Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Defendants owned land on the shore of a pond. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants claimed to be the owners of the land under the pond that was adjacent to Defendants' waterfront land. The parties' claims depended on the interpretation of two 1973 deeds from Anthony and Marilyn Furlano to Defendants' predecessors in title. According to Defendants, the deeds conveyed both waterfront land and land under the water. Plaintiffs claimed that only the waterfront land was conveyed. Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin Defendants from interfering with or using the underwater property "and the water thereon." The supreme court granted summary judgment for defendants, but the appellate division modified and ruled in Plaintiffs' favor. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since the deeds did not expressly exclude underwater lands, they must be read as conveying such land, to the center of the pond, to Defendants' predecessors. View "Knapp v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In this action, a real estate company that prepared due diligence reports for a developer in connection with the potential purchase of commercial properties alleged that a rival brokerage firm was unjustly enriched when it acquired the material from the developer and later obtained a commission on the ultimate sale of the properties. Supreme Court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim against the rival brokerage firm, and the appellate division affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether a sufficient relationship existed between the two real estate firms to provide a basis for an unjust enrichment cause of action. Based on the allegations presented in the complaint, the Court of Appeals held that the relationship between the two parties was too attenuated and affirmed.

Following the collapse of two investment vehicles known as SIV-Lites, Oddo Asset Management (Plaintiff) commenced this action against Barclays Bank PLC, Barclays Capital Inc. (collectively, Barclays), and The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., claiming aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The appellate division affirmed, concluding (1) the collateral managers of the SIV-Lites did not have a contract or relationship with Plaintiff such as would give rise to an underlying fiduciary duty, and (2) Plaintiff's tortious interference claim failed because Plaintiff did not allege an actual breach of the underlying contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the collateral managers appointed to oversee the assets of the SIV-Lites did not owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, and (2) Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim for tortious interference with contract.

Plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York was contractually obligated to pay rent subsidies to their landlords under the Advantage New York program until expiration of their leases. State and Federal reimbursement for two-thirds of the Advantage program's costs ended on April 1, 2011, causing the City to discontinue it as of that date. Both lower courts found that the City did not intend to enter into enforceable contracts with Plaintiffs or their landlords under the Advantage program. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit, holding that the courts below did not err in finding that the City made no contractual commitment to continue the Advantage program through expiration of Plaintiffs' leases.

This case arose when a real estate developer hired HOD to act as general contractor for the construction of two multi-family residences. HOD entered into a subcontract with Well Built for the masonry work. At issue was whether a general contractor acted as a joint employer of masonry workers, who were employed by one of its subcontractors, thereby owing unpaid wages to the subcontractor's workforce. The court held that the Board erred as a matter of law in relying on the federal six-factor test in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc. in reaching its determination of joint employment. Because the Board's factual findings indicated nothing more than that the usual contractor/subcontractor relationship existed between HOD and Well Built during the three-month period that Well Built's principal, Martin Bruten, was on the job, the court need not resort to federal precedent to resolve the issue. In any event, even if the court were to apply the Zheng test, the court would hold that HOD was not a joint employer of Well Built's employees. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the matter remitted with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings.

Pursuant to a contract with the State of New York, defendant agreed to provide various courier services via air and ground transportation. Plaintiffs own a trucking company and served as an independent contractor to defendant, providing ground shipping services to defendant within the state. In this qui tam action, the court was asked to consider whether plaintiffs' claims on behalf of the State of New York, pursuant to the New York False Claims Act (FCA), State Finance Law 187 et seq., were federally preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U.S.C 47173[b][1]. The court held that they were and that the market participant doctrine was inapplicable. Plaintiffs' remaining contentions were deemed without merit.

This case arose from a contract between the school district and DJH to perform heating, ventilation, and air condition work. The contract required DJH to obtain a performance bond which DJH secured from Nova, a compensated surety. At issue was whether Nova was discharged from it surety obligation to the school district on the bases that the school district allegedly violated New York's Lien Law 70[1] by improperly diverting construction contract payments constituting trust fund assets to a non-beneficiary and breached the terms of the parties' performance bond. The court held that under the facts, Nova had not demonstrated that discharge of its surety obligation was warranted. The court also considered whether the school district was entitled to attorneys' fees expended in the prosecution of the litigation and concluded that the request for attorneys' fees was properly denied.

Plaintiff, an auto parts distributor with operations in multiple states, secured general liability, automotive liability, and workers' compensation policies from defendants for annual coverage periods between September 1992 and September 2003. At issue was whether the six-year statue of limitations applicable to the insurers' breach of contract counterclaims began to run when they possessed the legal right to demand payment from the insured or years later after they issued invoices. Under the terms of the insurance contracts in this case, the court concluded that the counterclaims accrued when the insurers had the right to demand payment.

Plaintiff commenced a putative class action against Bloomberg alleging a violation of General Obligations Law 5-901 and 5-903; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; negligent misrepresentation; violation of General Business Law 349; and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Appellate Division subsequently granted Bloomberg's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. The court affirmed, holding that, even affording plaintiff every favorable inference, when reviewing the pleadings and factual allegations of his complaint, plaintiff's failure to identify a cognizable injury proved fatal to his action against Bloomberg.

Plaintiff sued his former employer alleging causes of action for failure to pay wages in violation of Labor Law 190-198 and breach of contract. The employer subsequently appealed the Appellate Division's order, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict because statements in the employment application and employee handbook negated plaintiff's alleged expectation of, or entitlement to, a guarantee or non-discretionary bonus and that the oral agreements respecting the bonus, if, in fact, entered into by the parties, were unenforceable. The court concluded that plaintiff's bonus was "expressly link[ed]" to his "labor or services personally rendered." Further, plaintiff's bonus had been earned and was vested before he left his job; its payment was guaranteed and non-discretionary as a term and condition of his employment. Since plaintiff's bonus therefore constituted "wages" within the meaning of Labor Law 190, the employer's neglect to pay him the bonus violated Labor Law 193, and entitled plaintiff to an award of attorney's fees under Labor Law 198(a-1). The court considered the employer's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.