Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery.

These two consolidated appeals arose from the same underlying district court action in which the district court issued a final judgment against Appellants in consolidated civil cases alleging various tort, contract, and declaratory relief claims. Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment and paid the requisite filing fee. That appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court as docket number 55200. Docket number 55981 was an appeal from a subsequent award of attorney fees entered in the same district court case. Because the notice of appeal was not accompanied by the requisite filing fee, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Docket number 56473 was an appeal from a subsequent order denying a motion to set aside the judgment entered in the same district court case underlying the previous two appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal for failure to pay the filing fee. Appellants submitted the instant motions for reconsideration in docket numbers 55981 and 56473, asking the Court to permit them to pay the fees necessary to reinstate the appeals. The Supreme Court denied the motions, stating that due to limited judicial resources, failure to pay the requisite fee in a timely matter will result in dismissal.

Eric Spannbauer, a police officer with the North Las Vegas Police Department, was asked to resign by the City Police Department Association. Spannbauer resigned, signing a letter of agreement prepared by the Department. Spannbauer later filed a complaint with the Employee-Management Relation Board (EMRB) against the Association, the City, and the Department, alleging multiple prohibited practices in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288, including gender discrimination. The EMRB found that the City and Department had committed prohibited labor practices and that the Association had breached its duty of fair representation. The City and the Department petitioned the district court for judicial review, which the district court denied. The City, on behalf of itself and the Department, filed an appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the EMRB's finding that the City and Department discriminated against Sannbauer on the basis of his gender in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288.110(1)(f); and (2) the EMRB appropriately disregarded the resignation agreement, including the covenant not to sue, as there was substantial evidence that the agreement was a culmination of prohibited practices in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288.270(1).

At issue in this extraordinary writ proceeding was whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.259(1) compels dismissal where the initial pleading in an action alleging nonresidential construction malpractice was served without filing the attorney affidavit and expert report required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258(1) and (3). The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that a defective pleading served in violation of section 11.258 is void ab initio and of no legal effect and, thus, cannot be cured by amendment. The Court held that because the initial pleadings served by certain real parties in interest in this case did not include the attorney affidavit and expert report as required by section 11.258, those pleadings were void ab initio, and the district court did not have discretionary authority to allow the parties to amend their pleadings to cure their failure to comply with section 11.258.

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) was named as a defendant in an action alleging civil rights violations. LVMPD had an insurance policy with respondent Coregis Insurance to protect against liability for police officer actions when the damages exceeded a certain amount. Coregis denied LVMPD coverage for the civil rights claims because LVMPD did not notify Coregis of its potential liability until ten years after the incident that led to the lawsuit. After settling the action, LVMPD filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a judicial determination that Coregis was required to defend and indemnify LVMPD for damages related to the civil rights claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Coregis, concluding that LVMPD's notice was clearly late and that Coregis was prejudiced by the late notice. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding (1) when an insurer denies coverage of a claim because the insured party failed to provide timely notice of the claim, the insurer must demonstrate that notice was late and that it was prejudiced by the late notice in order to assert a late-notice defense to coverage; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of LVMPD's notice. Remanded.

Pedro Gallegos was injured by David Gonzalez in a car accident. At the time of the accident, Gonzalez was driving a car rented from respondent Malco Enterprises, for which he purchased a liability insurance policy issued by respondent First American and managed by respondent Knight Management. Gallegos obtained a default judgment against Gonzalez. After Gallegos was unable to collect on the judgment, he sought a judicial assignment of Gonzalez's unasserted claims against respondents, which was granted. Gallegos brought the assigned claims, which related to Gonzalez's insurance policy with respondents, in a separate district court action. Respondents moved for summary judgment on the basis that the previous district court could not assign the right of action in a proceeding supplementary to the execution of the judgment, and thus, Gallegos lacked standing to bring Gonzalez's claims. The district court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, vacating the earlier assignment order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) rights of action held by a judgment debtor are subject to execution toward satisfaction of a judgment and may be judicially assigned; and (2) Gallegos properly asserted a right of action assigned to him by another district court. Remanded.

After Clark and Sullivan Constructors (C&S), a general contractor, solicited bids for a public works project, Dynalectric, a subcontractor, submitted a bid to perform electrical work on the project. C&S incorporated Dynalectric's bid into its bid for the contract, and C&S was awarded the project. Subsequently, Dynalectric repudiated its obligations to C&S. C&S sued Dynalectric in district court under various theories of liability, including promissory estoppel. The district court entered judgment for C&S on its promissory estoppel claim and awarded C&S $2,501,615 in damages, which represented the difference between Dynaletric's bid and the amount C&S paid the three replacement contractors to complete the work. Dynalectric appealed, contending that the district court applied the incorrect measure of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the determination of the appropriate measure of damages in any given case turns on considerations of what justice requires and the foreseeability and certainty of the particular damages award sought; and (2) the presumptive measure of damages for a general contractor that reasonably relies on a subcontractor's unfulfilled promise is the difference between the nonperforming subcontractor's original bid and the cost of the replacement subcontractor's performance.

In 2006, appellantâs vehicle was stolen from respondent hotelâs valet parking lot. Appellantâs insurer issued a check to appellant for the cost of the vehicle but not including the cost of customizations. Appellant filed a lawsuit in district court against respondent, alleging negligence and breach of a bailment contract and seeking damages exceeding $10,000. The district court determined that Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.101(1) shielded respondent from liability and entered summary judgment in favor of respondent. Appellant appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found as a threshold matter appellant to be a real party in interest with standing to sue because appellant was not fully compensated by his insurer for his losses and thus the principle of total subrogation did not apply. The Court also held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.101(1) did not protect respondent against liability arising out of the theft of appellantâs vehicle because the statute, which limits the liability of hotels for the theft or destruction of any property brought by a patron upon the premises or "left in a motor vehicle upon the premises," unambiguously places motor vehicles outside of its scope.

A group of homeowners brought suit against respondent, a developer and general contractor. Respondent then filed a third-party complaint against appellant, its subcontractor, pursuant to the indemnity clause in their contract. During trial, the district court granted respondentâs motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury found respondent ninety-nine percent at fault, and the district court held appellant liable for the resulting judgment. Appellant appealed. At issue was whether an indemnity clause in a construction contract obligates the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for its partial negligence for constructional defects, regardless of whether the subcontractor is also negligent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the indemnification clause in the partiesâ contract did not explicitly or expressly state that appellant would need to indemnify respondent for respondentâs own negligence but linked appellantâs indemnification duties to defects caused by appellant only.

Appellant Mildred Powell filed an insurance claim with respondent Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company to cover damage to her house. Liberty Mutual denied the claim, stating that the damage was excluded under the âearth movement exclusionâ in Appellantâs insurance policy. Appellant took Liberty Mutual to the district court. The court eventually granted Liberty Mutualâs motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the âearth movement exclusionâ of the policy excluded coverage of the damage. Appellant challenged the district courtâs review of the policy, arguing that it was contrary to state law on a similar âearth movement exclusion.â The Supreme Court concluded that Liberty Mutualâs policy was ambiguous held in light of the applicable state law. The Court held that the district court erred in granting the company summary judgment, and reversed its holding. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.