Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Gove worked for TDC, which had a contract with Loring. TDC employees were informed that CSD had been awarded the Loring contract and would be providing services previously furnished by TDC. Gove applied online for a CSD position, similar to the one that she held with TDC. The application included a provision that any dispute with respect to any issue prior to employment, arising out of the employment process, would resolved in accord with the Dispute Resolution Policy and Arbitration Agreement adopted by CSD for its employees. When Gove was interviewed by CSD, she was visibly pregnant and was asked whether she had other children. Gove was not hired, although CSD continued to have a need for the position and continued to advertise the position. Gove filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which found reasonable grounds, but was unable to persuade the parties to reach agreement. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Maine Human Rights Act. CSD moved to compel arbitration. The district court found that the arbitration clause was ambiguous as to whether it covered an applicant who was never hired and should be construed against CSD. The First Circuit affirmed.

The Douglas County Health Center Security Union (Union) filed a petition before the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that its employer, Douglas County (County), had engaged in certain prohibited practices. The CIR found the County had engaged in a prohibited practice when it failed to negotiate its intention to contract out bargaining unit work to a private security company. The CIR ordered the parties to recommence negotiation and awarded the Union attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the CIR with directions to vacate its order and dismiss the Union's petition, holding that the issue of the subcontracting of bargaining unit jobs resulting in the elimination of bargaining unit jobs was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between the County and Union and presented an issue of contract interpretation over which the CIR lacked jurisdiction.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against St. Patrick Congregation, alleging that her employment was terminated for an improper reason. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, concluding that because St. Patrick was a religious institution and Plaintiff was a ministerial employee, Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court may not review whether St. Patrick improperly terminated its ministerial employee because St. Patrick's choice of who shall serve as its ministerial employee is a matter of church governance protected from state interference by the First Amendment and by Wis. Const. art. I, 18; and (2) accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which a court may grant relief.

This case concerned a circuit court's order to transfer to a tribal court a civil suit that was brought against a tribally owned entity by a nonmember of the tribe. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it transferred the action to tribal court. At issue was the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 801.54, which authorizes the circuit court, in its discretion, to transfer an action to the tribal court and sets forth the conditions for doing so. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts and the applicable law were not fully stated and considered together in making the determinations that the statute requires, the order to transfer was an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion. Remanded.

Petitioner Leandre Layton, on behalf of himself and the similarly-situated members of his conditionally-certified class (collectively, "Drivers"), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DHL Express, Inc. ("DHL") on his claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). DHL contracted with Sky Land Express, Inc. to manage local parcel deliveries. Petitioner worked on DHL routes for Sky Land. Petitioner filed his collective action for unpaid overtime, naming DHL, Sky Land and Gary Littlefield (owner and president of Sky Land) as his joint employers and defendants to the suit. DHL moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not the drivers' employer. The district court granted DHL's motion: "DHL did everything it could possibly do to relate to Sky Land only as an "independent contractor[."] The contract with Sky Land allowed DHL to exercise only the minimal supervision necessary to monitor compliance with the contract. The undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that if plaintiffs were employed by anybody, they were employed by Sky Land, the entity that they ostentatiously dismissed as a defendant, for reasons this court can only guess at. DHL was not an employer, much less a joint employer." After a thorough examination of the realities of the economic relationship between Drivers and DHL, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the grounds that DHL was not a joint employer of the Drivers.

Defendant Brown University appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Beverly Haviland in her action for declaratory relief. The issue arose over placement of Haviland in a tenured teaching position as a condition to the employment contract her husband, another tenured professor would receive. The husband would not accept a position with Brown unless the university made room for his plaintiff. Through a series of letters ad negotiations, plaintiff accepted Brown's offer of employment. When her contract was due for renewal, issues arose over promises made in those letters and negotiations that became the subject of this dispute. Brown contended that there was no justiciable issue in this case because plaintiff could not demonstrate an injury in fact, as she did not face any actual or imminent loss of employment. Brown also asserted that the trial justice erred in determining the existence of an implied-in-fact contract between the plaintiff and Brown because insufficient evidence was presented to establish an enforceable promise of de facto tenure. Further, Brown contended that no tenure-like standard of review applied to plaintiff because only the Brown Corporation was vested with the authority to grant tenure and none of the University administrators who communicated with plaintiff were vested with actual or apparent authority to provide the plaintiff with de facto tenure. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Brown's arguments and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in this case.

Appellees entered into performance and stock agreements with their employer, appellant ONEOK, Inc. The agreements required Appellees to continue their employment for three years (performance period) in order to receive the full number of shares, but allowed pro rata payments if Appellees' employment terminated under certain conditions. After Appellees left ONEOK's employment before the earliest performance period ended, ONEOK denied Appellees' claims for pro rata payments under the agreements. Appellees sued ONEOK for breach of contract. The district court found for Appellees and awarded Appellees money damages equal to each of their pro rata shares under the agreements, and denied their request for attorney fees. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the denial of attorney fees, holding that the district court erred in determining Appellees were not entitled to attorney fees under the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act (NWPCA). Remanded for a determination of the amount of the attorney fees award under the NWPCA.

David Day, an ERISA plan beneficiary, elected to roll over his pension benefits into an individual retirement account (IRA) upon separation from his employer, AT&T. Exercising its discretion, the plan's claims administrator construed Day's lump sum rollover as the equivalent of his having "received" his pension benefits and, according to the terms of AT&T's Disability Income Benefit Plan, reduced Day's long-term disability (LTD) benefits by the amount of the rollover. The district court entered judgment in favor of the plan. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the administrator reasonably interpreted the plan; (2) AT&T did not breach its fiduciary duties by failing to disclose the possibility that Petitioner's LTD benefits would be reduced by his receipt of pension benefits; and (3) the administrator's actions did not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award.

After a school district (District) approved the conversion of an existing public school into a charter school, a union (UTLA) claimed that the District failed to comply with collective bargaining agreement provisions (CBPs) concerning charter school conversion. UTLA petitioned to compel arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the collective bargaining provisions (CBPs) regulating charter school conversion were unlawful because they conflicted with the Education Code, and therefore, arbitration of those unlawful provisions should not be compelled. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the court's function in adjudicating a petition to compel arbitration was limited to determining whether there was a valid arbitration agreement that had not been waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court faced with a petition to compel arbitration to enforce CBPs between a union and a school district should deny the petition if the CBPs at issue directly conflict with provisions of the Education Code; and (2) because UTLA had not identified with sufficient specificity which CBPs the District allegedly violated, the case was remanded for identification of those specific provisions and to address whether the provisions conflicted with the Education Code.