Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Ground Control, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Capsco Industries, W.G. Yates & Sons Construction and Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. The parties contracted to build the "Margaritaville Spa and Hotel" in Biloxi. The circuit court held in part that Ground Control's failure to obtain a certificate of responsibility rendered its contract with Capsco null and void. After its review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court agreed (and affirmed) that the lack of the certificate of responsibility rendered the contract null and void. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in part so that the circuit court could determine whether Ground Control was entitled to recover based on claims of unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit. View "Ground Control, LLC v. Capsco Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Pam Wood, David Wood, Justin Wood, Josh Wood and Jacob Wood filed an interlocutory appeal for the Supreme Court to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying their motion to transfer this case to another county. The underlying case involved a car accident in which a question arose over who was covered by an insurance policy. Defendant Pam Wood applied for the coverage in Covington County; the application was faxed from an insurance agent's office in Covington to Plaintiff Safeway Insurance Company's Rankin County office where it was approved. Safeway opposed the transfer of venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Safeway could not demonstrate sufficient facts to support that venue was proper in Rankin County. Therefore the Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case with instructions to transfer it to a permissible venue. View "Wood v. Safeway Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Charles Honeycutt was injured in an automobile accident involving a Mississippi state trooper. He sued the state trooper and two automobile-insurance providers, Atlanta Casualty Company and American Premier Insurance Company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari, seeking to appeal the grant of summary judgment for American Premier: (1) whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by finding an insurance agent does not have a duty to explain uninsured-motorist coverage; (2) whether summary judgment was granted improperly. The Supreme Court found that, in order to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of uninsured-motorist coverage (UM coverage), an insurance agent does have a duty to explain UM coverage to the insured. The Court also found that summary judgment was not proper in this case. Thus, the Court reversed both lower courts' judgments and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Honeycutt v. Coleman" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court was a fifteen-year old contract dispute regarding the construction of Kevin Clark's house. During the litigation, the contractor and counter-plaintiff William Knesal, died. His defense attorney, provided to him by his insurance company upon commencement of the suit, filed a suggestion of death in the deceased's name. When no substitution motion was filed within the prescribed ninety-day period, Knesal's attorney moved to dismiss. Knesal filed the appropriate motion for substitution well after the mandatory ninety-day period, asserting that Knesal's attorney had no standing to submit a suggestion of death and that, additionally, he never received proper notice of the filing until the motion to dismiss was served. The trial court dismissed the action, and Clark appealed. The issue before the Court centered on determining who may file a suggestion of death with the trial court and what circumstances surrounding a failure to file an appropriate substitution motion within the statutory period constitute "excusable neglect." The Court found that the plain language of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 25 permitted Knesal's attorney to file to suggestion of death without naming Knesal's successors or representatives. Similarly, there was no requirement under the rule that a motion to dismiss be filed at all prior to dismissal, so the fact that a motion to dismiss was filed by Knesal's attorneys did not provide grounds to overturn the trial court's decision. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Clark's delay in responding to the suggestion of death resulted from excusable neglect. Therefore, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Clark v. Knesal" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the proper procedure by which a workers' compensation insurer may enforce a subrogation claim arising under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-71. Richard Shoemake was injured in Alabama but received workers' compensation benefits from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company under Mississippi law. He brought and settled a third-party action in Alabama state court and reimbursed Liberty Mutual only the amount it was entitled to under Alabama law. Liberty Mutual, which knew of but did not join or intervene in the Alabama lawsuit, then sued Shoemake in the Circuit Court of Newton County, seeking full reimbursement as allowed under Section 71-3-71. In granting Shoemake summary judgment, the circuit court held that Alabama law applied and further concluded that res judicata and Liberty Mutual's failure to intervene in the Alabama action barred Liberty Mutual's claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Mississippi law governed the amount of Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim and that Liberty Mutual was not required to intervene in the Alabama action to become entitled to reimbursement under Mississippi law. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court found that 71-3-71 requires a workers' compensation insurer to join or intervene in a third-party action to become entitled to reimbursement, it reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

Norma Slater-Moore hired the Goeldner Law Firm and its attorneys to represent her in what ultimately was an unsuccessful lawsuit and its appeal. Slater-Moore and Goeldner entered into two separate contracts during the course of that litigation, both containing nearly identical provisions stating that any attorney-fee disputes would be submitted to arbitration. Slater-Moore later sued Goeldner for legal malpractice and breach of contract, disputing, among other allegations, the amount she was billed for attorney fees. Goeldner successfully moved the Circuit Court to compel arbitration of the attorney-fee dispute, and Slater-Moore appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Because the Supreme Court found ]no grounds for revocation of a valid agreement to arbitrate the fee dispute, the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Slater-Moore v. Goeldner" on Justia Law

The trial court denied defendant Virginia College's motion to compel arbitration. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that they were fraudulently induced to agree to the arbitration provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Virginia College, LLC v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

In a wrongful death action against a nursing home, the nursing home moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the nursing home resident was the third-party beneficiary to the admission and arbitration agreements signed by his sister. The trial court denied the motion, finding that no valid contract was signed by someone with the legal authority to do so, and the nursing home appealed. Because the resident's sister lacked the authority to contract for him, and thus no valid contract existed, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "GGNSC Batesville, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law

John Stubbs was awarded damages for breach of contract after he sued Martin and Valerie Falkner to enforce a construction lien on their home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment, but reversed its award of attorney's fees and prejudgment interest, finding that Stubbs's recovery was based in quantum meruit and, thus, attorney's fees and prejudgment interest were unavailable remedies. Stubbs petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to consider various statutory grounds for an award of attorney's fees. Although the Court of Appeals did not discuss the statutes Stubbs raised, the Supreme Court found that those statutes provided an insufficient basis for an award of either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees in this case. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and the judgment of the Circuit Court. View "Falkner v. Stubbs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two shareholders of a closely held corporation. They attempted to tender their shares to the corporation pursuant to a buy-sell agreement. Unhappy with the corporation's purchase offer, the shareholders brought suit in Chancery Court, and the court in turn submitted the matter to binding arbitration as required by the agreement. The chancellor ultimately rejected the arbitrators' valuations and ordered the corporation to buy plaintiffs' shares at a much higher price. The corporation appealed the chancellor's rejection of the arbitrator's award, and plaintiffs cross-appealed claiming they were entitled to additional damages. Finding no legal basis for setting aside the arbitration award, the Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court and reinstated the arbitration award. View "Bailey Brake Farms, Inc. v. Trout" on Justia Law