurance policy. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Huether v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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John and Lori Finstad owned 80 acres of a section of land in Ransom County and leased 240 adjacent acres in the same section from Willis and Doris Olson. The Ranson-Sargent Water Users District was considering this tract of land as a potential site to drill water wells. In 1997, the Finstads and the Olsons granted to the District options to purchase the land. The options also allowed the Finstads and the Olsons to lease back the property for five years, after which they had a nonassignable right of first refusal to lease back the property for an additional five years. The Finstads appealed from a judgment awarding them $53,000.99 in damages and interest in their action against the District for breach of the lease-back provisions of an option agreement between the parties. The District cross-appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the economic duress doctrine relieved the Finstads of their obligations under a subsequent agreement and release they had entered into with the District. Because the agreement and release is valid and enforceable, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendants Citation Oil & Gas Corp., Petro-Hunt LLC, and other working interest owners appealed a district court summary judgment quieting title to an oil and gas lease in Greggory Tank. In 1982, George and Phyllis Tank executed an oil and gas lease in favor of Petro-Lewis Funds, Inc. The parties agreed to extend the primary term of the lease for three more years, ending July 15, 1989. In May 1983, the Tank 3-10 well was spudded in the northwest quarter. The well produced until October 1996. In June 1998, the Tank 3-10R well was spudded and replaced the Tank 3-10 well. The Tank 3-10R well continues to produce oil or gas. In June 1988, the Tank 13-10 well was spudded in the southwest quarter. The well continuously produced oil or gas until October 2008, and intermittently produced oil or gas until January 2012. Tank was the successor in interest to George and Phyllis Tank and was the owner of minerals in the southwest quarter of section 10. In September 2011, Tank sued the defendants, seeking to cancel the oil and gas lease to the extent it covered the southwest quarter. The defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Tank's claims. The defendants argued the continued drilling and operation of oil and gas wells on the leased property maintained the lease beyond the primary term and the lease remained in full force and effect. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling the lease had expired and was no longer valid on the southwest quarter. The court determined summary judgment was appropriate because there were only issues of law to resolve, including the interpretation of an unambiguous contract and the application of undisputed facts. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law