Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this breach of contract case was whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to submit an issue of punitive damages to the jury. Finding that the plaintiff presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant exhibited bad faith in breaching the contract, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court for the jury to determine what punitive damages, if any, were due. View "T.C.B. Construction Company, Inc. v. W. C. Fore Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

The insureds in this case filed suit against their insurers claiming they were unaware their insurance policy had a $250,000 per-claim deductible and alleging that the insurer breached its insurance contract by refusing to provide a defense until the they paid the $250,000 deductible for each of five separate claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the insurers and the insureds appealed. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Southern Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal stemmed from a lawsuit in which Mark Wolgin sued various entities alleging wrongdoing surrounding his 2006 purchase of a condominium on the Gulf Coast. In case #2010-CA-00653-SCT, Wolgin appealed the Chancery Court's decision to dismiss two credit reporting agencies (Trans Union LLC and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian")), finding that claims against them were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). In case #2010-CA-01177-SCT, the broker for the sale, The Power Broker, Inc. ("Power Broker"), appealed the Chancery Court's decision to order discovery on the scope of the mandatory arbitration clause in the "Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Real Estate" instead of fully granting its "Motion to Compel Arbitration." Regarding Wolgin's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the credit reporting agencies, as Wolgin's claims are preempted by the FCRA. As to Power Broker's appeal, the Court reversed the trial court judgment ordering discovery and remanded the case with instructions to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration. View "Wolgin v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned whether preneed contracts for funeral services were unilaterally transferable by customers from the original service provider, Waller Funeral Home (Waller), to another service provider, Coleman Funeral Home (Coleman). Customers who had contracted with Waller had prepaid the costs of their funeral services and merchandise, and Waller had placed their money in a trust maintained by the Mississippi Funeral Directors Association ("the Trust"). Coleman, along with Aubrey Parham, who previously had contracted with Waller for prepaid funeral services, filed a declaratory action asking the trial court to find that the prepaid funeral services contracts issued by Waller to its customers were unilaterally transferable by those customers to Coleman. Waller filed a counterclaim that alleged tortious interference with its contracts, false advertising, and defamation. Waller argued in its motion for partial summary judgment, and the trial court agreed, that the contracts were valid, enforceable, irrevocable and nontransferable, and, thus, granted Waller’s motion. Ultimately, the jury found in favor of Waller on all issues presented at trial and awarded both actual and punitive damages. Post-trial, upon the motion of Coleman, the circuit court reduced the punitive damages to $0 due to Coleman’s representation to the court that it had a negative net worth. Waller was awarded attorneys’ fees. Both parties have appealed the trial court’s final judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in allowing Waller to adduce speculative evidence about its alleged damages (future lost profits) for its contracting customers who are living, for whom no goods or services have been provided, on behalf of whom no payment from the Trust has been made to Coleman, and whose preneed funeral services contracts with Waller were found to be valid, binding, and nontransferrable. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for a new trial on damages. View "Coleman & Coleman Enterprises, Inc. v. Waller Funeral Home" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal stemmed from litigation concerning a contract dispute among Williams Transport, LLC (Williams Transport), Driver Pipeline Company, Inc. (Driver Pipeline), Buckley Equipment Services, Inc. (Buckley Equipment), and other unnamed defendants. Based on an arbitration clause in the contract, Driver Pipeline filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Driver Pipeline filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court accepted as a notice of appeal. Finding no error by the trial court in denying Driver Pipeline's motion to compel arbitration, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Driver Pipeline Company, Inc., Buckley Equipment Services, Inc. v. Williams Transport, LLC" on Justia Law

After Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. (Farm Bureau) delayed payment of Robert Fulton's uninsured-motorist benefits, Fulton sued. The jury found Farm Bureau negligent for failing to timely investigate and pay Fulton's claim, awarding Fulton $10,000 in extracontractual damages. The jury did not find that Farm Bureau acted grossly negligent, reckless, or in bad faith and awarded no punitive damages. Following the jury's verdict, Fulton filed a post-judgment motion to amend, seeking $120,773 in attorney’s fees and expenses. The circuit court denied the motion, analyzing it under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and finding that Fulton had not shown reason to amend. Fulton appealed the denial of his motion, arguing that attorney's fees were collateral to the final judgment and outside the scope of Rule 59(e). The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the circuit court, holding that the court at least should have considered awarding them. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in classifying attorney’s fees as "collateral." Fulton had no post-judgment right to attorney's fees because the jury did not award punitive damages, and neither a statutory nor a contractual provision authorizes such fees. The circuit court, by properly applying a Rule 59(e) analysis, did not abuse its discretion in denying Fulton’s motion. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Fulton v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

This case involved a residence that the plaintiff homeowners allege contained "major structural defects." After discovering these defects and notifying the builder, the parties entered a "tolling agreement" to toll the applicable limitations period, so they could "engage in a review and analysis of the structural settlement issues to determine an agreed upon repair." After the builder refused to correct the defects, the plaintiffs filed suit averring breach of the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA); breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; implied warranty of construction performed in a workmanlike manner; negligence; and fraud/misrepresentation/and/or omission of fact. In response, the defendant builder asserted the claims were time-barred and that the tolling agreement was void. This appeal arose from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the tolling agreement was void: "Parties should not be discouraged from honest efforts to settle and/or compromise disputes, and thereby avoid incurring the attendant expenses and uncertainty of litigation and further burdening the courts – all laudable and desired goals. . . .parties should be allowed to agree to extend statutes of limitations (or repose) if they believe this to be in their best interest; however, the limitation period should not be shortened, absent an act of the Legislature." View "Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively "Tellus") alleged that they owned the "shallow gas" rights in a tract of land known as the Bilbo A Lease. While ownership of the shallow gas was disputed, all parties agreed that the defendants (collectively "TPIC") owned the gas rights below 8,000 feet and the oil rights in both the shallow and deep zones. In 2004, Tellus sued TPIC, alleging that it had produced Tellus's shallow gas through one if its wells known as the A-1 well. After much pretrial litigation and a two-month jury trial, the trial judge declared that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners and submitted the plaintiffs' conversion and negligence claims to a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and both sides appealed. Finding no reason to reverse, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court's declaratory judgment. View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC, v. Texas Petroleum Investment Co." on Justia Law

For four years, subcontractor Precision Welding, Inc. provided construction services to Denbury Onshore, LLC, under an oral agreement. Denbury, claiming its contract with Precision was terminable at will, terminated the relationship in 2006. Precision filed suit, claiming Denbury had breached its obligation to keep Denbury on the job until the completion of the project. A jury found for Precision and awarded it $1,500,000 in damages. But because the oral contract between Denbury and Precision was for a particular hourly rate for work performed and not for any particular or definite time period, the Supreme Court held that the contract was terminable at will, and reversed the jury verdict. The Court remanded for a new trial on the issue of whether, under the circumstances, Denbury provided Precision reasonable notice of the termination and, if not, the damages it proximately caused. View "Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Precision Welding, Inc." on Justia Law