Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

While working for Adnet, Inc. (“Adnet”), Defendants learned of a subcontract that Adnet was attempting to win. Thereafter, Defendants, through their own company, submitted a bid for that same subcontract. After Defendants won the subcontract, Adnet brought claims against them for breach of the duty of loyalty, tortious interference with a business relationship, and business conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendants did not compete against Adnet, that Adnet did not have a business expectancy in the subcontract, and that, without proof of an underlying tort, there was no business conspiracy. Adnet appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Adnet’s claims for breach of the duty of loyalty and tortious interference with a business relationship. Further, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Adnet’s business conspiracy claim and remanded. The court explained that there is sufficient evidence of a direct competition for the subcontract between Adnet and Defendants while they were working for Adnet to bar a grant of summary judgment to Defendants. A reasonable juror could conclude that employees, like Defendants, breach their duty of loyalty to their employer when they learn of a potential business opportunity through their employment and then participate in direct competition with their employer for that opportunity while still employed. View "Adnet, Inc. v. Rohit Soni" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African American woman, worked as a conductor for Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). During her employment, she belonged to a division of the Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART) union, which maintained a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Amtrak. Plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit pro se. She named Amtrak and the company’s director of employee relations as Defendants, along with three other Amtrak colleagues. Plaintiff asserted state-law claims of breach of contract and tort, as well as a federal claim of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. Defendants moved to dismiss, and Plaintiff moved for summary judgment as well as for leave to amend her complaint. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Plaintiff’s two motions. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it declines to unwind a statutory scheme without a clear congressional directive to do so. Plaintiff argued that at least her particular claim is not a minor dispute. The mere fact that Plaintiff’s claim arises under Title VII does not disqualify that claim from being a minor dispute within the RLA’s ambit. The thrust of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is that Amtrak deviated from its policies when dealing with her. While Plaintiff’s allegations as to her own treatment are factual, those concerning Amtrak’s policies directly implicate the relevant CBA between Plaintiff’s union, SMART, and Amtrak. That some of Plaintiff’s interpretive disagreements concern the Drug-Free Program does not alter the character of her claim. View "Dawn Polk v. Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a subcontractor for Forney Enterprises, a contractor working for the Pentagon. Forney Enterprises was bonded through the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland. Plaintiff worked as a project manager for Forney Enterprises, supervising others who engaged in manual labor. After Forney Enterprises’ work at the Pentagon was terminated, Plaintiff sued Fidelity to recover the value of the work he had not been paid for. The district court found that his supervisory work did not qualify as “labor” and granted summary judgment for Fidelity.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Under the Miller Act, contractors hired to work on government projects are required to furnish bonds to pay those who provided labor and were not paid as a result of a dispute. But not all work on a government project qualifies as “labor” under the Miller Act. And even when the work qualifies as labor, to claim his piece of the bond, a laborer must sue within one year of completing the labor to recover. Here, the court found that much of Plaintiff’s work was “labor,” the only work he performed within one year of filing suit, a materials inventory, was not “labor.” And no circumstances warrant estopping Fidelity from asserting the statute of limitations. View "Elliot Dickson v. Fidelity and Deposit Company" on Justia Law

Current or former Uber drivers from different states agreed to Uber’s “Technology Services Agreement” as a condition of using Uber’s platform. The agreement requires drivers to resolve disputes with Uber on an individual basis through final and binding arbitration. Drivers may opt-out by sending Uber an email or letter. Singh’s class action alleged Uber had violated New Jersey wage and hour laws by misclassifying drivers as independent contractors, failing to pay them the minimum wage, and failing to reimburse them for business expenses. Calabrese’s class action, which was joined to Singh’s, sought to proceed collectively under the Fair Labor Standards Act.The district court ruled in Uber’s favor, compelling arbitration, having defined the relevant class as Uber drivers nationwide. The court found that interstate "rides constitute just 2% of all rides, resemble in character the other 98% of rides, and likely occur due to the happenstance of geography” for purposes of the exception in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) for arbitration agreements contained in the “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” 9 U.S.C. 1. The Third Circuit affirmed. The drivers' work is centered on local transportation. Most Uber drivers have never made an interstate trip. When Uber drivers do cross state lines, they do so only incidentally. They are not “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” View "Singh v. Uber Technologies, Inc" on Justia Law

When she was hired by Kindercare, Westmoreland signed a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement Regarding Wages and Hours,” including a “Waiver of Class and Collective Claims” and a “Savings Clause & Conformity Clause,” stating that if the Waiver of Class and Collective Claims is found to be unenforceable, the agreement is invalid and any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in court. Kindercare terminated Westmoreland. She filed suit asserting violations of the Labor Code, on an individual and class action basis. Kindercare successfully moved to compel arbitration of Westmoreland’s individual non-PAGA (Private Attorneys General Act) claims, and to stay her PAGA claim. The court of appeal concluded that the unenforceable PAGA waiver was not severable and rendered the entire agreement unenforceable. The California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Kindercare’s petitions for review. Kindercare filed a “Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration of Non-PAGA Claims and Stay PAGA Claims Based on New Law” citing a July 2021 California decision, “Western Bagel.”The court of appeal affirmed, noting that an order denying a renewed motion is not appealable but exercising its discretion to hear the matter as a petition for writ of mandate. Western Bagel is not “new law” that justifies a different decision. As a consequence of Kindercare’s drafting decisions, the agreement is invalid by operation of the unambiguous “Savings Clause and Conformity Clause.” Kindercare must litigate all of Westmoreland’s claims in court. View "Westmoreland v. Kindercare Education LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants as to some of Plaintiff's claims and the judgment entered on the defense verdicts on Plaintiff's remaining defamation claims, holding that Plaintiff had not shown grounds for reversal.Plaintiff, the former principal at St. Joseph's Catholic School, brought this action against Father Josephs Pins, St. Joseph's Church, and the Diocese of Des Moines after her employment was terminated, alleging fraud and defamation by all defendants and breach of contract against Father Pins. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's fraud, breach of contract, and defamation claims, and then a jury returned defense verdicts on the remaining defamation claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to reversal on his allegations of error. View "Konchar v. Pins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part an order of the court of appeals in this jurisdictional dispute, holding that the Corporate Defendants intentionally reached out to North Carolina to conduct business activities in the state, and the claims at issue in this case arose from or were related to those activities.After Plaintiff was officially terminated from his employment he brought an action against Individual and Corporate Defendants alleging, inter alia, fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Defendants moved to dismiss the action. The trial court denied the motions. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Corporate Defendants' activities alone were not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction and that Plaintiff's claims did not arise out of, or even relate to, the alleged contacts between Defendants and North Carolina. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision as to Corporate Defendants, affirmed with respect to Individual Defendants, and remanded, holding that the trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants pursuant to the Due Process Clause. View "Schaeffer v. SingleCare Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case stemming from a labor dispute between a union and city, holding that remand was required to establish whether the city complied with Local Government Code Chapter 174's compensation standards.When the City of Houston and the Houston Professional Fire Fighters' Association, Local 341 could not agree to an employment contract the Fire Fighters sued the City for compensation under the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act, codified in Chapter 174, claiming that the City failed to meet Chapter 174's compensation standards. Thereafter, the City's voters approved the "pay-parity amendment" amending the City's charter. The Houston Police Officers' Union sued the Fire Fighters seeking a declaration that Chapter 174 preempted the pay-parity amendment, rendering it unenforceable. In the first action, the trial court rejected the constitutional and immunity challenges brought by the City, and the court of appeals affirmed. In the second action, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that state law did not preempt the amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed as to the initial suit and reversed as to the second suit, holding (1) Chapter 174 does not violate constitutional separation of powers principles; (2) the Fire Fighters met the prerequisites for seeking Chapter 174 enforcement; and (3) Chapter 174 preempts the pay-parity amendment. View "City of Houston v. Houston Professional Fire Fighters' Ass'n, Local 341" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Uber under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), claiming Uber willfully misclassified him as an independent contractor rather than an employee, which led to numerous other Labor Code violations. In response, Uber moved to compel arbitration under the “Arbitration Provision” in the “Technology Services Agreement” (TSA).The trial court denied Uber's motion and the Second Appellate District affirmed. However, in June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision when it granted Uber's petition for certiorari in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213 L.Ed.2d 179] (Viking River).Following this posture, the Second Appellate District held 1.) the TSA’s PAGA Waiver is invalid and must be severed from the Arbitration Provision; 2.) under the Arbitration Provision’s remaining terms, Plaintiff must resolve his claim for civil penalties based on Labor Code violations he allegedly suffered in arbitration, and his claims for penalties based on violations allegedly suffered by other current and former employees must be litigated in court; and 3.) under California law, Plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue his non-individual claims in court simply because his individual claim must be arbitrated. View "Gregg v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part the circuit court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Milwaukee Police Supervisors Organization (MPSO) and Milwaukee Professional Firefighters' Association Local 215 (Local 215) in this challenge to a shift in policy by the Milwaukee Employees' Retirement System (MERS), holding that the circuit court properly granted Local 215's motion for summary judgment.Under the Milwaukee City Charter, MERS must pay an eligible beneficiary for duty disability retirement (DDR) a percentage of the "current annual salary for such position which he held at the time of such injury." At issue in this case was the meaning of "current annual salary." In reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Local 215, the court of appeals concluded that DDR recipients cannot receive a pension offset payment. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the charter, read alongside the relevant collective bargaining agreement, requires MERS to include a 5.8 percent pension offset payment in the "current annual salary" used to calculate DDR benefits for beneficiaries hired before October 3, 2011. View "Milwaukee Police Supervisors Organization v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law