Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Union, representing certain employees at ExxonMobil's Baton Rouge refinery and chemical plant, brought suit to compel ExxonMobil to arbitrate two labor grievances pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The court held that it was within the province of the courts to decide whether "a good faith claim by one party that the other party had violated a written provision" of the bargaining agreement had been asserted. The court also held that, in light of the clairty of the parties' agreement, the Union's claim that ExxonMobil violated Section 1131 of the agreement when the language of that section explicitly authorized its actions was not colorable and could not constitute a good faith claim within the meaning of the arbitration clause. The court agreed with ExxonMobil that Baton Rouge Oil & Chemical Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp foreclosed reliance on Section 1151 of the agreement as an independent basis for the arbitrability of the contracting-out grievance. The court further held that for the same reasons that the court held that the contracting-out grievance was not arbitrable under Section 1151, Section 1151 could not serve as a basis for requiring arbitration of the post-reduction claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the Union's motion for summary judgment with regard to the contracting-out grievance, affirmed the district court's denial of the Union's motion for summary judgment with regard to the post-reduction grievance, and reversed the district court's denial of ExxonMobil's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff, employee, brought an action against Defendants, an archdiocese and a parish pastor, claiming that their refusal to renew her contract for employment as the principal of the parish school constituted, inter alia, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach of implied contract and breach of promissory estoppel. The trial court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss the action on the ground that adjudication of Plaintiff's claims called for impermissible judicial interference in the internal governance of the archdiocese with respect to its selection of religious leaders. At issue on appeal was whether the ministerial exception to judicial authority that precludes a court from adjudicating certain religious disputes required dismissal of the action. The Supreme Court first determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, and then reversed the trial court, holding that (1) in considering whether the ministerial exception is applicable in a particular case, a Connecticut state court must follow the Rweyemamu v. Cote standard; and (2) the ministerial exception applied to the various claims in the plaintiff's complaint. Remanded with direction to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.

In 1996, when their company (LS&H) was bought out, defendants signed confidentiality and non-competition agreements for a term of "12 months after termination of my employment with LS&H;" each was paid $2,500 for signing the agreements, which were assignable and contemplated the sale. Each defendant accepted employment with the buyer, but refused to sign a new noncompetition agreement. They continued to work, even after the buyer merged with OfficeMax, until they were terminated in 2009 and 2010. Each found work doing essentially what they had done in the past. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from selling office supplies. The First Circuit vacated. The contract is unambiguous; the triggering date for the noncompetition provision is termination of employment from LS&H. OfficeMax has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

This case arose because the settlement of a personal-injury suit brought by a recipient of workers' compensation benefits against a third-party tortfeasor did not make any provision to repay the statutory subrogee, the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The Bureau brought suit against both the recipient of the workers' compensation benefits and third-party tortfeasor under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.931(G) to recover the full amount of its subrogation interest. The trial court held that a two-year limitations period applied and that it had expired. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a six-year limitations period applied and that it had not yet run out. At issue on appeal was whether a claim under section 4123.931(G) brought by a statutory subrogee to recover its subrogation interest is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, the same period applicable to the injured worker's personal-injury suit against the third party, or to a six-year statute of limitations for an action on a liability created by statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the claim in this case was an action upon a liability created by statute and that the statute of limitations was six years.

In this appeal, accounting firm Bryan Brothers sought coverage under a professional liability insurance policy issued by Continental Casualty Company for liability arising from illegal acts of a former Bryan Brother's employee. Under the policy, it was a condition precedent to coverage that no insured had knowledge, prior to the inception of the policy, of an act that was reasonably likely to become the basis for a claim. The court held that because Bryan Brothers had such knowledge, the claims at issue were not covered. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Continental Casualty Company.

Plaintiff sued her employer under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. 363A.01-43, and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-54, and asserted other state common law claims including breach of employment contract. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the dismissal of her breach of contract claim with prejudice, the denials of her motions for leave to amend her complaint, the denial of her motion for consideration, and the adverse grant of her MHRA and FMLA claims by the district court. The court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's arguments because any error with respect to the dismissal of the breach of employment contract claim was harmless where plaintiff resigned from her employment with the county and failed to generate a genuine issue of fact as to constructive discharge in the context of her MHRA reprisal claim. The court also held that because plaintiff failed to generate an issue of fact as to whether she suffered a materially adverse employment action, summary judgment was appropriate as to her MHRA retaliation claim. The court further held that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiff's FMLA interference claim where plaintiff did not contest the district court's finding that she received the full twelve weeks of FMLA leave to which she was entitled each year she requested it. The court finally held that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim where she failed to generate an issue of fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action.

The company terminated plaintiff's employment in 2008 because he failed to meet his sales quota. A suit for unpaid wages under Wisconsin's wage-claim statute, alternatively seeking recovery under equitable contract doctrines, was rejected and the district court denied leave to amend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although plaintiff was an at-will employee, his commission-based compensation was the subject of an express contract, which, under Wisconsin law, precludes quasi-contractual relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because the motion came unjustifiably late.

This matter involved the interpretation of a limited liability company operating agreement. Petitioner (Showell) was a member of an accounting firm (Hoyt) and respondents (Pusey and Hatter) were the remaining members of the LLC at the time. In early 2007, Showell "retired" from Hoyt. Showell subsequently asked the court to construe the provisions of the Hoyt Operating Agreement to determine what value, if any, Showell was due for his interest in Hoyt as a consequence of his departure from the company. The court held that Showell was entitled to receive his share of the liquidation value of Hoyt as of the date of his "retirement" from the company.

This case arose when plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer, claiming that his failure to pay her a referral fee was a breach of contract and violated the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, sections 148, 150. At issue was whether a 2008 amendment to the enforcement section of the Wage Act, providing for a mandatory award of treble damages to a prevailing employee, should be applied in an action brought by an employee against her employer for violation of the Wage Act before the amendment's effective date. The court held that the amendment should be read to apply only prospectively, to claims arising on or after the amendment's effective date of July 12, 2008. Therefore, because the Superior Court judge applied the amendment retrospectively, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff was hired as a nurse by defendant in October 2006, had to take leave for cancer treatment, then was informed that she had been terminated on December 12, 2006 because she did not have "any accrued PTO time or FMLA." The district court dismissed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, finding that plaintiff assented to a valid agreement to arbitrate the claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The employee handbook stated: "Dispute Resolution Process Please refer to the Eby Companies Dispute Resolution Procedure (DRP) for details." That policy does refer to arbitration and contains a signature line. Plaintiff claims she did not receive or sign the policy and defendant did not provide a signed acknowledgment. There was no indication that plaintiff was notified of the existence of the arbitration agreement, much less that she manifested an intent to agree to its terms.