Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Landlord - Tenant
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Westwood Motorcars, LLC leased commercial property in Dallas to operate an automobile dealership. The lease was set to expire in 2013, but an addendum allowed Westwood to extend the lease for two additional 24-month terms. In 2015, ownership of the property changed hands and Virtuolotry, LLC became the new landlord. Westwood sought to exercise its option to extend the lease for the second additional term, but Virtuolotry’s lawyers refused, asserting that Westwood had breached the lease in numerous ways. Amidst this dispute, Westwood claimed that Virtuolotry and its manager, Richard Boyd, harassed Westwood at the premises, interfering with its business operations. Westwood sued Virtuolotry in district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not breached the lease and that it had properly extended the lease for another two years. Virtuolotry sued in justice court to evict Westwood for unpaid rent, lease violations, and holding over unlawfully.The justice court ruled in favor of Virtuolotry, awarding it "possession only." Westwood appealed the judgment to the county court at law. However, a few weeks before the trial date, Westwood formally withdrew its appeal in county court, and the county court entered a “stipulate[d] and agree[d]” judgment ordering “that possession of the Premises is awarded” to Virtuolotry. Westwood fully vacated the property, but continued its pending suit in district court, adding claims for breach of contract (against Virtuolotry) and constructive eviction (against Virtuolotry and Boyd). The district court ruled in favor of Westwood, awarding damages and attorney’s fees.Virtuolotry and Boyd appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, ruling that by agreeing to the eviction-suit judgment in county court, Westwood “voluntarily abandoned the premises” and thus “extinguish[ed] any claim for damages.” Westwood then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' decision, ruling that the court of appeals erred by giving a judgment of possession from a court of limited jurisdiction preclusive effect over Westwood’s claim for damages in district court. The Supreme Court of Texas held that Westwood’s agreement to entry of the county-court judgment cannot reflect assent to anything more than what that judgment resolves—i.e., who receives immediate possession of the property. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "WESTWOOD MOTORCARS, LLC v. VIRTUOLOTRY, LLC" on Justia Law

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Weston Bennion was injured when his apartment deck collapsed and subsequently sued his landlord, Dale Stolrow, for negligence. The parties settled, with Bennion agreeing to release Stolrow and his insurer from all claims in exchange for $150,000. The settlement was subject to related subrogation claims and healthcare liens, and Bennion promised to indemnify Stolrow from liability for any such claims and liens. Before making the payment, Stolrow informed Bennion that he intended to distribute the payment in two checks: one payable to Bennion and the other payable to a collection agency that had a healthcare lien on the settlement funds. Bennion objected and filed a motion to enforce the parties’ agreement, arguing that its terms did not allow Stolrow to issue a portion of the settlement funds to a third party.The district court disagreed with Bennion and suggested that Stolrow issue two checks: one jointly to Bennion and the third party for the amount of the lien, and another to Bennion for the remainder of the funds. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. Bennion then petitioned for certiorari.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted certiorari to address whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the parties’ agreement permitted Stolrow to issue a portion of the settlement funds jointly to Bennion and the third-party collection agency. The court agreed with Bennion, stating that the plain language of the release provides for payment to Bennion in exchange for his release of claims against Stolrow and his assumption of responsibility for third-party liens. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the lower courts. View "Bennion v. Stolrow" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute between Melissa Sanchez, a tenant, and Chris and Jennifer Pickering, her landlords, over the terms of a lease agreement for a mobile home owned by the Pickerings. Sanchez believed the agreement was a lease-to-own contract, while the Pickerings asserted it was a lease with a purchase option contract. After the Pickerings initiated an eviction action due to Sanchez's alleged violations of the agreement, Sanchez caused extensive damage to the home.The Pickerings sued Sanchez for waste, claiming she caused $40,000 in damages and sought treble damages. Sanchez counterclaimed, alleging violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA), breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and retaliatory eviction. The district court found Sanchez liable for damages to the residence and awarded treble damages. It also determined that there was no deception on the Pickerings' part to sustain Sanchez's ICPA claim, the agreement was unenforceable due to a lack of mutual understanding, and that the Pickerings were unjustly enriched by the $10,000 down payment and offset the Pickerings' damages award by this amount. The remaining claims were dismissed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court found substantial and competent evidence supporting the district court's decision that the Pickerings did not engage in a deceptive act under the ICPA. The court also rejected Sanchez's contention that the district court's damages award should have been reduced to reflect an insurance payment received by the Pickerings as Sanchez failed to provide an adequate record for review. Finally, the court upheld the district court's unjust enrichment award, finding that Sanchez had not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. The Pickerings were awarded attorney fees for having to respond to the collateral source issue. View "Pickering v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Ryan Kratz, who had entered into a purchase agreement to buy a business and building from Donald and Carol McIlravy, failed to make the agreed-upon payments. The McIlravys initiated two eviction actions, and a separate action seeking damages, cancellation of the contract, and release of funds held in a trust account. The district court initially dismissed one of the eviction actions, but eventually ruled in favor of the McIlravys, awarding them damages and ordering release of the trust funds. Several years later, Kratz filed a motion under Rule 60(b), alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction actions and seeking to vacate or void all findings, conclusions, and orders, except the dismissals of the eviction actions. The district court denied this motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the McIlravys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Kratz's appeal was limited to the judgment denying his Rule 60(b) motion and that the motion was timely. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the eviction cases and that any violation of N.D.R.Ct. 7.1(b)(1) was harmless error. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Don's Garden Center v. The Garden District" on Justia Law

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In this case, Epochal Enterprises, Inc., also known as Divine Orchids, entered into a commercial lease agreement with LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation. The lease included a limitation of liability clause which stated that the defendants were not personally liable for any provisions of the lease or the premises, and the plaintiff waived all claims for consequential damages or loss of business profits. After the plaintiff sued the defendants, a jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence.The jury awarded the plaintiff damages for lost profits and other past economic loss. However, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), reasoning that the lease agreement’s limitation of liability clause prevented the plaintiff from recovering the economic damages the jury awarded.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the order granting JNOV in the defendants' favor, finding that the limitation of liability clause did not bar plaintiff’s recovery of damages. The court reasoned that the jury's award of damages necessarily implied a finding of gross negligence on the part of the defendants, which would be outside the scope of the indemnification clause. Further, the court held that the limitation of liability clause was void to the extent that it sought to shield the defendants from liability for their violations of the Health and Safety Code, as it violated public policy under Civil Code section 1668.On the defendants' cross-appeal regarding the damages award, the court affirmed the denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV, finding that substantial evidence supported the damages award. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably interpret the term "other past economic loss" on the verdict form as a different form of lost profits, and that the evidence presented to the jury provided a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of the plaintiff's lost profits. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

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Seneathia K. Porter initiated an unlawful-detainer action against Tracy Murray, doing business as Tracy's Treasure Company, LLC ("Murray"), seeking possession of commercial property and the recovery of, among other things, unpaid rent, late fees, insurance costs, taxes, and attorney's fees. Porter claimed she owned the property, she had leased the property to Murray on a month-to-month basis for the sum of $1,500 per month, Murray defaulted under the lease by failing to pay rent in accordance with the lease, and that she had provided Murray with written notice that her right of possession of the property had been terminated. Murray, on the other hand, denied that she had leased the property. Rather, she claimed she had executed a contract to purchase the property and had made improvements to the property. Following a bench trial, the circuit court purported to enter a judgment in favor of Porter and against Murray. Murray appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the district court had adjudicated the unlawful-detainer action. Thus, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the action and the judgment it entered was void and, therefore, would not support an appeal. View "Murray v. Porter" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sued Defendant for breach of contract in connection with their rental of Defendant’s home. Defendant failed to file an answer, and the trial court entered a default judgment for $59,191. The judgment included $1,000 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to a provision in the parties’ lease agreement authorizing attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party not to exceed $1,000. Defendant appealed, and the Second Appellate District affirmed. While the appeal was pending, the trial court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080, subdivision (a), for an order allowing their costs of enforcing the judgment. The trial court awarded $27,721 in attorneys’ fees under section 685.040, which allows as an award of costs attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing a judgment “if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.” Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), in turn, provides that attorneys’ fees may be awarded as costs where authorized by contract. In this appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in awarding over $1,000 in attorneys’ fees for enforcing the judgment because the lease authorized attorneys’ fees “not to exceed $1,000.”   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that once the judgment was entered, the terms of the lease, including the $1,000 limitation on fees, were merged into and extinguished by the judgment. Because the judgment included an award of attorneys’ fees authorized by contract, section 685.040 allowed an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing the judgment. View "Nash v. Aprea" on Justia Law

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Between 2015 and 2019, BitterSweet Ranch and its managers (“BitterSweet”) leased three parcels of farmland from Frank Sullivan and two of his business entities, The Green Desert, LLC, and The Sullivan Limited Partnership (collectively, “Sullivan”). The parties signed three identical five-year leases (“the Leases”) involving three separate parcels of real property, each owned by one of the three Sullivan parties. The Leases specified that Sullivan was to be responsible for payment of the property taxes, but that those parties were to be reimbursed by BitterSweet, and that BitterSweet was to be responsible for bi-annual rent payments, utilities, and water assessments. For a variety of reasons, the parties purportedly orally agreed to modify the Leases to offset amounts owed to each other throughout the terms of the Leases. Shortly before the Leases were set to expire at the end of their five-year terms, Sullivan claimed that BitterSweet was in breach of the Leases for its alleged failure to make timely rent payments, to pay all property taxes, and to pay the water assessments pursuant to the terms of the Leases. Sullivan then filed three lawsuits (one for each of the Leases and in the names of each of the three parties) in district court. The district court ordered the cases consolidated and then granted summary judgment in favor of BitterSweet, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact had not been created as to whether BitterSweet had breached the Leases. Sullivan appealed the adverse order. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sullivan v. BitterSweet Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

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In early 2020, following the outbreak of COVID-19, Los Angeles County passed the “Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles Further Amending and Restating the Executive Order for an Eviction Moratorium During Existence of a Local Health Emergency Regarding Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)” (the “Moratorium”). The Moratorium imposed temporary restrictions on certain residential and commercial tenant evictions. It provided tenants with new affirmative defenses to eviction based on nonpayment of rent, prohibited landlords from charging late fees and interest, and imposed civil and criminal penalties to landlords who violate the Moratorium. Id. Section V (July 14, 2021). Plaintiff, a commercial landlord, sued the County, arguing that the Moratorium impaired his lease, in violation of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court found that Plaintiff had not alleged an injury in fact and dismissed his complaint for lack of standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Plaintiff had standing to bring his Contracts Clause claim. Plaintiff’s injury for Article III purposes did not depend on whether Plaintiff’s tenant provided notice or was otherwise excused from doing so. Those questions went to the merits of the claim rather than Plaintiff’s standing to bring suit. Plaintiff alleged that the moratorium impaired his contract with his tenant because it altered the remedies the parties had agreed to at the time they entered into the lease. The panel held that these allegations were sufficient to plead an injury in fact and to state a claim under the Contracts Clause, and remanded to the district court. View "HOWARD ITEN V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

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This consolidated appeal arose from a dispute regarding a purchase option within a lease agreement. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, and its manager and registered agent, Brandon Paine (collectively “Bronco Elite”), operated a gymnastics facility in Garden City, Idaho. The gymnastics facility was located on property that Bronco Elite leased from 106 Garden City, LLC (“106 Garden City”), and Tricon Properties, LLC (“Tricon”). The lease agreement provided Bronco Elite the option to purchase the Property five years into the initial ten-year lease term. However, when Bronco Elite attempted to exercise its option, 106 Garden City and Tricon refused to honor the option. Bronco Elite sued 106 Garden City and Tricon, seeking specific performance. 106 Garden City and Tricon argued that Bronco Elite was precluded from exercising its purchase option because Bronco Elite had breached the lease agreement by consistently failing to pay rent on time and the lease terms only permitted Bronco Elite to exercise the purchase option if it was not in breach. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bronco Elite and ordered 106 Garden City and Tricon to convey the Property to Bronco Elite. The specific performance ordered by the district court was stayed pending appeal. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Bronco Elite, however, the Court found the trial court erred in setting the purchase price of the Property in the way that it did. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC v. 106 Garden City, LLC" on Justia Law