Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, which owned and operated a ranch, hired Defendant as a custom seeder to seed a barley crop grown under a contract with Circle S Seeds of Montana, Inc. The crop could not be harvested on schedule, and a heavy October snow later destroyed the crop. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, alleging that crop did not ripen in time because of improper seed placement. The district court denied and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, concluding that Defendant did not materially breach its contract with Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding Defendant did not breach the contract by failing to object to rocky field conditions or by failing to achieve uniform depth of seed placement. View "CNJ Distrib. Corp. v. D & F Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal arose from the district court's order certifying a class in Plaintiff's class action against Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company. Plaintiff's class action claim arose out of the Supreme Court's remand of his initial non-class third-party claim against Allstate in Jacobsen I. In Jacobsen I, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Allstate for, among other causes of action, violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case for a new trial. On remand, Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, proposing a class definition encompassing all unrepresented individuals who had either third- or first-party claims against Allstate and whose claims were adjusted by Allstate using its Claim Core Process Redesign program. The district court certified the class. The Supreme Court affirmed the class certification but modified the certified class on remand, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) class action but that the certification of class-wide punitive damages was inappropriate in the context of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Remanded. View "Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, Irene and John Moerman each signed an oil and gas lease with Prairie Rose Resources. In 2011, the Moermans filed a complaint for declaratory judgment claiming that their leases with Prairie had expired because, inter alia, Prairie had failed to establish oil production until after the expiration of the primary term of the lease. Prairie counterclaimed for a declaration that the lease remained in effect. The district court entered judgment in favor of Prairie and awarded Prairie its attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that the parties' oil and gas leases remained in effect; and (2) because the Moermans failed to establish that the leases had been forfeited, Prairie's attorney fees in defending the action were recoverable. View "Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Clifford Sabo and Sabo Brothers Construction (the Sabos) entered into a written lease agreement with Vernon and Laura Caldwell for the excavation of scoria, a substance used in road construction, on the Caldwells' land. The Sabos agreed to pay the Caldwells a royalty rate for all scoria sold from the Caldwells' land, but the lease was silent as to when royalty payments were to be made. For several months, the Sabos made royalty payments to the Caldwells but for another period of several months, the Sabos did not make any royalty payments at all. The Caldwells subsequently filed a complaint against the Sabos, alleging breach of the lease for failure to pay royalties in a timely manner. The Caldwells also filed an application for a preliminary injunction. The district court enjoined the Sabos from hauling or selling any scoria from the Caldwells' land, concluding that the Caldwells had made a prima facie case that the Sabos had not paid them for all the scoria sold. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting the Caldwells a preliminary injunction in a breach of contract action when pecuniary compensation was contemplated and would afford adequate relief. Remanded. View "Caldwell v. Sabo" on Justia Law

Whitney Schwan died in an automobile accident after Travis Turner, the driver, lost control of the vehicle. Whitney's parents sued Travis's estate and his parents (the Turners). The Turners had a homeowners policy with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm). State Farm filed an action seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the Turners under the homeowners policy. Meanwhile, a mediation concluded with a settlement that included assignment of all of the Turners' rights and claims under the homeowners' policy to the Schwans, and the Schwans replaced the Turners in the declaratory action. The district court granted summary judgment to the Schwans on its counterclaim that State Farm had breached its duty to defend the Turners by not retaining separate counsel for the Turners in the underlying action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by concluding that State Farm had breached its duty to defend under the policy, as State Farm did ensure a full defense was provided to the Turners even though its decisions regarding counsel did not include hiring additional counsel. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who carried health insurance through New West Health Services (New West), was injured in an automobile accident resulting in medical expenses totaling approximately $120,000. The tortfeasor's insurer paid approximately $100,000 of Plaintiff's medical bills. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against New West alleging individual and class claims, asserting that New West failed to pay approximately $100,000 of her medical expenses because the third party liability carrier had paid the majority of the bills. The district court certified the class complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by adopting the class definition proposed by Plaintiff and denying New West's motion to modify the class definition. View "Rolan v. New West Health Servs." on Justia Law

Leonard Landa was the sole managing member of a Montana limited liability corporation. Landa carried commercial general liability insurance through Assurance. After a former employee of Landa's filed a complaint alleging that Landa had committed various torts by inducing him to work for Landa under allegedly false pretenses, Landa tendered defense of the former employee's claim to Assurance. Assurance refused to defend Landa, stating that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy. Landa filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief establishing that Assurance had a duty to defend and indemnify Landa and alleging violations of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), negligence, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Assurance, finding that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy and that Assurance was not liable under the UTPA because the denial of coverage was grounded on a legal conclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Assurance correctly declined to provide a defense where the former employee's complaint did not allege an "occurrence" and, as a result, did not trigger a duty to defend under the policy. View "Landa v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Wife sustained injuries as a result of Husband's negligent driving. Wife and Husband (Plaintiffs) sought coverage from Insurer, which denied coverage due to a family member exclusion in the umbrella police Husband held with Insurer. The district court concluded that the exclusion was unconscionable and entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Insurer, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that the family member exclusion unconscionably favored State Farm, and the district court erred in so concluding; (2) the exclusion did not contravene and express statute, undermine the made-whole doctrine, or violate public policy in any other way; and (3) the policy unambiguously excluded Wife's claim from coverage, and the family member exclusion did not violate Plaintiffs' reasonable expectations. View "Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dorothy Harris and Tedeen Holbert were injured in separate automobile accidents caused by third-party tortfeasors. Plaintiffs were treated at Billings Clinic and St. Vincent Healthcare (Providers) for their injuries. Both Harris and Holbert were members of health plans administered by Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), which entered into a preferred provider agreement (PPA) with the Providers pursuant to which Providers accepted payment from BCBS at a discounted reimbursement rate for certain medical services for BCBS insureds. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Billings Clinic, asserting breach of contract and constructive fraud claims and requesting compensatory damages equal to the difference between the amount the third-party insurers paid to the Providers and the reduced reimbursement rates under the PPA with BCBS. Harris also filed similar claims against St. Vincent Healthcare. The district courts dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the Providers were entitled to collect from third-party insurers payment for the full amount of the billed charges for the medical treatment provided to Plaintiffs. View "Harris v. St Vincent Healthcare" on Justia Law

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law