Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

RFD-TV, LLC, a television programming service, executed an affiliation agreement with Sunflower Broadband Corporation that granted Sunflower a nonexclusive right to distribute RFD programming to Sunflower’s subscribers in Kansas in exchange for a fee. Knology, Inc., subsequently purchased Sunflower’s assets. Prior to this purchase Knology was providing cable service to subscribers in South Dakota. Knology later became a wholly owned subsidiary of WOW! Cable. Two years later, Knology and WOW ceased distribution of RFD programming and did not pay fees. RFD sued Knology and WOW (collectively, Appellees) for breach of contract. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over them. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the minimum contacts requirement between Appellees, as nonresident defendants, and the State had not been met. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) erred in dismissing the case with prejudice. View "RFD-TV v. WildOpenFence Fin." on Justia Law

Martin Linscott, Rolf Shasteen and Tony Brock formed the law firm Shasteen, Linscott & Brock (SLB). Linscott drafted a proposed shareholder agreement contemplating that if a shareholder left the firm, he would receive one-third of all fees from existing in-process cases. After Linscott left the firm, Linscott brought suit individually and derivatively on behalf of SLB against Shasteen and Brock seeking to recover one-third of attorney fees recovered from the SLB cases that existed at the time he withdrew as a shareholder. The district court ultimately concluded (1) the agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds; (2) the “unfinished business rule” had no application to this case; and (3) therefore, Linscott was not owed any attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the absence of any definition of the term “net fees” prevented the formation of an implied in fact contract; and (2) determining that the statute of frauds rendered any implied contract void. Remanded. View "Linscott v. Shasteen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, including Lyle Sukup and Kristen Sukup, seeking payment for a boundary fence he built between his property and the property in which Defendants had an interest. Specifically, Defendant alleged that he had an agreement with the Sukups to build the fence between his property and the Sukups’ property and that the Sukups agreed to share equally in the cost. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Plaintiff's cause of action arose under Nebraska's "fence law" and that the county courts had exclusive jurisdiction over fence contribution cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint was not simply an action for contribution but was also a common-law contract action that was subject to the district court’s jurisdiction. View "Kotrous v. Zerbe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed a quiet title action against owners of adjacent lots, seeking a declaration that express easements granted in favor of the adjacent lots were invalid. The defendants filed counterclaims asserting that the express easements were valid. Plaintiffs submitted to Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") a claim for defense pursuant to a policy of title insurance issued by Commonwealth insuring Plaintiffs’ property, but Commonwealth denied the claim. In the quiet title action, the district court extinguished the express easements and denied the counterclaims but concluded that the defendants possessed implied easements. While the quiet title action was pending, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Commonwealth, seeking a determination that Commonwealth breached its duty under the policy by refusing to provide a defense to the counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in sustaining Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment because Commonwealth did not violate its contract with Plaintiffs by denying coverage or indemnification. View "Woodle v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff was hired as a salesperson at Planet Group, Inc. As part of his employment, Plaintiff signed a Sales Compensation Plan, which set out the requirements for when a commission was earned and how it would be paid. In 2009, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Planet Group, alleging that he was owed commissions on four of the projects he was working on that were ongoing at the time of his termination. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Planet Group on three of the projects, finding that the Compensation Plan required a signed contract prior to a commission’s being paid. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1229(4) does not permit an employer and an employee to contractually define when a commission becomes payable as “wages,” and therefore, he was entitled to commissions for two of the three projects at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the 2007 legislative amendments to section 48-1229(4) allow an employer and employee to contractually define when a commission becomes payable; and (2) therefore, the commissions for the two projects were not payable to Plaintiff under the Compensation Plan. View "Coffey v. Planet Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, the district court filed a decree dissolving the marriage of Brenda Rice and Dale Rice that incorporated a property settlement agreement (“agreement”) previously entered into by the parties. Dale died one week later. At the time of his death, Dale owned two life insurance policies, both of which listed Brenda as the primary beneficiary. Brenda subsequently filed claims for the proceeds of the policies. The personal representative of Dale’s estate moved to enforce the dissolution decree, claiming that under the agreement, Brenda relinquished her beneficiary interests in the life insurance policies. The district court ordered Brenda to withdraw her claims under the policies and to renounce her rights to any property or interest in Dale’s estate and proceeds from any insurance policies on Dale’s life. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, Brenda relinquished all rights to Dale’s life insurance policies in the agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce decree; and (2) therefore, the district court did not err when it enforced the dissolution decree and ordered Brenda to withdraw claims to Dale’s life insurance policies. View "Rice v. Web" on Justia Law

Russell Reichert sued Sherry Hara in small claims court, claiming that Hara owed him for a $4,000 loan he gave her. The court found the transaction was a loan and entered judgment for Reichert. Hara subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the district court, alleging that the $4,000 was a gift and not a loan. The district court dismissed Hara’s complaint, concluding that the action was barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) claim preclusion, but not issue preclusion, applies to small claims court judgments; and (2) the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied in this case, and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed Hara’s action. View "Hara v. Reichert" on Justia Law

Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) distributes water and natural gas to businesses and residents in the Omaha metropolitan area. MUD contracts with Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern) to provide natural gas pipelines transportation services. In November 2012, MUD and Northern entered into an amendment to a contract providing that Northern would provide interstate natural gas transportation service to MUD for twenty years. Jason Bruno, an Omaha ratepayer and taxpayer who obtained gas and water services from MUD, sought a declaratory judgment that the 2012 amendment to the contract between MUD and Northern was void or voidable on the grounds that Neb. Rev. Stat. 14-2121 requires MUD to seek competitive bids for all contracts for work not performed by MUD employees. The district court determined that the statute does not require competitive bidding, but rather, grants MUD the discretion whether or not to go through the bidding process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that there was no statutory competitive bidding requirement with respect to the contract at issue. View "Bruno v. Metro. Utils. Dist." on Justia Law

Rick Wheeler had two liability insurance policies with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Both Rick and his son Ryan were insureds under the policies. Both policies provided personal liability coverage and included exclusions for abuse and intentional injury. Both policies also contained a severability clause, which required that the insurance be applied separately to each insured. Joshua and Maren McCrary sued Rick and Ryan for Ryan’s alleged sexual assault of the McCrarys’ minor daughter. American Family filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that its policies did not provide liability coverage to Rick. The district court granted summary judgment to American Family. At issue on appeal was whether the severability clause changed the effect of, or rendered ambiguous, the exclusions that would otherwise bar coverage for Rick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the severability clause did not affect the unambiguous language of the policies’ exclusions, which barred coverage for Rick. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted with a shipper agent to move his household goods and personal property from Nebraska to Florida, but the movers who took possession of Plaintiff's property demanded additional payment before the property was delivered, and the property was never delivered to Florida or returned to Plaintiff. Plaintiff sought coverage under his homeowner's policy for loss of personal property due to theft. Insurer denied coverage, claiming that a theft had not occurred. Plaintiff sued Insurer for breach of contract and bad faith in denying the insurance claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Insurer, concluding that Plaintiff lost his property in a contractual dispute and that there was no showing of criminal intent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a theft occurred in this case. Remanded. View "Peterson v. Homesite Indem. Co." on Justia Law