Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Sandpointe Apartments obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to real property. Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan. After Sandpointe defaulted on the loan, the interest in the loan and guarantee was transferred to CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC. In 2011, CML-NV pursued its rights under the deed of trust's power of sale provision and purchased the property securing the loan at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which limits the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who acquired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who held that right. Subsequently, CML-NV filed a complaint against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation contained in section 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV's action. The district court concluded that the statute applies only to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the statute may not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute's limitations did not apply in this case. View "Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest in this case were the owners and developers (collectively, P&R) and the general contractor (PCS) of a construction site in Las Vegas. Petitioner, an architecture firm, designed a housing project at the site. After a fatal automobile accident occurred at the site, Plaintiffs and/or their estates filed complaints against P&R, PCS, and Petitioner. Petitioner and Plaintiffs settled, and the district court determined the settlement was made in good faith. P&R subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Petitioner for breach of contract, professional negligence, and express indemnity, among other claims. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were barred as "de facto" contribution and/or equitable indemnity claims. The district court granted the motion in part and dismissed P&R's claim for professional negligence. Petitioner then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the district court to dismiss P&R's remaining third-party claims against Petitioner, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.245(1)(b) bars all claims that seek contribution and/or equitable indemnity when the settlement is determined to be in good faith; and (2) P&R's remaining third-party claims here were "de facto" contribution claims and were thus barred by section 17.245(1)(b). View "Otak Nev., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Sha'Kayla St. Mary and Veronica Damon became romantically involved and decided to have a child together. The couple subsequently drafted a co-parenting agreement. Using Damon's egg and an anonymous donor's sperm, St. Mary gave birth to a child through in vitro fertilization. After their relationship ended, the parties disputed who had custodial rights over the child. The district court (1) concluded that St. Mary was a mere surrogate and therefore not a parent entitled to any custodial rights; and (2) refused to uphold the parties' co-parenting agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that St. Mary was a surrogate lacking any legal rights to parent the child without holding an evidentiary hearing on that issue; and (2) the parties' co-parenting agreement was not void as unlawful or against public policy, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in deeming the agreement unenforceable. View " St. Mary v. Damon" on Justia Law

Respondent purchased a luxury motor home manufactured by Appellant and took possession of the motor home despite noticing problems with the motor home during inspection. The motor home subsequently experienced significant electrical problems, and Respondent attempted to revoke her acceptance of the motor home from Appellant. Appellant rejected the revocation. Respondent filed suit against Appellant, asserting causes of action for revocation of acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court found in favor of Respondent and awarded her damages that included the purchase price of the motor home. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but reversed the award of attorney fees, holding (1) Respondent was entitled to revoke acceptance of the motor home where privity existed between Respondent and Appellant because Appellant interjected himself into the sales process and had direct dealings with Respondent to ensure completion of the transaction; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding incidental and consequential damages but abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. View " Newmar Corp. v. McCrary" on Justia Law

Real party in interest, a homeowner's association (HOA), filed construction defect actions against Petitioners. During discovery, Petitioners disclosed some of their primary insurance agreements to the HOA pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(a)(1)(D). Petitioner refused to disclose additional undisclosed policies covering it that may have been purchased by its parent companies. A special master ordered Petitioner to disclose those agreements. Petitioner objected to the order and filed this writ petition, contending that the disclosed insurance policies were more than sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be entered against them. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that section 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of any insurance agreement that may be liable to pay a portion of a judgment. View "Vanguard Piping v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Sierra International purchased a manufacturing facility's operations. Sierra later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants, the facility and its president, hired Respondent (MCW) to represent them in Sierra's bankruptcy action. Sierra's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2006, Appellants filed an action against MCW, alleging professional malpractice arising from its representation of Appellants in the bankruptcy action. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(e)(2). In 2010, Appellants filed a second complaint against MCW, reasserting the claims in their first complaint. MCW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations because the appropriate accrual date was 2006, the date of the filing of the first complaint. Appellants responded by asserting that Hewitt v. Allen, which provides that the statutory limitation period of a claim of legal malpractice involving the representation of a client during litigation does not commence until the underlying litigation is concluded, governed. The district court held that 2006 was the appropriate accrual date and that Hewitt was inapplicable because a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holing that Sierra's bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding under Hewitt. View "Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP" on Justia Law

Appellants agreed to purchase a restaurant and real property on which the restaurant was located from Respondent. After Appellants failed to make payments on the promissory note, Respondent filed an action against Appellants to recover the principal and unpaid interest. According to Respondent, a third buy-and-sell agreement between the parties was the operative agreement. But during trial, Appellants presented evidence that a fourth written agreement, which was allegedly later destroyed by Respondent or his brother, existed containing the agreed-upon purchase price and terms of the sale. The district court concluded that Appellants' evidence of the destroyed fourth agreement was barred by the statute of frauds because Appellants failed to produce the written agreement. The court then found that Appellants breached the third agreement and entered judgment for Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a writing that is subsequently lost or destroyed, and oral evidence is admissible to prove the existence and terms of the lost or destroyed writing. Remanded. View " Khan v. Bakhsh" on Justia Law

Appellant received treatment at Hospital for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Appellant granted two statutory liens to Hospital on settlement proceeds she obtained from the tortfeasor for hospital services rendered. Appellant subsequently settled her case against the tortfeasor, and the tortfeasor's insurer (Insurer) agreed to pay Appellant $1.3 million in exchange for Appellant's agreement to indemnify Insurer from all healthcare provider liens. Hospital subsequently sued Insurer, and Appellant tendered to Hospital all money it asserted was due. Appellant then filed a complaint against Hospital, alleging that Hospital overcharged her pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 439B.260(1), which provides that hospitals must reduce charges by thirty percent to inpatients who lack insurance "or other contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a third party." The district court entered judgment in favor of Hospital, finding that Appellant's settlement agreement with the tortfeasor rendered Appellant ineligible for the thirty percent statutory discount. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that a patient's eligibility is determined at the commencement of hospital services, and therefore, a later settlement agreement with a third party for the payment of such services does not disqualify the patient for the statutory discount. View " Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant sued the trustee of his deceased wife's estate, claiming that the trustee improperly transferred Appellant's assets into the trust. Appellant also sought to disqualify the attorney who prepared the trust documents (Attorney) from representing the trustee based on the district court's conclusion that a prior attorney-client relationship existed between Appellant and Attorney, creating a conflict of interest. After the trust litigation settled, Appellant sued Attorney for legal malpractice due to Attorney's failure to verify Appellant's intentions before preparing he documents for his signature. Before trial, Appellant sought to preclude Attorney from arguing that an attorney-client relationship did not exist because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, Attorney could not deny the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The district court denied Appellant's motion. During trial, the district court ruled that evidence of Appellant's intent in executing the documents was precluded by the parol evidence rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion because the issue of an attorney-client relationship between Appellant and Attorney was not necessarily litigated in the trust action; and (2) the district court did not err in applying the parol evidence rule. View " Frei v. Goodsell" on Justia Law

After a general contractor (Perini) was sued in connection with alleged reinforcing steel defects on commercial construction project, Perini filed a counterclaim against the steel installer (Century) and the company to whom the steel installer assigned its assets (PCS). Century and PCS in turn filed third- and fourth-party complaints against several entities, including the company that provided structural engineering services for the project (Halcrow), alleging negligence, indemnity, contribution, an declaratory relief. Halcrow moved to dismiss the third- and fourth-party complaints, arguing that unintentional tort claims against design professionals in commercial construction projects are barred when the claimant incurs purely economic losses. The district court granted Halcrow's motion. The district court subsequently granted Century's and PCS's motions to amend their complaints to allege a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Halcrow then filed this petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court issued the writ and directed the district court to vacate its order granting PCS and Century leave to amend their third- and fourth-party complaints, holding that, in commercial construction defect litigation, the economic loss doctrine applies to bar claims against design professionals for negligent misrepresentation where the damages alleged are purely economic. View "Halcrow, Inc. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law