Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Douglas County Health Center Security Union (Union) filed a petition before the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that its employer, Douglas County (County), had engaged in certain prohibited practices. The CIR found the County had engaged in a prohibited practice when it failed to negotiate its intention to contract out bargaining unit work to a private security company. The CIR ordered the parties to recommence negotiation and awarded the Union attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the CIR with directions to vacate its order and dismiss the Union's petition, holding that the issue of the subcontracting of bargaining unit jobs resulting in the elimination of bargaining unit jobs was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between the County and Union and presented an issue of contract interpretation over which the CIR lacked jurisdiction.

This was an appeal after a retrial on remand in a breach of contract claim by Insured against Insurer. At issue on appeal was the optional replacement cost coverage that Insured contracted. The question was whether Insurer's general denial of liability excused Insured from complying with a policy condition requiring that Insured actually repair or replace the damaged property before replacement costs would be paid. The Supreme Court remanded the cause for a new trial on the limited issue of the extent to which Insurer's conduct prevented Insured from complying with the repair / replace condition to replacement cost coverage under the policy. Also to be tried on remand was the amount of the actual cash value of the loss in the event Insured was not excused from the condition precedent to replacement cost coverage.

Mutual of Omaha Bank filed a petition seeking declaratory judgment against Patrick and April Kassebaum, who owed the Bank payments due under several promissory notes. In particular, the Bank sought to have the district court declare the rights of the parties with respect to an assignment of unliquidated proceeds or personal injury litigation executed by the Kassebaums. The Kassebaums filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the assignment was ineffective. The district court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to trial. A jury entered a verdict in favor of the Bank in the amount of $126,376. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Kassebaums' assignment was valid and enforceable under Nebraska law.

The county district court entered a decree of dissolution of the marriage of Kevin and Valara Mamot. The court determined that the premarital agreement entered into by the parties, although unconscionable, was valid and enforceable. The court then divided the assets and entered an order regarding child support. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding that the premarital agreement was enforceable, holding that because Valara did not sign the agreement voluntarily, the agreement was unenforceable under the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act adopted by Nebraska, and therefore, the Court did not need to further address whether the agreement was unconscionable.

The dispute in this case revolved around a limited partnership (Kellom Heights) formed to provide financing for the redevelopment of property. Appellees were Kellom Heights, a corporation, and limited partners in Kellom Heights. Appellants were the redevelopment corporation, the general partner, and a corporation that was a limited parter of the redevelopment corporation. Appellees became dissatisfied with the operation of Kellom Heights and filed this complaint asserting various causes of action. The district court found for Appellees on certain causes of action and entered a judgment in their favor in the amount of $918,228 plus costs and interest. The court also awarded attorney fees and denied Appellees' request for prejudgment interest. The Supreme in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred when it rejected Appellants' statute of limitations defenses as to certain claims; and (2) the court erred in ruling that additional supervisory fees were not permitted. The Court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment.

John Doe filed a lawsuit arising from the termination of his enrollment as a medical student at the University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) against the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska and several faculty members (Defendants). During the pendency of the case, all causes of action except the claim for breach of contract were dismissed. The district court determined that Doe's dismissal was not in violation of a contract between Doe and UNMC regarding the conditions of Doe's continued enrollment. The court then sustained Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Doe's cause of action for breach of contract and thereby dismissing the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that UNMC did not breach its contract with Doe when it terminated his enrollment, and although the Court's reasoning differed from that of the district court, the court did not err when it sustained Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Thomas & Thomas Court Reporters sued Douglas Switzer, an attorney, and his law firm, Hathaway & Switzer (Hathaway Switzer), for failure to pay for court reporting services. The district court entered judgment for Thomas & Thomas. At issue on appeal was whether Hathaway Switzer was liable to Thomas & Thomas for its fees or whether Hathaway Switzer's clients were. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's judgment to the extent that it held Hathaway Switzer rather than Hathaway Switzer's clients liable, as Hathaway Switzer had not disclaimed liability for those fees; and (2) reversed the court's judgment to the extent that it held Switzer personally liable. Remanded with directions to dismiss Thomas & Thomas' claim against Switzer as an individual.

Anthony Alsidez died in a single-car accident after a passenger, Gregory Segura, grabbed the steering wheel of the Jeep Anthony was driving. The Jeep was owned by Melissa Alsidez, Anthony's mother, who had a policy with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Melissa filed a negligence suit against Segura, combined with a coverage action against American Family. After Melissa settled with Segura at an amount that did not compensate her for her claimed loss, Melissa sought to recover underinsured motorist coverage from American Family. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Melissa, holding, among other things, that the exclusion from the underinsured coverage in Melissa's policy for vehicles "owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or a relative" was not void as against public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment where (1) the Jeep was not an "underinsured vehicle" under the policy, and (2) the "regular use" exclusion was consistent with the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Act and not void as against public policy.

Under one contract, City collected solid waste and took it to a waste services company's (Company) transfer station. Company hauled the waste to a landfill. After this contract expired, Company charged the city $42.50 per ton for temporarily accepting its waste at the transfer station. Company later increased City's rate to $60 per ton. Under a second contract, Company performed disposal services for City and charged the same rate it charged under the first contract. After the first contract expired, Company increased City's rate to $60 per ton under the second contract. City sued Company, alleging it was entitled to recover the payments that Company had received for disposal services at the rate of $42.50 per ton. The district court entered judgment for City. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that the parties were operating under an implied contract when Company temporarily accepted City's waste at the transfer station; (2) affirmed the district court's restitution award for the full amount of the overpayments, concluding that Company was unjustly enriched because Company obtained City's assent to its unilateral modification of the price for services through economic duress; and (3) reversed the court's determination of the reasonable value of Company's services. Remanded.

John and Betty Vlasin leased the oil and gas rights to their land to Ranch Oil Company. Ranch Oil operated on one-half of the land in the lease and Byron Hummon operated on the other half. After the primary term of the lease expired and the wells stopped producing oil, the Vlasins entered into a new lease agreement with Hummon which encompassed the entirety of their land. Thereafter, Ranch Oil took action to revive one of its dormant wells, relying on a savings provision of the lease, which stated that the lease shall not terminate if the lessee commences operations for drilling a well within sixty days from such cessation. Plaintiffs, the Vlasins and Hummon, brought suit against Ranch Oil for declaratory judgment, trespass, and conversion. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs but awarded only nominal damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding (1) Ranch Oil's activities on the Vlasins land did not operate so as to extend Ranch Oil's interest in the lease, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to prove they were entitled to damages under trespass and conversion claims, and the Vlasins were entitled only to nominal damages.