Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

From 2002 through 2004, George Harper and his law firm at that time, Jackson Lewis, represented EnerSys Delaware, Inc. in a variety of employment and labor law matters. Harper served as EnerSys' attorney of record in at least five employment-related lawsuits during this time. The relationship between Jackson Lewis and EnerSys deteriorated in 2004 when EnerSys brought a malpractice claim against the firm based on some labor-related legal advice that it claimed resulted in fraudulent testimony. In 2011, EnerSys filed this suit against a former EnerSys employee, Tammy Hopkins, alleging six causes of action including breach of contract based on violations of the confidentiality agreement and various computer use policies and agreements, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. When EnerSys learned that Hopkins had retained Harper to represent her, it moved to have him disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Harper's previous assistance in developing EnerSys' litigation strategy was insufficient grounds upon which to disqualify him due to the dissimilarities of his previous representations and the current suit. EnerSys then filed this appeal. This case presented the question of whether the denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court held it was not and dismissed the case as interlocutory. View "EnerSys Delaware v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Pagliara, a licensed securities broker for more than 25 years, maintained a spotless record with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) except for this case. Under a 2002 licensing agreement, Pagliara served both Capital Trust and NBC until 2008. During that time, Butler followed Pagliara’s recommendation to invest $100,000 in bank stocks that later lost value. Butler’s attorney threatened to sue NBC and Pagliara. NBC retained JBPR for defense. Unbeknownst to NBC and JBPR, Pagliara offered to settle the claim for $14,900, $100 below FINRA’s mandatory reporting threshold. Butler refused. Pagliara then informed NBC of his intent to defend the claim in FINRA Arbitration and objected to any settlement of the “frivolous claim.” NBC insisted that Pagliara not have any contact with Butler, based on the License Agreement signed by the parties, which stated that: “NBCS, at its sole option and without the prior approval of either [Capital Trust] or the applicable Representative, may settle or compromise any claim at any time.” JBPR finalized a $30,000 settlement without obtaining a release for Pagliara. Pagliara sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and intentional infliction of harm. The district court rejected the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Pagliara v. Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose, LLP" on Justia Law

Insured was injured in an accident. Insured's policy with Insurer included uninsured motorist (UM) bodily injury coverage and personal injury protection (PIP) coverage. Insured's Employer's third-party workers' compensation (WC) administrator asserted a subrogation right against any PIP or UM recovery by Insured. At issue in this case was the correct interpretation of Md. Code Ins. 19-513. The district court asked the Court of Appeals to determine whether section 19-513(e) requires an insurance company to deduct WC benefits payable to an insured for UM and PIP when the insured has not reimbursed its provider and the insured intends to reimburse the WC provider in the future. The Court of Appeals held (1) under the plain meaning of section 19-513(e), an insured's benefits payable under UM and PIP coverage shall be reduced to the extent that the insured recovered benefits under WC and the WC provider has not been reimbursed; and (2) if the applicable workers' compensation law treats "write-downs" of medical bills as WC benefits, and the WC benefits have not been reimbursed, then the insurer shall deduct those benefits, calculated as discounts, from its benefits payable to the insured under section 19-513(e). View "Travco Ins. Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff began working for Defendant as a salesperson in 2005. Defendant resigned from his employment in 2010 and signed a separation agreement before his departure. Defendant initially paid Plaintiff pursuant to the separation agreement but then claimed it had paid Plaintiff more than it agreed to and stopped payment on two of the checks it had issued. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for breach of contract, breach of quasi-contract, and unjust enrichment. A federal jury found that Defendant had breached its separation agreement with Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was entitled to $70,331 in quantum meruit damages from Defendant. After the jury verdict, Plaintiff moved the federal court to conclude that the the quantum meruit damages were "wages" within the meaning of 26 Me. Rev. Stat. 626. The federal court then certified a question to the Maine Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) whether a quantum meruit recovery activates the penalty provision of section 626 depends on the services rendered; (2) if the services rendered are of the type for which an employee would have been due wages, then application of section 626 to a recovery in quantum meruit is appropriate; and (3) if not, section 626 would not apply. View "Dinan v. Alpha Networks Inc." on Justia Law

Burton founded and ran companies that manufactured and distributed medical device parts. By 2006, the companies employed approximately 140 people and generated annual revenue of $14 million. In 2007, Burton sold to Teleflex and entered into a two-year employment agreement with Teleflex, providing that she could terminate her employment by providing 30 days’ written notice. Teleflex could fire Burton without cause by providing 30 days’ written notice or could fire Burton for cause, upon written notice and an opportunity to cure. Burton, then age 67, became Vice President of New Business Development, supervised by Boarini. The two had a strained relationship. During an argument, Burton asked Boarini whether he wanted her to resign. There is evidence that she stated that she was resigning, stayed out of the office for two days, then left on a previously-scheduled vacation, after which SMD “accepted” her resignation in writing. The district court granted Telefex summary judgment on claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and state law. The Third Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of fact on whether Burton resigned. View "Burton v. Teleflex Inc." on Justia Law

These three cases stemmed from a residency policy that called for employees of the City of Niagara Falls School District hired or promoted after the policy's effective date to reside in the City and maintain residency there during their employment. Here the District's Administrator for Human Resources notified three employees that they were suspected of violating the residency policy. The Board then terminated the employees' employment for failure to comply with the policy. On appeal, the Appellate Court (1) found that the District did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the employee had changed her domicile in the first case; (2) found the Board's determination was not arbitrary and capricious in the second case; and (3) determined that the third employee's termination was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals reversed in the first case, affirmed in the second case, and reversed and remanded in the third case, holding (1) the residency policy and its implementing regulations were clear and unambiguous; (2) the District's notice-and-hearing procedures easily complied with due process; and (3) in the majority of these cases, the Board's determinations were not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. View "Beck-Nichols v. Bianco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his suit alleging claims of equitable estoppel and breach of fiduciary duties pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff stated a claim for relief that was cognizable under ERISA, in light of CIGNA Corp. v. Amara. Because relief was available under the surcharge doctrine under Amara, the court did not address the equitable estoppel claim and the district court was free to consider that claim on remand. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing Defendant Entergy Mississippi where plaintiff failed to allege that Entergy Mississippi sponsored or administered the plan or made any decisions with respect to his benefits. View "Gearlds, Jr. v. Entergy Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Dean Pepper, the owner and sole shareholder of D.F. Pepper Construction (DFP) was driving one of his trucks home in the early winter morning. An icy road caused the truck to slide into Pepper's house and crash through the foundation and west wall. The house was later condemned and demolished as a result of the damage. The house was insured by Nationwide Casualty Insurance Company. Nationwide paid the loss. As subrogee of Pepper, Nationwide then sued DFP, the registered owner of the truck, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Pepper. The superior court issued judgment in favor of Nationwide, finding that Pepper had been negligent and that the antisubrogation rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

American Family appealed the district court's order denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial and awarding defendant attorney's fees pursuant to section 91A.8 of the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's Rule 15(b)(2) motion to amend the pleadings to add the IWPCL claim because the claim was tried with American Family's implied consent and the amendment did not result in prejudice to American Family. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to defendant under the IWPCL. Any error in giving jury Instruction 13A was harmless in light of the subsequently given Instruction No. 14. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hollander" on Justia Law

A group of retired firefighters and police officers who worked for the City of Columbia all elected to have group health insurance provided to them by the city. Prior to July 2009, the City paid all costs to fund the group health insurance for employees and retirees. The retirees received newsletters stating that their health insurance was free and were told by the City's human resources department that retiree health insurance would be at no cost to the retiree. In planning the 2009-2010 budget, the City considered a number of cost-saving measures including shifting part of rising health care costs to participants in the group health plan. The retirees sued under claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the retirees' causes of action. Seven of the thirteen retirees appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the retirees on their contract and estoppels claims to the extent that those claims were based on an employee handbook and benefits booklet each received when they were hired. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against the retirees on their estoppel claims based upon representations made by their supervisors and the City's human resources personnel. View "Bishop v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law