Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Ruth Mendenhall appealed a summary judgment in favor of Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford on her equitable garnishment claim seeking insurance coverage for the death of her husband, Len Mendenhall. The trial court's judgment was premised on the conclusion that Len was an "employee" under the terms of the Hartford policy and, therefore, was excluded from coverage. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, given the facts of this case and the policy language, Len was not an "employee" but was instead a "temporary worker" subject to coverage under the terms of the Hartford policy. View "Mendenhall v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals withdrew its previous opinion in this case filed on April 20, 2012. Because the case involved important and determinative questions of Texas law as to which there was no controlling Texas Supreme Court precedent, the Court substituted its previous opinion with the following questions to the Supreme Court of Texas: (1) whether, under Texas law, at-will employees may bring fraud claims against their employers for loss of their employment; and (2) if question number one is answered in the negative, whether employees covered under a sixty-day cancellation-upon-notice collective bargaining agreement that limits the employer's ability to discharge its employees only for just cause may bring Texas fraud claims against their employer based on allegations that the employer fraudulently induced them to terminate their employment. View "Sawyer v. E I DuPont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

DiPonio Construction entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Union, which it subsequently terminated according to the terms of the agreement. DiPonio refused to bargain for a new agreement and sought a declaratory judgment. The district court held that even if it possibly had concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board to decide this issue, it would be inappropriate to exercise it, and imposed sanctions (attorney fees) against DiPonio under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ultimate issue is whether the CBA was entered into pursuant to section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(f), or section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(a). If the CBA was a section 8 contract, DiPonio had no duty to negotiate for a new CBA; however, if it is a section 9(a) contract it did. DiPonio’s claims are clearly “primarily representational” and fall within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.

The Union established two funds for its members—a Pension Fund and a Health & Welfare Fund. DLF entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Union, under which DLF agreed to be bound to all Collective Bargaining Agreements between the Union and various employer associations in the geographical jurisdiction of the Union. Under the CBA, DLF is required to make fringe benefit contributions to the Funds on behalf of members of the Union. An audit of DLF’s payroll records showed that DLF had failed to make contributions on behalf of Mata, a cement mason who also performed other work (such as painting), for 1,119.5 hours in 2007 and for 234.5 hours in 2008, a total $11,955.05 in fringe benefit contributions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Funds, The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejecting DLF’s argument that, under the MOA, it is not contractually bound to make contributions for non-bargaining unit work. The MOA binds DLF to the CBAs and establishes the type of employee covered under the CBA. It was not intended to, and does not, define bargaining unit work for purposes of fringe benefit contributions.

NuVasive alleges that Lanx improperly persuaded NuVasive employees and a NuVasive consultant to leave NuVasive and work for Lanx instead, in breach of agreements that the employees had with NuVasive, to misappropriate NuVasive’s trade secrets and other proprietary information. Both are medical corporations. NuVasive claimed unfair competition, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with prospective contractual relations, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Lanx argued that the former NuVasive employees were necessary and indispensable parties to the action because NuVasive’s claims are predicated upon their acts. The chancellor declined to dismiss. While the former employees’ interests are not adequately protected by Lanx, the chancellor reasoned that a remedy could be crafted to avoid prejudice to their interests. The former employees were not indispensable to the misappropriation claim.

Gove worked for TDC, which had a contract with Loring. TDC employees were informed that CSD had been awarded the Loring contract and would be providing services previously furnished by TDC. Gove applied online for a CSD position, similar to the one that she held with TDC. The application included a provision that any dispute with respect to any issue prior to employment, arising out of the employment process, would resolved in accord with the Dispute Resolution Policy and Arbitration Agreement adopted by CSD for its employees. When Gove was interviewed by CSD, she was visibly pregnant and was asked whether she had other children. Gove was not hired, although CSD continued to have a need for the position and continued to advertise the position. Gove filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which found reasonable grounds, but was unable to persuade the parties to reach agreement. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Maine Human Rights Act. CSD moved to compel arbitration. The district court found that the arbitration clause was ambiguous as to whether it covered an applicant who was never hired and should be construed against CSD. The First Circuit affirmed.

The Douglas County Health Center Security Union (Union) filed a petition before the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that its employer, Douglas County (County), had engaged in certain prohibited practices. The CIR found the County had engaged in a prohibited practice when it failed to negotiate its intention to contract out bargaining unit work to a private security company. The CIR ordered the parties to recommence negotiation and awarded the Union attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the CIR with directions to vacate its order and dismiss the Union's petition, holding that the issue of the subcontracting of bargaining unit jobs resulting in the elimination of bargaining unit jobs was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between the County and Union and presented an issue of contract interpretation over which the CIR lacked jurisdiction.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against St. Patrick Congregation, alleging that her employment was terminated for an improper reason. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, concluding that because St. Patrick was a religious institution and Plaintiff was a ministerial employee, Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court may not review whether St. Patrick improperly terminated its ministerial employee because St. Patrick's choice of who shall serve as its ministerial employee is a matter of church governance protected from state interference by the First Amendment and by Wis. Const. art. I, 18; and (2) accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which a court may grant relief.

This case concerned a circuit court's order to transfer to a tribal court a civil suit that was brought against a tribally owned entity by a nonmember of the tribe. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it transferred the action to tribal court. At issue was the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 801.54, which authorizes the circuit court, in its discretion, to transfer an action to the tribal court and sets forth the conditions for doing so. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts and the applicable law were not fully stated and considered together in making the determinations that the statute requires, the order to transfer was an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion. Remanded.

Petitioner Leandre Layton, on behalf of himself and the similarly-situated members of his conditionally-certified class (collectively, "Drivers"), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DHL Express, Inc. ("DHL") on his claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). DHL contracted with Sky Land Express, Inc. to manage local parcel deliveries. Petitioner worked on DHL routes for Sky Land. Petitioner filed his collective action for unpaid overtime, naming DHL, Sky Land and Gary Littlefield (owner and president of Sky Land) as his joint employers and defendants to the suit. DHL moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not the drivers' employer. The district court granted DHL's motion: "DHL did everything it could possibly do to relate to Sky Land only as an "independent contractor[."] The contract with Sky Land allowed DHL to exercise only the minimal supervision necessary to monitor compliance with the contract. The undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that if plaintiffs were employed by anybody, they were employed by Sky Land, the entity that they ostentatiously dismissed as a defendant, for reasons this court can only guess at. DHL was not an employer, much less a joint employer." After a thorough examination of the realities of the economic relationship between Drivers and DHL, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the grounds that DHL was not a joint employer of the Drivers.