Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2012, GNP Parent, LLC entered into a sales agreement to purchase compressed natural gas from Xpress Natural Gas, LLC as fuel for the Great Northern Paper Mill. Cate Street Capital, Inc., the corporate owner of GNP, guaranteed the amounts payable by GNP up to $1,500,000. GNP failed to make the required payments for natural gas, and an arbitrator found Cate Street liable to Xpress for $1,500,000 on the guarantee. Xpress applied to the superior court to confirm the arbitration award. Cate Street and GNP moved to vacate the award in part, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding Xpress $1,500,000 in damages on the guarantee of payments. The superior court entered a judgment confirming the award and denying the motion to vacate the award. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in this case because his interpretation was rationally derived from the sales agreement. View "Xpress Natural Gas, LLC v. Cate St. Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

Camden National Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Ilene Weintraub. Weintraub brought several counterclaims against the bank, including violations of the Maine Consumer Credit Code, breach of contract, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that she suffered injuries as a direct and proximate result of the abuse conduct of the Bank’s collections department and an accusation of criminal conduct. The Bank filed a special motion to dismiss requesting dismissal of several claims based on Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, but failing to request dismissal of the breach of contract claim. The superior court concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute prohibits selective dismissal of claims and that Weintraub met her burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of actual injury and causation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in holding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not allow for selective dismissal of some, but not all, of Weintraub’s counterclaims, but the error was harmless; and (2) did not err in concluding that Weintraub met her burden of showing prima facie evidence of causation. View "Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub" on Justia Law

After Sloan’s Cove, LLC executed a power of sale foreclosure on Armand Vachon’s property, Vachon and Oceanic Inn, Inc. (collectively, Oceanic) filed suit claiming that Sloan’s Cove improperly conducted the sale. The trial court (1) dismissed Oceanic’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (2) granted summary judgment against Oceanic on its claims for breach of contract and accounting and in favor of Sloan’s Cove on its counterclaim seeking a declaration that its foreclosure by sale of the Oceanic Inn property was legal and effective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as amended, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, but that the judgment must be amended to correct a clerical error. View "Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a construction company, perfected a mechanic’s lien on Defendants’ property and filed a five-count complaint alleging that Defendants breached a contract with Plaintiff to renovate their house by failing to make any payments. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on its breach of contract, Prompt Payment Act, and mechanic’s lien claims. Defendants filed a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 59, arguing that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to the time and manner of payment. The court denied the motion and later dismissed the remaining counts of Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiff could not succeed on any of its claims because the parties’ oral contract was unenforceable pursuant to the Home Construction Contracts Act. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. View "Warren Constr. Group, LLC v. Reis" on Justia Law

In 2009, John Flynn joined the law firm of Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. (LLO). In 2011, Flynn left LLO to open his own practice. LLO and Daniel Lilley subsequently filed a complaint against Flynn seeking a judicial declaration that any contingency fees earned in cases that Flynn brought to LLO were the property of LLO to be distributed at Lilley’s sole discretion and seeking the return of such fees that Flynn had already received. Flynn counterclaimed. In 2012, the superior court denied LLO’s motion to consolidate this case with the closely-related cases at issue in Tucker v. Lilley. After a jury trial, the superior court entered judgment awarding Flynn unpaid salary from his tenure at LLO and apportioned attorney fees between the parties in cases that Flynn brought to LLO from his former law firm. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the superior court abused its discretion in declining to consolidate this case with the cases at issue in Tucker v. Lilley, as this case was an integral member of the set of cases that “must be resolved in one consolidated action before a single fact-finder.” Remanded with instructions to grant LLO’s motion to consolidate. View "Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. v. Flynn" on Justia Law