Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court requiring Timothy Day to pay NuVasive, Inc., his former employer, more than $1.7 million in damages and attorney's fees for breach of contract and spoliation of evidence, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.NuVasive brought suit against Day making claims arising from Day's business interactions with NuVasive's customers on behalf of Alphatec Spine, Inc., Day's new employer, in violation of non-competition and non-solicitation obligations in Day's contract with NuVasive. After the district court entered its final judgment Day appealed, arguing that the court erred in finding the requisite causal nexus between Day's improper solicitations and the decisions of certain NuVasive customers to switch to Alphatec as their primary supplier of spine-related surgical products. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error in the damages award or the sanctions-based award of attorney's fees and costs. View "NuVasive, Inc. v. Day" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Tug Hill Operating, LLC, for approximately a year and a half at rig sites in West Virginia. He commenced an action against Tug Hill under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that while Tug Hill formally classified him as an independent contractor, he actually qualified as an employee for purposes of the FLSA based on the degree of control that Tug Hill exercised over his work. He, therefore, claimed that Tug Hill was required to pay him overtime for those weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours. Tug Hill filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action on the ground that Plaintiff was contractually required to arbitrate his claim against it. In addition, RigUp itself filed a motion to intervene in order to seek the action’s dismissal in favor of arbitration. The district court granted both motions.   The Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings and remanded. The court explained that the numerous provisions in the Agreement preclude any conclusion that the Agreement was entered into solely or directly for the benefit of Tug Hill, such that Tug Hill could enforce it as a third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Tug Hill’s motion to dismiss and compelling Plaintiff, under the arbitration agreement between him and RigUp, to proceed to arbitration with respect to his FLSA claim against Tug Hill. Moreover, the court explained that because RigUp’s agreement with Plaintiff expressly disclaimed any interest in any litigation, Plaintiff might have with a company in Tug Hill’s position RigUp cannot now opportunistically claim that intervention is necessary. View "Lastephen Rogers v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are twenty-six former employees of International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) who signed separation agreements requiring them to arbitrate any claims arising from their termination by IBM. The agreements set a deadline for initiating arbitration and included a confidentiality requirement. Plaintiffs missed the deadline but nonetheless tried to arbitrate claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”). Their arbitrations were dismissed as untimely. They then sued IBM in district court, seeking a declaration that the deadline is unenforceable because it does not incorporate the “piggybacking rule,” a judge-made exception to the ADEA’s administrative exhaustion requirements. Shortly after filing suit, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and attached various documents obtained by Plaintiffs’ counsel in other confidential arbitration proceedings. IBM moved to seal the confidential documents. The district court granted IBM’s motions to dismiss and seal the documents. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that (1) the filing deadline in their separation agreements is unenforceable and (2) the district court abused its discretion by granting IBM’s motion to seal.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court first wrote that the piggybacking rule does not apply to arbitration and, in any event, it is not a substantive right under the ADEA. Second, the court held that the presumption of public access to judicial documents is outweighed here by the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) strong policy in favor of enforcing arbitral confidentiality provisions and the impropriety of counsel’s attempt to evade the agreement by attaching confidential documents to a premature motion for summary judgment. View "In re IBM Arb. Agreement Litig." on Justia Law

Andrew Hennessey appealed a district court order dismissing with prejudice his action against the Milnor School District (“District”). The District employed Hennessey as a teacher for the 2021-2022 school year. In October 2021, the District placed Hennessey on paid administrative leave for immoral conduct and conduct unbecoming his position. The District requested Hennessey sign a resignation letter, which would have immediately terminated his employment, salary, and benefits. He declined to sign the resignation letter and requested an administrative hearing. The District then converted Hennessey’s leave from paid to unpaid leave and recommended his dismissal for cause. Hennessey subsequently signed a severance agreement providing him salary through October 2021 and insurance benefits through December 2021, and waiving his rights to challenge the dismissal. He later learned through an open records request that the District’s legal counsel had advised the District in an email, in part, to convert his leave to unpaid to have “some leverage over this guy.” In December 2022, Hennessey filed this action seeking to rescind the agreement’s release and waiver section to allow him to challenge his dismissal. He claimed the District exerted undue financial pressure on him to secure the waiver of his rights to an administrative hearing and to challenge his termination in district court when it converted his paid leave to unpaid leave. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding Hennessey failed to allege facts sufficient to support rescinding a contract for undue influence under N.D.C.C. § 9-09-02. View "Hennessey v. Milnor School District" on Justia Law

Bazemore, a Papa John’s delivery driver, sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that the company had under-reimbursed his vehicle expenses. Papa John’s moved to compel arbitration, attaching a declaration from its “Director of People Services” that Papa John’s requires all new employees to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. She asserted that Bazemore signed the agreement electronically on October 10, 2019, by signing in using a user ID and password, then scrolling through the entire agreement and checking a box in order to sign. Bazemore swore under penalty of perjury that he “had never seen” the agreement and that he had seen his manager login for Bazemore and other delivery drivers “to complete training materials” for them. The court denied Bazemore’s request for targeted discovery as to whether he had actually signed the agreement and granted the motion to compel arbitration.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, the party seeking arbitration must prove that such an agreement exists. Kentucky law governs whether Bazemore entered into an agreement and provides that an electronic signature is legally valid only when “made by the action of the person the signature purports to represent”—which is a question of fact. Bazemore’s testimony that he never saw the agreement was enough to create a genuine issue as to whether he signed it. View "Bazemore v. Papa John's U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiff and declaring that the City of Woonsocket improperly terminated Plaintiff's employment with the Woonsocket Police Department in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 42-28.6-4 of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), holding that there was no error.The order appealed from declared that the city's termination of Plaintiff's employment was unlawful in violation of section 42-28.6-4 of the LEOBOR and that the City must comply with LEOBOR's procedural requirements if it wished to terminate Plaintiff's employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice properly determined that the City improperly terminated Plaintiff's employment and improperly deprived him of the requisite notice and hearing. View "Sosa v. City of Woonsocket" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff twice lost out on a promotion, she sued Union Pacific for discrimination. The question is whether a dispute over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement required dismissal. Union Pacific to sought dismissal under the Railway Labor Act, see 45 U.S.C. Section 151, et seq., which requires disputes over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement to go to arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties agree that this case does not involve an attempt to “form” or “secure” a collective-bargaining agreement, so it does not fall into the major-dispute category. In a failure-to-promote case like this one, Plaintiff must establish that (1) she “was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified and applied for a promotion to a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) she was not promoted; and (4) similarly situated employees, not part of the protected group, were promoted instead.” The sticking point is whether she actually applied for either promotion: she says she did, but Union Pacific disagreed. Whether faxed resumes count as applications under the collective-bargaining agreement is something she will have to prove to establish her prima-facie case. Perhaps the best evidence of its importance was the prominent role it played at trial, especially in the questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney. In these circumstances, the issue is one for the National Railroad Adjustment Board to decide. View "Nancy Avina v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court awarding attorneys' fees after a medical doctor sued and lost against a hospital following its revocation of the doctor's medical staff and surgical privileges, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.Doctor, a surgeon, sued Hospital after his termination stemming from allegations that Doctor provided care that fell short of standard surgical practice. After a remand, all of Doctor's claims were dismissed. Thereafter, the circuit court awarded Hospital attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion for attorneys' fees was timely filed; and (2) Doctor was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Williams v. Baptist Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissing his complaint pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), holding that the superior court did not err.Plaintiff, a former employee of the City of East Providence, attempted to rescind an agreement he made with the City regarding, among other things, his retirement benefits and the issuance of a corrected W-2 to reflect his injured-on-duty status. The trial judge entered judgment for the City. Plaintiff then filed a complaint and petition for a writ of mandamus against his union asking the superior court to abrogate agreement regarding the period of his injured-on-duty status. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) several of Plaintiff's arguments were waived; and (2) this case was barred by res judicata. View "Jenkins v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this employment discrimination suit ruling that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable and affirming the order of the trial court denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.After Petitioner terminated Respondent's employment Respondent sued for race discrimination and retaliation under federal and state law. Petitioner moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement signed by Respondent when he was hired. Respondent opposed the motion, arguing that the agreement was unconscionable. The trial court denied the motion to compel, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the agreement was unconscionable. View "Houston AN USA, LLC v. Shattenkirk" on Justia Law