Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Brian Herman and Skyler Herman sued Peter Tonn Enterprises, LLC, doing business as I39 Supply, for breach of contract. The Hermans alleged that they agreed to buy a livestock trailer from I39 Supply, but I39 Supply failed to honor the agreement. The Hermans served I39 Supply via certified mail, but I39 Supply did not respond, leading the Hermans to file for a default judgment. The district court granted the default judgment, ruling that I39 Supply was properly served and had failed to answer the complaint.I39 Supply, represented by its owner Peter Tonn, who is not an attorney, sent documents to the district court and participated in the default judgment hearing by telephone. The district court ruled that Tonn could not represent the LLC and entered a $19,000 judgment in favor of the Hermans. I39 Supply later retained counsel and filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, arguing that Tonn was unaware he could not represent the LLC. The motion did not mention personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to vacate the default judgment and set the matter for a pretrial conference.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that I39 Supply made a general appearance by filing the motion to vacate the default judgment without raising the issue of personal jurisdiction. This action conferred personal jurisdiction on the district court. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the Hermans' complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herman v. Peter Tonn Enters." on Justia Law

The case involves Meisam Sedighi, who sought reimbursement from his employer, Schnackel Engineers, Inc., for $3,000 he paid to an immigration attorney for the preparation and filing of a permanent labor certification application. Sedighi argued that under 20 C.F.R. § 656.12(b), Schnackel Engineers was responsible for these costs. Schnackel Engineers contended that Sedighi was to pursue his green card at his own expense, as stipulated in his employment contract, and that it did not agree to pay for the certification application.The small claims court of the county court for Douglas County ruled in favor of Sedighi, finding that Schnackel Engineers was responsible for the attorney fees under 20 C.F.R. § 656.12(b). Schnackel Engineers appealed to the district court for Douglas County, which reversed the small claims court's decision. The district court found that the employment contract controlled the parties' obligations and that Sedighi was responsible for his own green card expenses. It concluded that the Michigan immigration attorney represented Sedighi, not Schnackel Engineers.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its appellate review. The Supreme Court noted that the small claims court's judgment was supported by competent evidence showing that Schnackel Engineers actively participated in the preparation and filing of the permanent labor certification application. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have presumed that the small claims court found the Michigan immigration attorney represented both Sedighi and Schnackel Engineers. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and directed it to reinstate the small claims court's judgment in favor of Sedighi. View "Sedighi v. Schnackel Engineers" on Justia Law

Dylan R. Isham and Billy C. Jack entered into an agreement to exchange Isham’s manufactured home for Jack’s travel trailer, with an option for Jack to purchase a garage attached to the manufactured home for $3,000 by May 11, 2020. Jack declined the option via a message on June 3, 2019, which Isham read but did not respond to. In February 2021, Isham contacted Jack to either receive payment for the garage or remove it, leading to a dispute as Jack had integrated the garage into his home.The District Court for Butler County found in favor of Jack, concluding that Isham had abandoned his rights to the garage by failing to act on them for over 20 months. The court noted that Isham’s lack of communication and actions indicated abandonment, and it would be inequitable to enforce Isham’s right to remove the garage after such a delay. The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that Isham had waived his right under the contract and that the district court’s finding of abandonment was not clearly erroneous.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Jack did not meet the burden of proving abandonment, as mere nonuse and the passage of time are insufficient to establish abandonment without clear and convincing evidence of intent. The court found that Isham’s actions, such as exploring options to move the garage, did not demonstrate an intent to abandon. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to reverse the district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings to determine the value of the garage, given its integration into Jack’s home. View "Isham v. Jack" on Justia Law

A swine producer experienced a disease outbreak in its sow facility and sued two manure management companies, alleging the outbreak was caused by their failure to follow biosecurity protocols. The swine producer sought $1.5 million in damages under breach of contract and negligence theories. The claims against one company were dismissed, and the remaining company, Frost, moved for summary judgment on both theories.The district court for Burt County granted summary judgment in favor of Frost, finding no contractual relationship between Frost and the swine producer and concluding that Frost owed no duty to the producer. The swine producer appealed, and Frost cross-appealed on the issue of causation.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim but reversed on the negligence claim, finding that Frost owed a duty of reasonable care. The court noted that the standard of care and whether Frost breached it were factual questions for the jury. However, it declined to address Frost’s cross-appeal on causation, as the district court had not ruled on that issue.On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the district court that Frost was entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claims. It found no evidence of an industry standard prohibiting manure pumpers from pumping at a sow facility after a hog finishing facility and concluded that Frost did not breach the standard of care by failing to inform the producer of his previous pumping location. The case was remanded with directions to affirm the grant of summary judgment. View "Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp" on Justia Law

Shawn Slezak, a mechanic for Lancaster County, Nebraska, filed a grievance after his performance evaluation for 2021 was completed late and by higher-level supervisors rather than his direct supervisor. The evaluation, which was below the threshold for a merit increase, was delayed due to discrepancies between numerical ratings and written comments. Slezak argued that the late evaluation violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and sought a merit increase.The Lancaster County Personnel Policy Board found that the late evaluation constituted a breach of contract and awarded Slezak a retroactive merit increase. The County challenged this decision, arguing that the remedy was improper since Slezak's evaluation score did not warrant a merit increase. The District Court for Lancaster County agreed with the County, reversing the Board's decision on the grounds that the remedy made Slezak "more than whole" and was inconsistent with the objective of a damages award in a breach of contract case.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the Board's remedy was inappropriate because it exceeded the scope of a damages award in a breach of contract case. The Court emphasized that the objective of such an award is to make the injured party whole, not to provide a benefit they would not have received if the contract had been performed. The Court also noted that Slezak's score on the late evaluation was below the threshold required for a merit increase, and thus, the delay in the evaluation did not cause his injury. The Court concluded that the District Court did not err in reversing the Board's decision and affirmed the order. View "Lancaster County v. Slezak" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between D&M Roofing and Siding, Inc. (D&M), a roofing company, and Distribution, Inc., the owner of a warehouse. D&M had entered into a contract with Distribution to repair hail damage to the roof of Distribution's warehouse. However, Distribution later decided to use a different contractor for the repairs. D&M sued Distribution for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, claiming damages based on a cancellation fee provision in the contract. The district court found that the contract was enforceable and that Distribution had breached it. However, it also found that D&M was not entitled to any damages because it had not performed any work under the contract.The district court's decision was based on D&M's admission that its breach of contract damages were limited to those under the cancellation fee provision in the contract. The court found that under the clear and unambiguous language of the provision, D&M was only entitled to a cancellation fee of 20 percent of the "work done" by D&M. Since D&M had not performed any work, it was not entitled to the cancellation fee. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Distribution on D&M's unjust enrichment claim, explaining that an enforceable contract displaces such a claim.D&M later filed a second motion for summary judgment, this time alleging lost profits as the measure of damages for the breach of contract claim. The district court construed the motion as a motion to reconsider. The court explained that even though its prior order did not use the word "dismissed," it had disposed of the whole merits of the case and left nothing for the court's further consideration. The court denied D&M's motion and granted a cross-motion by Distribution for summary judgment. D&M appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the court had not yet issued a final order or rendered a judgment. View "D& M Roofing & Siding v. Distribution, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the calculation of postjudgment interest on a series of loans between David Meiergerd and Qatalyst Corporation and Roland Pinto. Meiergerd had filed a complaint in 2007 seeking to recover on a series of loans that occurred between him and the appellees. In 2008, the district court granted Meiergerd’s motion for default judgment, ordering the appellees to pay Meiergerd a certain amount plus postjudgment interest “at the rate of 16% compounded annually ($58.97 per day).”The appellees initiated a separate proceeding in 2022, seeking to vacate or amend the judgment from the earlier proceedings. This new action was ultimately dismissed. Subsequently, in the original case, the court granted the appellees’ motion for revivor. The appellees then filed a “Motion for Satisfaction and Discharge of Judgments” related to the judgment against them. The district court calculated the amount of postjudgment interest due to Meiergerd by multiplying the per diem rate stated in the 2008 order, $58.97, by the number of days between the date of the 2008 order and the date of payment. The court found that the appellees’ checks had satisfied the amount due on the judgment, including postjudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees.Meiergerd appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, asserting that the computation of the amount due and owing in the satisfaction of judgment improperly used the specified per diem rate, but failed to apply compound interest on the postjudgment amount. He contended that the district court’s approval of this daily rate disregards the language in the 2008 order that stated that postjudgment interest would be “compounded annually.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the district court, and Meiergerd petitioned for further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the 2008 order was ambiguous with respect to the manner of calculating postjudgment interest, and determined that the 2008 order provided for simple interest and did not introduce compound interest that had not been requested by Meiergerd or supported by prior conduct between the parties. View "Meiergerd v. Qatalyst Corp." on Justia Law

A Delaware corporation, Northern Natural Gas Company, sued another Delaware entity, Centennial Resource Production, LLC, in Nebraska for breach of contract. The dispute arose after Centennial, due to a cold weather event in Texas, was unable to use its reserved pipeline capacity and refused to pay the corresponding invoice. The district court concluded it had personal jurisdiction over Centennial based on Centennial's contractual consent and sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska during the formation and implementation of their business relationship.Centennial appealed, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Centennial consented to personal jurisdiction in Nebraska by joining Northern's Master Escrow Agreement that contained an express consent to jurisdiction in Nebraska and waived the personal jurisdiction defense. The court found that the Service Agreement, Joinder Agreement, and Master Escrow Agreement became one unitary unseverable agreement through the plain language of the Tariff. The court concluded that the forum selection clause found in the Master Escrow Agreement applied equally to the Service Agreement as one unitary agreement. Thus, due process was satisfied when Centennial consented to personal jurisdiction by entering into a contract that contains a valid forum selection clause, and Nebraska was not a forum non conveniens. View "Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Centennial Resource Prod." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment after determining that Plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist benefits against American Family Insurance Company was time-barred, holding that Plaintiff's action was untimely.Plaintiff sought underinsured motorist benefits against American Family Insurance Policy, but the district court determined that the action was barred by a two-year limitation provision in the insurance policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Family. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that Plaintiff's action was untimely. View "Rose v. American Family Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court finding that the city council of the City of Fremont (Council) and the City of Fremont (City) lacked reasonable sufficient evidence to terminate a contract with the Dodge County Humane Society for animal control, holding that the district court lacked petition in error jurisdiction to review the decision.At a regularly scheduled meeting, the Council approved a motion authorizing Fremont's mayor to terminate the contract for animal control. The Humane Society later filed a petition in error alleging that the Council and the City had no cause to terminate the contract. Thereafter, the district court entered a temporary injunction / temporary restraining order in favor of the Humane Society. The County and City moved to dismiss, asserting that the Council's decision to authorize the mayor to send a letter was not an action that could support a petition in error. The district court sustained the petition in error and ordered the contract to be reinstated. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding (1) the Council did not exercise a judicial or quasi-judicial function in voting on the motion to send the disputed letter to the Humane Society; and (2) therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review this action. View "Dodge County Humane Society v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law