Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The town manager of the Town of Freeport signed a contract transferring the Town's emergency dispatch services to another town. Plaintiffs, two Town residents, filed an amended complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that the contract was void because it was inconsistent with section 6.10 of the Town's charter, which provides that multi-year contracts must be "made or approved by ordinance," and seeking an injunction. The Town Council later voted in favor of an ordinance that ratified the contract. The superior court subsequently dismissed the complaint, finding that the case was moot because the Town had approved the outsourcing contract by ordinance, thereby complying with section 6.10. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and held (1) the court erred by dismissing the amended complaint because the passage of the ordinance ratifying the transfer of dispatch services contract did not render the case moot, as the contract did not conclude until the year 2016; but (2) the passage of the ordinance did satisfy the "made or approved by ordinance" requirement of section 6.10 of the charter. Remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of the Town on the merits of the amended complaint and denying the request for an injunction.

Galen Porter was the sole shareholder in County Forest Products. Porter began operating a fuel delivery business as Porter Cash Fuel but never registered that name with the Secretary of State. Porter ordered fuel and gas from A.E. Robinson in a series of transactions that continued for three years. Ultimately, the business relationship deteriorated, and A.E. Robinson refused to deliver any more products. A.E. Robinson sued County Forest and Porter seeking payment on the account. Following a non-jury trial, the court entered judgment for A.E. Robinson jointly and severally against County Forest and Porter in the amount of the invoices plus financing charges and attorney fees. The Supreme Court modified the judgment to remove the award of attorney fees and affirmed as modified, holding that the trial court (1) properly held Porter and County Forest jointly and severally liable; but (2) erred in awarding attorney fees to A.E. Robinson pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 2-207.

Joshuah Farrington struck a moose while driving a vehicle loaned to him by Darling's Rent-a-Car, causing damages. Philadelphia Indemnity, Darling's insurer, compensated Darling's pursuant to the property damage provision of its commercial insurance policy. Philadelphia Indemnity, as Darling' subrogee, subsequently filed a complaint against Farrington, asserting that he breached the rental contract by damaging the vehicle. The Business and Consumer Docket entered judgment in Philadelphia Indemnity's favor. Farrington appealed, contending that he was insured by Darling's insurance policy with Philadelphia Indemnity and that Maine's anti-subrogation rule prohibited Philadelphia Indemnity to bring a claim against him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Farrington was not included as an insured within the meaning of the property damage portion of the contract Darling's made with Philadelphia Indemnity.

Husband and Wife divorced in 1989 pursuant to a divorce judgment that incorporated an agreement dividing the parties' property. Husband retired from the Air National Guard in 2002 and began collecting his retirement benefits in 2006. In 2010, Wife filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment, requesting that the district court specify the amount of Husband's military pension to which she was entitled. The court granted the motion and awarded a portion of Husband's benefits to Wife after concluding that the provision of the divorce judgment regarding Husband's military pension was ambiguous. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the provision awarding Husband his military pension was unambiguous and that Wife's motion to modify was improperly granted. Remanded.

Robert Laux and Cynthia Moran-Laux (collectively Laux) appealed, and Ralph Harrington cross-appealed, from a judgment of the superior court declaring the continued existence and location of a road easement in favor of Harrington over Laux's property and awarding Harrington nominal damages for Laux's interference with the use of the easement. Laux asserted that a 1990 quitclaim deed given by Harrington's predecessor-in-title to Laux's predecessor-in-title extinguished the easement, or, alternatively, that construction on the site of its original entry point resulted in its abandonment. Harrington contended that the court erred in excluding certain evidence at trial, resulting in its miscalculation of his damages and failure to award punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding, inter alia, that the superior court did not err in (1) finding that the 1990 quitclaim deed was not intended to release Harrington's easement over the land now owned by the Lauxes; (2) concluding that Harrington did not abandon his easement; (3) calculating damages; and (4) finding that Laux's conduct did not rise to the level of actual ill will or outrageousness required to award punitive damages.

Mark Cookson purchased two homeowner's insurance policies from Liberty Mutual, one to cover his primary residence in West Newfield and another to cover property in Acton, where he was constructing a house. Cookson would drive his tractor along public roads between the properties. Cookson's tractor was subsequently destroyed by fire. Cookson filed a claim for loss of the tractor, which Liberty Mutual denied based on a personal property exclusion in both policies. Cookson filed a complaint seeking, in part, a declaratory judgment that the Liberty Mutual policies provided coverage for his tractor. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual, concluding that Cookson's policies excluded the tractor from loss coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Cookson's tractor was not the type of vehicle that fell within the limited exception for "vehicles not subject to motor vehicle registration" to the otherwise broad personal property exclusion of all "motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances," and (2) Cookson's tractor was not the type a homeowner would commonly purchase and employ simply to service his or her residence.

This appeal involved six siblings and their mother. The parties participated in mediation that resulted in an agreement, which, among other things, divided Mother's real property. After disputes arose over the agreement, the probate court ordered arbitration pursuant to the agreement's arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the transfer of land necessary to effectuate it. Four of the sisters (Appellants) and the remaining siblings and mother (Appellees) then filed a series of motions. The superior court confirmed the arbitration award, denied a motion to vacate the award, denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and granted a motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in affirming the arbitrator's award and in concluding that the arbitrator and that the settlement agreement gave the arbitrator the authority to determine whether the agreement was valid and enforceable.

Fore LLC, a Maine entity, purchased a Maine business from a New Hampshire client of William Benoit, a Massachusetts-based accountant. Fore sued Benoit, alleging that Benoit fraudulently misrepresented that the tax returns he prepared for the Maine business were accurate. The superior court granted Benoit's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, concluding that Fore made the requisite prima facie showing that Benoit's contacts with Maine were related to the claims in this case and that they were sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Remanded to determine whether it was reasonable to require Benoit to defend this action in Maine.

Edwin Mitchell, a lobster fisherman, was sued by Victor Ames, who alleged that a group of lobster fishermen had conspired to prevent him from fishing for lobster in the area. The Ames complaint alleged that Mitchell had, among other things, converted Ames's personal property. Mitchell held a homeowners policy with Allstate Insurance Company. By the policy's terms, Allstate agreed to provide a defense if the policyholder was sued for such damages. Allstate, however, declined to provide coverage to Mitchell on the Ames litigation, after which Mitchell sued Allstate for breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, concluding that Allstate had no contractual duty to defend Mitchell because a policy exclusion for certain intentional acts applied. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that Allstate did have a duty to defend because the liability alleged in the Ames complaint had the potential to result in covered liability.

This case involved a dispute between the Mattesons and the Batchelders over fee ownership of less than one acre of land on a stream and the location of a deeded right-of-way on property owned by the Mattesons. The superior court (1) concluded that the Mattesons owned the disputed parcel of land; and (2) reformed the deed to locate the easement along a field road that crossed that Mattesons' property, concluding that the deed description of the right-of-way was ambiguous. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the superior court did not err in finding that the Mattesons obtained the property in dispute, which was included in the deed's property description; and (2) the court erred in reforming the deed to reflect a new location of the easement along the field road where there was no mutual mistake of fact that anything other than the shoreline was the boundary, as described in the deed. Remanded.