Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Heins rented a house from Julia Benintendi and the Perkerwicz family (hereinafter B&P). B&P alleged the Heins caused considerable damage to the property when they vacated the premises. The Heins countered that B&P unlawfully retained their security deposit and refused to reimburse the Heins for home and lawn improvements. B&P sued and obtained a default judgment. The district court subsequently set aside the default judgment and held a jury trial. B&P were awarded damages but not attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees to both parties; (2) the district court incorrectly required each party to bear its own costs because, as the prevailing party, B&P was entitled to its costs under Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-101; and (3) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment because it had good cause to do so.

Sellers entered an alleged contract with Buyer for the sale of property. After the parties failed to complete the sale, Buyer sued Sellers, seeking specific performance of the alleged contract. Buyer filed an amended complaint that added as a defendant Attorney, who had served as counsel for Sellers in the failed transaction, alleging fraud and other tortious conduct. Attorney filed a motion to substitute the district court judge, which the district court denied after finding Attorney's motion was untimely. At issue on appeal was whether Attorney qualified as a third-party defendant who possessed an independent right of substitution as opposed to a subsequently joined defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Attorney and Buyer qualified as adverse parties, and therefore, Attorney was a third-party defendant; and (2) Attorney timely filed his motion of substitution. Remanded.

Frederick and Mandelena Harmon bought a home pursuant to a buy-sell agreement that realtor Dianne Burright, a licensed real estate salesperson who worked for Fiscus Realty, prepared at the Fiscus Realty office. The home was built by Dianne's husband, Jerry. The Harmons subsequently discovered numerous construction problems. The Harmons sued Defendants Jerry and Dianne Burright and Fiscus Reality, raising several causing of action, including a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (the Act). A jury returned a verdict against the Burrights on breach of warranty and negligent misrepresentation claims and held for Defendants on all other claims. After trial, Defendants filed motions for attorney fees as prevailing parties under the Act, which the district court denied. Fiscus Realty appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorney fees to Fiscus Realty as the Harmons' claims had a basis in fact and law and were not frivolous, unreasonable or unfounded.

John Miller pled guilty to two counts of deliberate homicide. Miller later filed suit against James Goetz, the attorney that defended him, and arranged for Patrick Begley's limited representation in his claims against Goetz. Begley later withdrew from representing Miller. Miller then filed suit against Begley, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent deceit. The district court granted summary judgment to Begley, finding that Begley had reasonably assisted Miller with his claims against Goetz and the dismissal of the Goetz claim was based on legal deficiencies unrelated to Begley's legal services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Begley as Miller failed to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact existed regarding his claims.

Dane Shattuck died from injuries after being hit by an automobile. Dane received medical care at Hospital for his injuries. Dane was enrolled in a children's health insurance program (CHIP), administered by the department of public health and human services (DPHHS). Hospital submitted the bill for Dane's care to Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS), which served as third-party administrator of the CHIP program for DPHHS. Hospital then asserted a lien for the full bill amount against recoveries Gail Shattuck, as personal representative of Dane's estate, may obtain against third parties. Shattuck sued Hospital, BCBS, DPHHS, and the State, asserting that Defendants unlawfully acted to avoid application of "made whole" rules and that Hospital could not foreclose the lien because Shattuck had not been made whole. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Shattuck. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred by determining that CHIP constitutes insurance and was governed by the made whole doctrine, and (2) the district court did not err by determining that BCBS was not an insurer in its role here and, therefore, was not subject to the made whole statute. Remanded.

Mother consented to the adoption of her two biological children, after which the children were placed in the legal care of Guardians. Guardians later arranged for the adoption of the children by Adoptive Parents and relinquished the children. After six months of living with Adoptive Parents, Guardians moved to have their relinquishment and consent to adoption set aside, claiming their consent was fraudulently obtained by their reliance on a deficient pre-placement evaluation provided to them by Adoptive Parents. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Guardians failed to establish the existence of actual or constructive fraud by clear and convincing evidence, there was no statutory basis to set aside the relinquishments and consents given by Guardians.

After Homeowners' house burned down, Homeowners' insurer denied coverage, stating that payment was not timely delivered, the money order was not signed, and the damaged house was the secondary house and Insurer's underwriting policies required insurance on the primary house also to be purchased through Insurer in order to have coverage in place for the secondary residence. Homeowners filed suit, asserting that no reasonable basis in fact or law existed for denial of the claim and seeking damages and a declaratory judgment that the loss was covered. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment and denied Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to their declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Insurer as genuine issues of material fact remained, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment.

Stephen and Dawn Steadele contracted with Montana Component Housing Corporation (MCHC) to construct a home. MCHC did not complete the home by the deadline and eventually abandoned the project without completing the home. The Steadeles filed suit against MCHC. The district court entered a default judgment against MCHC when it failed to respond to the suit. The Steadeles then requested payment from Colony Insurance Company, MCHC's insurer. Colony denied coverage and refused to pay because MCHC never notified it of the Steadeles' claim. The Steadeles then filed this action, arguing that Colony's refusal to issue payment on the underlying judgment was a violation of Mont. Code Ann. 33-18-201, which prohibits unfair claim settlement practices. The district court granted summary judgment to Colony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Colony because MCHC's failure to notify Colony of the Steadeles' claim was a material breach of MCHC's obligations under the policy.

Timothy Hop's automobile was damaged in an accident with a driver insured by Safeco Insurance Company. In addition to the costs of repair, Hop sought "residual diminished value" (RDV) for his vehicle. When Safeco failed to pay RDV, Hop filed a class action complaint for declaratory relief in the district court, seeking a declaration that Safeco was required to investigate and pay class members, people whose vehicles were damaged by a Safeco insured and who were not paid RDV by Safeco, for RDV of their vehicle. The district court granted Hop's motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying a class action before Hop had satisfied the statutory requirements to bring an individual third party action against Safeco. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Hop's class action without prejudice.

Appellant, Summer Night Oil Company, and Appellees, individuals and oil companies, resolved a dispute over the operation of two oil wells through a settlement agreement. Appellant filed a motion to compel performance of the agreement after the parties failed to perform timely their obligations under the agreement. Specifically, Appellant asked the district court to compel Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents under the agreement. Appellees responded with a request to compel Appellant to pay a fine due to the EPA and a payment owed to Appellees under the agreement. Both parties sought attorney fees. The district court enforced what it determined to be the plain meaning of the agreement's terms, and (1) ordered Appellant to pay the fine owed to the EPA, (2) ordered Appellant to pay Appellee the amount owed it under the agreement, (3) ordered Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents to an escrow agent, and (4) declined to award attorney fees to either party. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion to compel performance of the agreement according to Appellant's terms, and (2) the district court correctly denied Appellant's motion to alter or amend its judgment.